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ABSTRACT 
Human capital – the stock of knowledge and abilities possessed by employees – is consistently touted as an 
integral part of firm survival and success in dynamic environments. Managers must regularly decide how to 
allocate employees among competing tasks and projects to optimize the utilization of available knowledge, 
as well as select and implement the required structural mechanisms to support employees as they combine 
their knowledge to address complex problems on behalf of the firm. The principal motivation of this thesis is 
to explore how the effectiveness of particular aspects of organizational design in fostering the integration and 
use of human capital is bounded by individual cognitive limitations that may lead employees to deviate from 
expected behavior, both individually and in collaboration. 
The thesis consists of three research papers relying on comprehensive longitudinal project data from a 
global manufacturing company to investigate the integration of human capital and attendant consequences 
for firm performance. The first paper measures cognitive load as an outcome of managerial choices on 
employee allocation, and examines how cognitive load impacts employee choices on the distribution of 
working time among competing requirements. The second paper builds on these insights to explore how 
individuals adapt their information processing behavior in team settings based on cognitive load and the 
observed behavior of other team members, as well as how these adaptive processes and differences in 
cognitive load aggregate to impact team performance. The third paper investigates geographical and 
psychological distance between interdependent employees as important organizational design parameters 
that determine employee behavior and information use, both separately and in conjunction with one another.  
The overarching contribution of the thesis is to demonstrate, through the combination of psychological 
and organizational theory, how the ability of firms to properly activate and apply the knowledge held by their 
employees is fundamentally contingent on the interplay of cognitive limitations and managerial choices on 
organizational design. Common to the findings in this thesis is their immediate applicability in managerial 
and organizational settings as recommendations on how to allocate employees between competing uses. In 
sum, therefore, the thesis sketches the contours of a behavioral theory of human capital integration.  
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SAMMENFATNING 
Human kapital – den viden og de evner, som virksomhedens medarbejdere besidder – fremhæves ofte som 
en afgørende forudsætning for virksomheders overlevelse og succes i en dynamisk verden. Ledere må 
løbende beslutte, hvordan medarbejdere bedst allokeres blandt opgaver og projekter, således at den samlede 
viden udnyttes bedst muligt. De må samtidig sikre, at de nødvendige strukturer implementeres for at bidrage 
til medarbejdernes fælles håndtering af komplekse opgaver på vegne af virksomheden. Denne afhandling har 
til hensigt at afdække, hvorledes effektiviteten af de valgte strukturer afhænger af medarbejdernes kognitive 
begrænsninger, som ofte betyder, at medarbejdere afviger fra forventet adfærd, både individuelt og i grupper. 
Afhandlingen består af tre forskningsartikler, som bygger på omfangsrige tidsseriedata fra en global 
produktions- og udviklingsvirksomhed. Disse data anvendes til at undersøge, hvordan human kapital bringes 
i anvendelse og derigennem påvirker virksomhedens resultater. Den første artikel måler kognitiv belastning 
som resultat af ledelsesmæssige beslutninger om allokering af medarbejdere og undersøger på denne 
baggrund, hvordan kognitiv belastning påvirker medarbejders fordeling af arbejdsindsats blandt forskellige 
opgaver og konkurrerende krav. Den anden artikel bygger på disse indsigter idet den undersøger, hvordan 
medarbejdere tilpasser deres anvendelse og deling af information i grupper på baggrund af kognitiv 
belastning og andre gruppemedlemmers adfærd. Det undersøges desuden, hvordan disse gensidige 
tilpasninger og forskelle i belastning påvirker gruppens samlede resultat. Den tredje artikel undersøger, 
hvordan geografisk og psykologisk afstand mellem medarbejdere er vigtige organisatoriske parametre, som i 
fællesskab påvirker medarbejderkognition og evnen til at anvende tilgængelig information. 
Afhandlingen bidrager med afsæt i psykologisk og organisatorisk teori ved at påvise, hvorledes 
virksomheders evne til at anvende og udnytte medarbejderes viden er grundlæggende betinget af samspillet 
mellem medarbejderes kognitive begrænsninger og ledelsens beslutninger med hensyn til organisatorisk 
struktur og allokering. Fælles for afhandlingens konklusioner er, at de omsættes til konkrete anvisninger af, 
hvordan medarbejdere bedst allokeres under en række forudsætninger. Således bidrager afhandlingen til 
udviklingen af en adfærdsbetinget teori om allokeringen af medarbejderressourcer i virksomheder. 
v 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
This thesis would have remained an ambition if not for the kind help and diligent contributions of countless 
others. I am especially grateful to my supervisors, Associate Professor Marcus M. Larsen and Professor 
Torben Pedersen, both of whom have been instrumental to this achievement. To Torben; thank you for 
accepting me into the Manufacturing Academy of Denmark, for bringing me into the world of academia, and 
for your unwavering support, your intelligent advice, and your kindness. And Marcus; thank you for being 
critical and constructive, for your diligent contributions, and for motivating me, perhaps unknowingly, to 
aspire to the things that matter most.  
I wish to thank my co-authors on projects related to this thesis, Professor Marie Louise Mors, Associate 
Professor Frans Bévort, and Assistant Professor Magda Dobrajska, for valuable and inspiring collaborations. 
I am grateful to my colleagues at the Department of Strategic Management and Globalization at Copenhagen 
Business School and to Head of Department Michael Mol for his support. Thank you, as well, to PhD 
students Maitane Elorriaga Rubio, Stefan K. Sløk-Madsen, and Peter Schou for their doctoral colleagueship, 
and to Associate Professors Jacob Lyngsie and Jimmy Martinez-Correa for invaluable comments at my PhD 
pre-defense. I wish to acknowledge the aid, financial support, and openness of the Manufacturing Academy 
of Denmark and of the companies across Denmark that assisted in this research.  
Thank you to my parents, Tommy and Marita, for enabling me to pursue this route and motivating me to 
stay on it. To Otto, my father-in-law – thank you for interesting and inspiring discussions along the way, and 
to Birgit, my mother-in-law, a heartfelt appreciation for taking the helm in my absence. Last of all, to my 
wife, Susanne; thank you for being in my corner, even when I was not, and for being the cornerstone of our 
little family. 
 
Jesper Christensen 
Copenhagen, November 2017  
vi 
 
  
vii 
 
CONTENTS 
 
PREFACE 
CHAPTER 1 
CHAPTER 2 
CHAPTER 3 
CHAPTER 4 
CHAPTER 5 
REFERENCES 
 
 
A behavioral theory of human capital integration: An introdution 
Valuable to whom? A theory of individual allocation of effort under 
cognitive load 
Carrying the load: Effects of team cognitive load on team performance 
So close, yet so far: The interdependence of geographical and 
psychological distance in collaboration 
Conclusion 
 
 
i 
1 
21 
55 
90 
118 
 
viii 
 
  
1 
 
 
CHAPTER 1 
 
A BEHAVIORAL THEORY OF HUMAN CAPITAL INTEGRATION: 
AN INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 PURPOSE OF THE RESEARCH  
This thesis investigates the integration of human capital in organizations. Human capital is defined as the 
knowledge and abilities of individual employees (Ployhart and Moliterno, 2011). Integration denotes the 
process of combining human capital through particular organizational structures and mechanisms to ensure 
the matching of tasks and relevant knowledge, and to foster the combination and amplification of individual 
abilities and insights (Barki and Pinsonneault, 2005; Turkulainen and Ketokivi, 2012). 
Integration mechanisms range from centralization and formalization (Pugh et al., 1968) to cross-
functional teams, integrator roles, and information systems (Adler, 1995; Galbraith, 1973; Van de Ven, 
Delbecq, and Koenig, 1976). These are differentiated primarily according to their information processing 
capacity (Tushman and Nadler, 1978), which describes the extent to which they enable individuals to process 
and combine more and more complex information (Makhija and Ganesh, 1997; Puranam, Singh, and 
Chaudhuri, 2009). To the extent that selected mechanisms succeed in fostering integration, the organization 
is expected to reap collaborative benefits without sacrificing the advantages of specialization, and without 
incurring added costs from conflict, inefficient communication, and sub-optimizing behavior (Chen, 
Mattioda and Daugherty, 2007; Swink, Narasimhan, and Wang, 2007). 
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In past literature, integration has often been considered an intended strategy, where the degree of 
integration (and its correlation with performance) is assessed in terms of the presence of integration 
mechanisms (Gerwin and Barrowman, 2002; Gattiker and Goodhue, 2004). More recently, scholars have 
acknowledged that the implementation of such “infrastructural enablers” (Swink and Schoenherr, 2015: 71) 
does not equate to effective integration. Accordingly, calls have been made for research into achieved 
integration (Pagell, 2004; Turkulainen and Ketokivi, 2012); that is, the extent to which the implementation of 
particular organizational design choices and structural mechanisms ensure efficient coordination among 
individuals and units, with sufficient information being shared, processed and applied without unnecessary 
costs or undue pursuit of functional agendas (Barki and Pinsonneault, 2005; Pagell, 2004; Swink and 
Schoenherr, 2015).  
This thesis contributes to this transition from a structural contingency perspective to real assessments of 
the process of integration (cf. Turner and Makhija, 2012; Puranam, Raveendran, and Knudsen, 2012). It 
begins from the observation that the decisional logic inherent in organizational information processing theory 
- in terms of how to match integration mechanisms to complexity and informational asymmetry - does not 
account for emerging insights on the behavioral nature of integration (Enz and Lambert, 2015; Frankel and 
Mollenkopf, 2015; Stolze, Murfield, and Esper, 2015). These insights include the emphasis on individuals as 
the engines of information processing (Turner and Makhija, 2012; Puranam et al., 2012) with cognitive and 
perceptive differences (Cronin and Weingart, 2007; Weingart, Todorova, and Cronin, 2008). The established 
logic ignores how cognitive and behavioral elements determine - and introduce variation in - the effective 
information processing capacity of the structural mechanisms in which individuals are embedded, and it 
therefore provides a partial and potentially spurious account of organizational outcomes (Frankel and 
Mollenkopf, 2015). Indeed, mechanisms have often been conceptualized as though they have the ability to 
process information (Turner and Makhija, 2012). Attention to the behavioral aspects of integration theory 
represents an opportunity to expand its explanatory power and practical applicability (Van de Ven, Ganco, 
and Hinings, 2013). 
Several authors have highlighted the need for a more detailed understanding of interdepartmental 
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integration based on micro-level data (Griffin and Hauser, 1996; Malhotra and Sharma, 2002; Oliva and 
Watson, 2011). Attempts to empirically validate the traditional information processing perspective and its 
implications for organizational design have met with limited success (Capon, Farley and Hoenig, 1990; 
Drazin and Van de Ven, 1985; Puranam et al., 2012). This has been ascribed to equifinal performance of 
competing organizational designs (Gresov and Drazin, 1997) and inertia in structural change (Hannan and 
Freeman, 1977; Meyer and Scott, 1983), but the dominant explanation has become the difficulty of 
adequately capturing intervening variables that determine the relationship between high-level structural 
choices and performance (Abell, Felin, and Foss, 2008; Puranam et al., 2015; Siggelkow and Rivkin, 2009). 
Adding to these concerns, Premkumar, Ramamurthy, and Saunders (2005: 261) argue that the concept of fit 
between organizational information processing needs and the information processing capabilities of 
structures and mechanisms is “an elusive concept for empirical research [for which] operationalization and 
empirical testing with an appropriate statistical procedure is still a major issue”. In doing so, they echo the 
concern of Galbraith and Nathanson (1979: 266) that “the concept of fit […] lacks the precise definition 
needed to test and recognize whether an organization has it or not”. 
Delving into the black box of integration employing a behavioral lens is therefore critically important so 
as to allow scholars to understand the more granular context within which individual behaviors and actions 
take place (Foss, 2011). Indeed, “studying how individuals act is important, because theoretical work in the 
behavioral tradition may otherwise invoke decision rules that only have weak empirical support” (Billinger, 
Stieglitz, and Schumacher, 2013: 95). By demonstrating how the information processing capacity (and hence 
the integration potential) of different mechanisms is fundamentally bounded along certain behavioral 
dimensions, I hope to temper the view that integration efforts are inherently beneficial to performance, and 
instead lay the groundwork for a model of integration that explains the contingent value of integration 
mechanisms and sketches the contours of a behavioral theory of integration (Gavetti and Warglien, 2015; 
Kretschmer and Puranam, 2008; Postrel, 2002; Turkulainen and Ketokivi, 2013). 
The remainder of this introductory chapter describes the rationale and structure of the thesis. First, the 
nature of the integration challenge, and the decisional logic governing the selection of appropriate integration 
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mechanisms, is described. Second, the theoretical perspective employed in the thesis is introduced. Finally, 
the empirical foundation of the thesis is described and the three research chapters are presented. 
 
1.2 THEORETICAL CONTEXT 
This thesis defines organizations as coordination systems (March and Simon, 1958; Okhuysen and 
Bechky, 2009) that orchestrate the differentiation and integration of specialized tasks (Faraj and Xiao, 2006; 
Kretschmer and Puranam, 2008). Differentiation is defined as the ‘segmentation of the organizational system 
into subsystems’ (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967: 4). Differentiated units address distinct tasks and 
environments, and hence differ in structural characteristics, work processes, information requirements, and 
the knowledge and skills of their members (Gulati, Lawrence and Puranam, 2005; March and Simon, 1993). 
Differentiation enables specialization, which improves unit-level productivity by enhancing returns to 
individual knowledge (Grant, 1996; Jacobides and Winter, 2005) and economizing on bounded rationality 
(Connor and Prahalad, 1996; Ethiraj and Levinthal, 2004; Langlois, 1990). As the level of differentiation 
changes, the degree and nature of interdependence among differentiated tasks change accordingly (Simon, 
1991; Thompson, 1967; Van de Ven et al., 1976). When wholly modular interfaces between tasks are not 
available (Sanchez and Mahoney, 1996; Srikanth and Puranam, 2014), firms need to integrate activities and 
outputs of differentiated units (Glouberman and Mintzberg, 2001; Scott and Davis, 2007). 
THE NATURE OF THE INTEGRATION CHALLENGE 
Drawing on research into formal planning and division of labour (e.g. Chandler, 1962; Taylor, 1916), early 
contributions on organizational design and integration developed an assumption of designability, i.e. that 
‘organizational systems could be articulated with enough specificity and precision to allow for individuals to 
fully complete the work’ (Okhuysen and Bechky, 2009: 467) independent of the attributes of the individuals 
embedded in the system (Scott and Davis, 2007). In this tradition, research has developed important insights 
on the integration of employees and human capital (e.g. Hickson, Pugh and Pheysey, 1969; Lawrence and 
Lorsch, 1967). In particular, scholars have recognized the heterogeneity of task interdependencies (McCann 
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and Ferry, 1979; Thompson, 1967; Van de Ven et al., 1976) and the variation in informational asymmetry 
between units (Galbraith, 1973; Tushman and Nadler, 1978). These dimensions determine the level of 
requisite integration among units and, in turn, the mechanisms most appropriate for achieving integration 
(Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967; Ketokivi, Schroeder and Turkulainen, 2006). 
The insight that interdependencies are heterogeneous builds on the observation that tasks differ in the 
extent to which “value generated from performing each is different when the other task is performed versus 
when it is not” (Puranam et al., 2012: 421). An extensive range of taxonomies of interdependence have been 
developed as the relevant literatures have progressed (e.g. Thompson, 1967; Van de Ven et al., 1976; 
McCann and Ferry, 1979; McCann and Galbraith, 1981; Burton and Obel, 1984), but a rigorous definition of 
interdependence has remained elusive, despite calls for the development of an interdependence construct 
(Puranam et al., 2012).  
Drawing on the fundamental view of interdependence as the change in task value brought about by other 
tasks, scholars have devoted significant attention to the different ways in which tasks may be interdependent. 
For instance, tasks may be related either sequentially or reciprocally, depending on whether one or both of 
them serve as prerequisites for the other (Giachetti, 2006; Thompson, 1967; Van de Ven et al., 1976). 
Similarly, interdependence may involve the exchange of different types and amounts of resources and may 
occur at different frequencies (Crowston, 1994; McCann and Ferry, 1979). Whether interdependent tasks are 
temporally separated or take place in quick succession also has a significant impact on coordination (Adler, 
1995; Schelling, 1960), as does the relationships and epistemic interdependencies among agents responsible 
for the relevant tasks (Levinthal and Warglien, 1999; Puranam et al., 2012). In sum, the nature and degree of 
task interdependence may vary along several dimensions with important consequences for the required mode 
and frequency of coordination. For instance, as tasks and units tend towards greater sequential (unilateral) or 
reciprocal (bilateral) dependence, the interaction frequency between units will increase along with the need 
to combine and process information on one or both sides of the relation through closer and more personal 
integration (e.g. mutual adjustment, Glouberman and Mintzberg, 2001), to economize on coordination costs 
(Williamson, 1985). Similarly, increasing task complexity and variability has been linked with greater 
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reliance on personal and group-based coordination mechanisms in place of structural and impersonal 
mechanisms (Faraj and Xiao, 2006; Perrow, 1967; Van de Ven et al., 1976). 
Greater differentiation and specialization of individuals and units implies informational asymmetry 
(Tushman and Nadler, 1978). In short, individuals in separate units depend on and possess different stocks of 
knowledge and so they come to know and view the world differently (Brown and Eisenhardt, 1995; 
Dougherty, 1992). In terms of information, organizations are comprised of more or less diverse tasks, and the 
execution of each task draws on and creates information that is specific to its characteristics and local 
environment. With greater diversity, organizations face a greater disparity in the information and skills 
required to complete different tasks (Tushman and Nadler, 1978). In addition, every task in an organization 
is associated with a particular level of uncertainty that reflects the amount of new information that must be 
developed or acquired during execution (Galbraith, 1973; Premkumar et al., 2005). When firms become 
increasingly complex (e.g. more knowledge-intensive) or experience increasingly dynamic environments, 
they face greater uncertainty and, in turn, greater difficulties in obtaining and exploiting relevant and timely 
information (Burns and Wholey, 1993; Cuijpers, Guenter, and Hussinger, 2011). Similarly, when tasks are 
interdependent, uncertainty rises because information residing in one unit responsible (and specialized) for a 
certain task must be integrated with information from other distinct units. Hence, as differentiation and 
complexity increase, the firm becomes more dependent on the ability to identify, assess, and process 
distributed information so as to overcome ambiguity and informational asymmetry.  
However, this ability is bounded as individuals differ in their perception or ‘thought-worlds’ (Griffin and 
Hauser, 1996). Specifically, individual and managerial access to and interpretation of disparate information 
is limited by hierarchical positions, experience, and cognitive frames, and is inherently boundedly rational 
(Foss and Weber, 2016; Puranam et al., 2015). What individuals know may differ significantly across 
intraorganizational boundaries, along with incentives, language, attitudes, and cultural disposition (Argyres, 
1999; Gupta, Raj and Wilemon, 1986; Song, Montoya-Weiss, and Schmidt, 1997). To the extent that 
separated individuals develop different cognitive frames inspired by specialized tasks and incentives, 
individual attention will emphasize unit-level priorities (Ocasio, 1997) and information flows will tend 
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toward hierarchically bounded communication inside functional domains (Bercovitz et al., 2001). 
Consequently, perceptions and interpretive frames may be incompatible between units (Weber and Mayer, 
2014). With cognitive differences, individuals may in turn pursue incongruent objectives and priorities 
(Swink and Schoenherr, 2015) and possess dissimilar interpretations of similar information and tasks (Schütz 
and Bloch, 2006). In sum, therefore, organizations seeking to integrate tasks of varying interdependence 
cannot focus merely on the bridging of informational asymmetries in a narrow sense, but should also 
recognize and contend with cognitive asymmetries that do not lend themselves to quick resolution. Indeed, 
specialization is “not just the simple fact of partition and specialized knowledge [but] fundamental 
differences in attitude and behaviour” (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967: 9). 
UNPACKING THE DECISIONAL LOGIC 
Essentially, the optimal set of integration mechanisms in any rational organization would be those that 
manage, at the lowest possible cost, to reduce cognitive and informational disparity among interdependent 
tasks to such an extent that efficient collaboration is made possible (Hitt, Wu, and Zhou, 2002; Turkulainen 
and Ketokivi, 2013). To formalize this notion and determine when particular mechanisms are best suited to 
the integration challenges at hand, scholars have frequently invoked organizational information processing 
theory (Daft and Lengel, 1986; Galbraith, 1973; Tushman and Nadler, 1978), where each integration 
mechanism “is endowed with a specific information-processing capability and must be matched to the 
information-processing demands of the environment or needs generated by the interdependence of work 
units” (Faraj and Xiao, 2006: 1156). Implicitly, the established literature on integration holds that cognitive 
and informational disparities underlying coordination failure can be addressed by implementing mechanisms 
with adequate information processing capabilities (Argote, 1982; Scott and Davis, 2007; Van de Ven et al., 
1976). 
When the complexity of information and degree of interdependence are negligible, organizations are able 
to rely on standardized processes and interfaces to accomplish coordination (March and Simon, 1958; Pugh 
et al., 1968). Managers are able to handle exceptions when complexity arises (Garicano and Wu, 2012), but 
inevitably become constrained and boundedly rational as complexity (Gavetti, Levinthal, and Ocasio, 2007; 
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Rivkin and Siggelkow, 2003), thus limiting the extent to which hierarchical referral can be relied upon to 
ensure information processing. To avoid information overload in the hierarchy, organizations are instead 
advised to rely on lateral and more social integration mechanisms in the face of increasing complexity 
(Hoegl, Parboteeah, and Munson, 2003; Mullen and Copper, 1994; Van de Ven et al., 1976). While these 
include informal and transient solutions, e.g. spurring informal relationships and reducing cross-functional 
equivocality through (managerial) rotation (Daft and Lengel, 1986; Pagell, 2004) or the use of matrix 
structures (Foss and Weber, 2016; Hax and Majluf, 1981), more enduring (and costly) lateral mechanisms 
become necessary in non-routine or highly complex settings. This involves the appointment of dedicated 
liaisons (Brion et al., 2012) or the implementation of cross-functional teams (Lovelace, Shapiro, and 
Weingart, 2001) to address more permanent information processing needs and mitigate functional 
differences through greater scope for individual agency (Hirunyawipada et al., 2010; Pagell, 2004). 
Moving through these mechanisms towards a progressively greater information processing capability, it 
is clear that this predicted capability is linked to the increasing emphasis on interpersonal interaction and 
social cohesion (Lakemond and Berggren, 2006; Nakata and Im, 2010; Van de Ven et al., 1976), as well as 
the increase in proximity of interdependent units (or, more aptly, of individual representatives of these units), 
as face-to-face interaction in co-located settings is widely regarded as the richest and most flexible medium 
(Daft and Lengel, 1986; Kiesler and Cummings, 2002; Von Hippel, 1994). 
From this emerges a decisional logic underlying the choice of integration mechanisms in differentiated 
organizations. As cognitive and informational asymmetries increase, information processing is assumed to 
benefit from a transition from a predominant focus on impersonal mechanisms, e.g. centralization, 
formalization, and information systems (Pugh et al., 1968), towards a greater emphasis on personal and 
group-based mechanisms, e.g. cross-functional teams, integrator roles, and face-to-face interaction (Adler, 
1995; Storper and Venables, 2004; Van de Ven et al., 1976). The adoption of more personal, frequent, and 
costly mechanisms is therefore justified when integration is pursued under increasing interdependence and 
asymmetry (Lakemond and Berggren, 2006; Nakata and Im, 2010; Swink and Schoenherr, 2015). Indeed, 
“studies of coordination […] have substantiated the core idea that matching increased task uncertainty to 
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less formal modes of coordination leads to better performance” (Faraj and Xiao, 2006: 1155). Importantly, 
this is not to argue that more impersonal mechanisms are crowded out, or that there is a necessary one-to-one 
relationship between the level of requisite integration and specific integration mechanisms (Gresov and 
Drazin, 1997; McCann and Galbraith, 1981). Rather, it is an observation that as interdependence and 
uncertainty increase, organizations will tend towards a greater relative emphasis on individual agency in 
integration and the structural mechanisms that afford this (Okhuysen and Bechky, 2009). 
But if the decisional logic is to be a sufficient guideline for organizational design, then individuals must 
be assumed to be able to realize the processing potential of the mechanisms in which they are embedded 
(Okhuysen and Bechky, 2009; Scott and Davis, 2007). Successful integration, and the beneficial allocation 
and use of human capital, is then reduced to a matter of successfully implementing integrative mechanisms 
with the requisite information processing capacity (Faraj and Xiao, 2006). Therefore, establishing what 
causes violations in the ability of individuals to effectively realize this potential provides a behavioral 
account of why organizations sometimes fail to achieve integration (cf. Radner, 1993; 2000). Conversely, 
following the logic of Gavetti (2012), the behavioral roots of superior integration and performance can be 
understood in terms of the behavioral factors that bound individual information processing behavior. In 
essence, this thesis seeks to isolate such factors by identifying systematic behavioral bounds and 
impediments to individual information processing and collaboration to better understand and explain 
deviations from the decisional logic. 
This notion that behavioral bounds on the information processing capacity of integration mechanisms 
should exist is not outlandish or novel (e.g. Puranam et al., 2012; Radner, 1993, 2000). It is individuals who 
are swayed through these mechanisms to share and process information with bounded rationality and an 
inclination to systematically bias information (Marschak and Reichelstein, 1998).Yet, the key role played by 
individuals as the processors of information has consistently remained in the background (Turner and 
Makhija, 2012).  
Behavior is a product of willingness and ability (Blumberg and Pringle, 1982). Similarly, information 
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processing behavior is determined by the interplay of epistemic motivation and cognitive load. An 
individuals’ epistemic motivation denotes the willingness to engage in extensive search and information 
processing when available information is perceived as insufficient for the task at hand (Chaiken and Trope, 
1999). Cognitive load, on the other hand, denotes the strain imposed on individual processing capacity and 
attention by work related demands for more extensive or varied information processing (Marois and Ivanoff, 
2005; Ocasio, 1997; Shah and Oppenheimer, 2008). The foremost premise of this thesis is that while task 
characteristics and individual cognitive traits may engender higher levels of epistemic motivation and 
motivate employees to engage in more substantive and thorough information processing (e.g. Cacioppo et 
al., 1996), this process is effectively constrained, as increases in cognitive load necessitate - and stimulate a 
preference for - more heuristic and less time-consuming information processing (De Dreu, 2003; Hoffmann, 
Helversen, and Rieskamp, 2013). 
The importance of considering the behavioral and psychological aspects underlying integration is echoed 
by the observation that interunit collaboration is not simply a motivational issue (Camerer and Knez, 1996, 
1997; Heath and Staudenmayer, 2000; Hoopes and Postrel, 1999). Previous work on collaboration between 
specialized units has often emphasized conflicts of interest or opportunism as the main challenges (e.g. Foss, 
2001; Williamson, 1985). In this tradition, self-interested individuals fail to cooperate due to sub-goal pursuit 
(March and Simon, 1958), misaligned incentives (Hart, 1995; Wageman and Baker, 1997), and greater 
identification with lower order identities compared to higher order identities (e.g. the prioritization of 
functional over organizational membership) (Ashforth and Mael, 1989; Ashforth, Harrison, and Corley, 
2008). Such misalignment leads to failures of cooperation, which manifest as holdup, shirking, and impaired 
allocation of resources and information to interunit relationships (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972, Klein, 
Crawford and Alchian, 1978, Williamson, 1979). While cooperation failures are critical to integration, they 
may be alleviated through incentives, monitoring, sanctions, or identification (Eisenhardt, 1989; Kogut and 
Zander, 1996; Williamson, 1985), and may therefore be rather easily incorporated in the structural logic 
outlined previously.  
However, even if opportunism and misaligned interests were resolved, and “both parties behave in a 
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manner that suggests they understand that they must work together to be successful” (Cannon and Perrault, 
1999: 443), integration could still fail (Camerer, 2003; Gulati et al., 2005; Srikanth and Puranam, 2008). This 
is due to failures of coordination, which are “fundamentally cognitive in origin, and require shared 
understanding and common knowledge to be solved” (Kretschmer and Puranam, 2008: 862). Coordination 
failure refers to the state of impaired or wholly absent alignment or adjustment of actions (Gulati, 
Wohlgezogen, and Zhelyazkov, 2012), which stems from cognitive and informational disparities between 
members of differentiated units (Gupta, Raj and Wilemon, 1986; Schütz and Bloch, 2006; Weber and Mayer, 
2014). Coordination failures arise due to the cognitive limitations of individuals that deny them 
comprehensive knowledge of how others will behave in situations of interdependence, and how they are 
interdependent with others (Weingart et al., 2008); something that is likely to be exacerbated under 
complexity and uncertainty (Varshney and Oppenheim, 2011). Thus, the identification of behavioral bounds 
on integration and associated behavioral failures in this thesis adds to this perspective on coordination failure 
by demonstrating how such failures arise from the interaction of individual behavior and structural 
mechanisms in the context of integration. 
By accentuating the importance of behavioral bounds and their impact on structural integration 
mechanisms, the thesis is effectively arguing that parts of the extant literature have not adequately accounted 
for the determinants of integration outcomes. Prior studies have often correlated aggregate measures of 
organizational performance with integration, operationalized either in structural terms, i.e. as the presence of 
relevant mechanisms, or in anecdotal terms, i.e. as the level of integration as perceived by one or a few 
respondents within the organization (see, for instance, Gerwin and Barrowman, 2002; Millson, 2015; Swink 
and Schoenherr, 2015; Turkulainen and Ketokivi, 2012). While these studies choose to ignore the micro-
level determinants of the observed correlation (Frankel and Mollenkopf, 2015), this does not count against 
their relevance for our understanding of integration (Gerhart, Wright, and McMahon, 2000. Indeed, models 
of economic and organizational phenomena are often premised on assumptions that are known to be 
inadequate representations of reality, because they may still offer valuable insights on the variables of 
interests for particular empirical problems or given certain assumptions (Gilboa et al., 2014; Gul and 
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Pesendorfer, 2008). The purpose of this thesis is not to find fault with prior research, but to contribute to a 
more micro-level understanding of the process of integration, and to couple these insights with extant 
knowledge of structural mechanisms to complement the theory of integration and enable more accurate 
predictions, as well as an improved scope for management action. 
 
1.3. RESEARCH DESIGN 
The thesis consists of three complementary research papers on the cognitive and behavioral implications of 
organizational design choices on the integration and allocation of human capital. While these constitute self-
contained studies with distinct contributions to theory and practice, their combination is thought to provide a 
coherent perspective on the behavioral antecedents of successful human capital integration, as well as a set of 
actionable implications for management. 
EMPIRICAL FOUNDATION  
The papers have a common empirical foundation consisting of three independent data sources from a 
world-leading hydraulic pump manufacturer. With around 20,000 employees in more than 50 countries and a 
net turnover of more than $4 billion in 2015, the company is a dominant figure in the global pump market. 
Data from the three separate sources in the firm were identified, retrieved, and consolidated specifically for 
the purposes of this research and therefore represent a unique dataset. While the reliance on a single 
company sample reduces extraneous variation at firm and industry levels, as well as spurious effects on the 
hypothesized relationships (Harrigan, 1983; Siggelkow, 2007), we cannot rule out firm-specific effects and 
therefore cannot make broad claims to generalizability (Hambrick, 1981).  
The empirical setting described by the data is the exhaustive set of active new product development 
(NPD) projects in the firm in the two-year period from January, 2015 to December, 2016. Potential projects 
emerge from preliminary concept meetings and technology trials in the firm (Adler, 1995; Gerwin and 
Barrowman, 2002). Provided that projects demonstrate sufficient expected value or technological 
contributions to be prioritized for further development, their subsequent lifecycle follows a standardized 
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stage-gate model that spans seven distinct phases from concept development, validation, and approval over 
production ramp-up to the optimization of final manufacturing and sales release. Collectively, these 
consecutive and often recursive phases account for the bulk of resource investments made by the firm in 
innovation, development activities, and human capital integration. 
On account of the strategic importance and significant resource commitments, the firm subjects NPD 
projects to rigorous requirements with regard to the documentation and continuous assessments of current 
and expected performance. Project management teams are tasked with the formulation of monthly reports 
with updated estimates on numerous operational indicators describing, e.g., project performance, incurred 
expenses, activities and challenges, as well as projections for subsequent activities and performance. As the 
main source of project-level data, the dissertation consolidates data from 501 monthly reports from 45 
unique NPD projects in the two-year period.  
Given the behavioral and cognitive perspectives informing the research, multiple variables of interest are 
defined at the individual level. Therefore, the monthly reports were matched with employee data from two 
other repositories within the firm. Demographic data on all project employees were obtained from the HR 
database, along with individual data on, e.g., physical location, job position and description, formal project 
accountability, managerial responsibilities, and departmental affiliation. From the company work time 
registry, comprehensive information was obtained for each employee detailing the tasks and projects to 
which the employee contributed in every month, including the number of hours allocated to each of them.  
The integration of these sources of employee and project data provides 10,294 project-month-employee 
observations corresponding to 583 unique individuals contributing with varying frequency across 45 projects 
in the two-year period. These observations enable the construction of longitudinal measures of individual 
behavior and project conditions, and allows for the mapping of these phenomena to concurrent variation in 
important secondary variables at the individual and project levels. Given different statistical specifications, 
the research papers naturally draw on different subsets of the observations.  
CHAPTER SUMMARIES  
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The common denominator and objective of the chapters in the dissertation is the elucidation and explanation 
of distinct behavioral phenomena that emerge from the interaction of individual cognition and organizational 
design choices regarding the allocation and integration of human capital. While the research papers build on 
a common dataset, there are significant differences in their theoretical emphasis and, therefore, in their 
primary empirical constructs. 
Chapter 2: Valuable to whom: A theory of individual allocation of effort under cognitive load 
When organizations implement more personal and frequent mechanisms to enable the integration of 
interdependent employees and human capital from across the firm, employees are often given considerable 
autonomy in deciding how to distribute their available time and attention among different tasks and 
integration demands. Specifically, real authority (Aghion and Tirole, 1997) and greater discretion in terms of 
the distribution of effort (Leana, 1986) is increasingly delegated to employees on the lower rungs of the 
organizational hierarchy to economize on scarce managerial capacity (Gavetti et al., 2007; Mendelson, 2000; 
Schiffrin and Schneider, 1977) and exploit local knowledge and competence (Dobrajska, Billinger and 
Karim, 2015; Garicano and Wu, 2012; Hayek, 1945). An implicit assumption is that this autonomy is 
productively used and that employees dedicate sufficient time to the available integration mechanisms so as 
to enable the intended sharing and processing of information (Puranam et al., 2012; Turner and Makhija, 
2012). In response to this assumption, this paper studies the factors influencing effort distribution and argues 
that the salience of particular factors, and subsequent employee behavior, is impacted by cognitive load. 
The study builds on recent experimental insights from psychology and economics on how individuals 
adjust their collaborative behavior in response to changing workloads (e.g. Cason, Savikhin and Sheremeta, 
2012; Schulz et al., 2014; Rand, 2016). Fundamentally, Bednar et al. (2012), using four different games, test 
behavior under cognitive load and find that overloaded individuals are unable to efficiently choose optimal 
strategies separately for each task. These findings resonate with the studies by Duffy and Smith (2014) and 
Schultz et al. (2014) that manipulate cognitive load in multi-player prisoner’s dilemma and dictator games, 
respectively, and find that low load subjects are better able to behave strategically. Specifically, low load 
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subjects are more likely to strategically defect as repeated games draw to a close, as well as more capable of 
conditioning their actions on fair displays of collaboration from peers (see also Milinski and Wedekind, 
1998). Conversely, studies find that individuals under high cognitive load become more sensitive to risk (e.g. 
Benjamin, Brown, and Shapiro, 2013). Similar findings indicate a tendency for these risk signals to crowd 
out other factors (Gilbert, Pelham, and Krull, 1988; Van den Bos et al., 2006). Combining these factors, the 
paper proposes and tests the argument that individuals respond to value signals, i.e. indications of fair efforts 
and good performance prospects, and uncertainty signals, i.e. indications of complexity and risk. 
Relying primarily on comprehensive time registration data to trace monthly redistributions of employee 
working time among competing tasks and projects, the paper finds support for the prevailing effect of value 
signals under low cognitive load, such that individuals respond by allocating more time to collaborations that 
are deemed fair and display good value prospects. Conversely, we find that individuals under high cognitive 
load become mostly insensitive to value signals, but instead respond by defecting comparatively more from 
projects characterized by high complexity or risk. With these findings, the paper contributes to our 
understanding of how individuals form – and navigate on – predictive knowledge about the information 
processing options and interdependencies available in the collaborative context (see Puranam et al., 2012; 
Turner and Makhija, 2012). We further contribute by providing insights on how individuals constitute the 
engines that realize or impair structural information processing capacity, as well as how and when the well-
intended delegation of autonomy is productively retained and used. 
Chapter 3: Carrying the load: Effects of team cognitive load on group performance 
When interdependent employees differ with regard to cognitive load, their information processing behavior 
is likely to differ accordingly and introduce behavioral heterogeneity in the group (O’Leary, Mortensen, and 
Woolley, 2011; Shah and Oppenheimer, 2008). Given the fact that individuals condition their behavior on 
the behavior of those with whom they collaborate (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004), it is natural to expect team 
members to adapt their information processing behavior on the basis of the heterogeneous behavior of others 
(Fischbacher and Gächter, 2010; Fitzgerald, Mohammed, and Kremer, 2017). However, our knowledge of 
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how this process of adaptation occurs and how heterogeneity in cognitive load is aggregated to impact 
collective outcomes is “in its infancy” (Mohammed and Schwall, 2009: 302; Loock and Hinnen, 2015; 
Vuori and Vuori, 2014).  Therefore, this research paper explores how the composition of project teams with 
regard to cognitive load of team members determines project performance, and how mutual adaptation 
within the team influences this process. 
We gauge variation over time in cognitive load and the associated composition of project teams using 
comprehensive data from 587 employees within 45 NPD projects. We hypothesize and find empirical 
evidence of an inverted u-shaped relationship between project performance and the share of team members 
with high cognitive load. It is theorized that initial increases in the number of team members with high 
cognitive load helps alleviate extensive analysis and the associated risk of overfitting (Gigerenzer, 2008), 
that is, the failure to appropriately filter out irrelevant past information in decision-making. Moreover, the 
disruptive effects of differences in information processing behavior are unlikely to manifest at low levels of 
heterogeneity due to ad-hoc redistributions of workload within the team and the general robustness of 
collaborative behavior in noisy environments in the short run (McNamara, Barta, and Houston, 2004; Wu 
and Axelrod, 1995). When team compositions become more skewed towards a higher proportion of team 
members with high cognitive load, the disruptive effects do manifest as declining project performance. This 
aligns with the findings of the first paper that collaboration and performance suffer when employees 
determine their distribution of effort on less valid signals of peer contributions under cognitive load.  
On the basis of evidence from economics on conditional cooperation using game theory (Duffy and 
Smith, 2014; Fischbacher and Gächter, 2010), we demonstrate a moderating effect of the stability of team 
compositions. When teams maintain their composition over time, i.e. constant ratio of employees with high 
cognitive load, they experience declining performance as stability increases. This pattern of cooperation 
decay is explained by the compounding effects of team members continually readjusting their effort to the 
declining aggregate effort of their peers (de Oliveira, Croson, and Eckel, 2015; Gunnthorsdottir, Houser, and 
McCabe, 2007). Additionally, we demonstrate how the negative effects of team cognitive load are mitigated 
by increasing metaknowledge, i.e. the extent to which team members accumulate knowledge of the skills and 
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working conditions of their peers (Hollingshead, 2001; Mell, Van Knippenberg, and van Ginkel, 2014). 
The paper contributes to the psychological design of the firm by coupling insights on individual behavior 
to higher-level organizational design choices and outcomes (Kahneman and Klein, 2009; Milkman, Chugh, 
and Bazerman, 2009; Powell et al., 2011). We posit conditional cooperation based on cognitive load 
differentials as the key mechanism governing how individual information processing behavior is aggregated 
to impact group outcomes. The paper contributes to integration research by demonstrating how the objective 
of human capital integration, to enable the sharing and collective processing of specialized information, 
hinges on managerial choices vis-à-vis the allocation of employees and the cognitive composition of teams. 
Thus, the paper provides clear recommendations for managerial intervention and responds to calls for the use 
of experimental findings from economics and psychology to pose and answer novel questions concerning 
organizational design (Agarwal and Hoetker, 2007; de Oliveira et al., 2015; Hartig, Irlenbusch, and Kölle, 
2015). 
Chapter 4: So close, yet so far: The interdependence of geographical and psychological distance in 
collaboration 
With comprehensive longitudinal NPD data covering 583 employees across 45 NPD projects, this paper 
investigates the contingent relationship between geographical and psychological distances between 
interdependent employees. Distance is commonly understood and operationalized as the geographical 
distance between employees (e.g. Storper and Venables, 2004; Gray, Siemsen, and Vasudeva, 2015), and 
research from this perspective has demonstrated how physical proximity and face-to-face interaction 
improves integration and knowledge sharing compared to geographical dispersion (Allen, 1977; Storper and 
Venables, 2004). But while physical proximity is lauded as an integral element in coordination and 
collaboration (Daft and Lengel, 1986), studies have found inconsistent evidence on these collaborative 
effects (Cha, Park, and Lee, 2014; Wilson, Crisp, and Mortensen, 2013) and have ascribed it to the failure of 
prior research to consider psychological distance (Chong et al., 2012; Wilson et al., 2008).  
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Exploring the contingencies of these distance dimensions, we confirm negative performance effects of 
geographical dispersion and psychological distance on team performance. When collaborating employees 
become psychologically distant, their attention to potential problems and analytical processing is substituted 
for more abstract cognition (Förster, Friedman, and Liberman, 2004; Liberman, Trope, and Stephan, 2007). 
However, we find that these distance dimensions have joint effects. Specifically, we argue that the benefits 
of geographical distance hold true only insofar as team members are psychologically close to the tasks at 
hand. If this condition is violated and psychologically distant employees come to contribute to the project, 
the reduced analytical effort and disruptive cognition associated with psychological distance is magnified, 
thus potentially undermining the collaborative benefits of proximity. Conversely, we find that the negative 
effects of psychological distance are mitigated when the psychologically distant members are also 
geographically removed from the immediate team context. We argue that physical impediments impose 
restrictions on behavior that encourage more selective interventions in team decision processes. This curbs 
the disruption and could help channel the potential benefits of creative cognition. 
The study contributes through an improved understanding of the contingencies of distance dimensions in 
organizational work (e.g. Trope and Liberman, 2010; Wilson et al., 2013). In particular, the results support 
the claim that different distance dimensions cannot be adequately understood in isolation (Boschma, 2005; 
Wilson et al., 2013). We also contribute to emerging research on the value of behavioral insights for 
organizational design and human capital allocation (e.g. de Vries et al., 2014; Foss and Weber, 2016). By 
applying insights from CLT to operational challenges to do with the integration and allocation of employees, 
our research explores the conditions under which the traditional advantages of geographical proximity may 
be expected and thus outweigh other strategic options (e.g offshoring). The study therefore holds 
implications for strategic decision making and organizational design of human capital integration (Higgins, 
1996; Rietzschel et al., 2007). 
 
1.4. A NOTE ON TERMINOLOGY AND BEHAVIORAL THEORY  
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Social science is preoccupied with behavior, but the labelling of theory and phenomena as ‘behavioral’ tends 
to invoke ambiguity and polysemy. In the strategic management literature, the behavioral moniker is 
routinely associated with the psychological underpinnings of the phenomenon of interest (Powell, Lovallo 
and Fox, 2011: 1371) and is commonly interpreted as “being about mental processes” (Gavetti, 2012: 267). 
For the purposes of this thesis and the continued development of psychological and cognitive dimensions in 
strategy research, a more precise definition of behavioral theory is required.  
In extant literature, the use of the term has converged on two perspectives that differ mainly in their 
rationality assumptions (Eisenhardt and Zbaracki, 1992; Lant and Shapira, 2001)1. One perspective 
emphasizes the role of bounded rationality and cognitive capacity as constraints on the ability of agents to 
identify and implement optimal courses of action (Gavetti, 2012; Simon, 1990). The other perspective rejects 
this notion of optimal choice and instead espouses an ecological view of rationality (Berg and Gigerenzer, 
2010; Langlois, 1990) in which strategic action rests on individual interpretations and heuristics that are 
more or less well-adapted to the situation at hand and therefore more or less rational (Levinthal, 2011; 
Narayanan, Zane, and Kemmerer, 2010; Weick, 1979). While the first perspective treats limitations in 
rationality and cognition as deviations from normatively optimal behavior, the second perspective holds that 
optimal behavior is determined endogenously in the fit between the parameters of the situation and the 
decisional heuristics of the individual. Thus, the first perspective invokes psychology and cognition to 
explain why observed behavior deviates from normative optima, while the second emphasizes the 
mechanisms that explain how behavior unfolds given cognitive constraints. 
If our scholarly ambition is to build comprehensive models of strategic and organizational phenomena, 
neither perspective should be treated in isolation, as “these processes coexist in a dynamic interplay” 
(Hodgkinson and Healey, 2008). Instead, developments in behavioral theory should seek to encompass 
cognitive drivers of ‘misbehavior’, i.e. the psychologically-based deviations from normative or theoretically 
predicted agency, as well as the mechanisms and behavioral patterns that rationalize these deviations and 
                                                          
1 Akin to distinctions between the heuristics-and-biases paradigm (Kahneman, 2003) and the fast-and-frugal paradigm 
(Gigerenzer and Goldstein, 1996) in the study of decisional heuristics (Loock and Hinnen, 2015) 
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provide scope for managerial intervention. Thus, as the field matures, we must buttress extant insights on 
structural mechanisms with microfoundational perspectives on integration to foster the development of 
multilevel understandings that enable more accurate predictions and well-informed management of 
integration (Frankel and Mollenkopf, 2015). 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
VALUABLE TO WHOM? 
A THEORY OF INDIVIDUAL ALLOCATION OF EFFORT UNDER COGNITIVE LOAD 
 
Jesper Christensen2 
 
ABSTRACT 
This study investigates how individuals distribute their available working time among competing activities 
under cognitive load. When firms seek to integrate more closely their human capital to amplify the value of 
knowledge and address complex or dynamic conditions, individuals are often granted more lateral conditions 
and greater autonomy in the interest of supporting integration and information processing. But individuals do 
not necessarily distribute their working time to support these goals. Drawing on experimental evidence from 
psychology and management, the study hypothesizes and finds evidence that individuals allocate their time 
on the basis of a particular set of signals, value signals and uncertainty signals, depending on their level of 
cognitive load. The efficiency of implemented organizational designs for information processing therefore 
hinges directly on the ability of managers to understand and account for the cognitive load of employees, as 
employees constitute the engines of information processing inside well-intentioned structures. 
 
                                                          
2 Copenhagen Business School, Frederiksberg, Denmark. 
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2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Coordination problems within the firm have been studied extensively in management and economics 
(Heath and Staudenmayer, 2000; Kretschmer and Puranam, 2008; March and Simon, 1958). One of the 
prerequisites for coordination problems to arise is the dispersion of information and knowledge among 
individual employees (Marschak and Reichelstein, 1998; Tushman and Nadler, 1978). When tasks require 
the integration of dispersed information and human capital, firm performance becomes contingent on the 
adoption of appropriate structures that ensure the effective management of knowledge (Daft and Lengel, 
1986; Turkulainen and Ketokivi, 2012, 2013; Tushman and Nadler, 1978).  
Prior literature has largely adopted a structural contingency view of integration (Tushman and Nadler, 
1978; Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967), which has ignored the role of individuals and the interaction between 
individuals and organizational design choices by assuming that “structural features automatically give rise 
to consistent information processing” (Turner and Makhija, 2012: 662; see also Faraj and Xiao, 2006). As 
operational uncertainty and environmental instability introduce complexity in tasks and problems, firms 
often implement more lateral and personal coordination mechanisms to accommodate the growing need to 
combine and amplify distributed knowledge from across the organization to resolve complex challenges and 
explore new ventures (Van de Ven et al., 1976).  
An integral part of the adoption of these mechanisms is the delegation of more real authority and 
autonomy to employees (Aghion and Tirole, 1997), as the lower rungs of the hierarchy are expected to 
outperform management in terms of the productive combination of knowledge resources and human capital 
(Dobrajska et al., 2015; Garicano and Wu, 2012). But individuals face cognitive limitations that constrain 
their ability to adequately perceive and act upon interdependencies (Gulati et al., 2012); these are often not 
recognized or underestimated to the detriment of coordination (Heath and Staudenmayer, 2000). As 
individuals possess distinct belief structures (Walsh, 1988), studies have shown that even relatively similar 
individuals within an organization or group may exhibit representational gaps (Cronin and Weingart, 2007), 
that is, inconsistencies in individual conceptualizations of information, interfaces, or common tasks. 
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The implicit assumption that delegated authority is in fact retained and productively used in integration 
by individuals in the face of informational asymmetry and uncertainty deserves exploration. With privileged 
access to longitudinal data from a global manufacturing firm, this paper studies how employees in a 
knowledge-intensive development setting choose to distribute their available working hours in response to 
increasing cognitive load. Drawing on experimental evidence from the economics and psychology literatures 
on how individuals condition their behavior on signals from their peers and environment (Cason, Savikhin 
and Sheremeta, 2012; Duffy and Smith, 2014; Rand, 2016), we demonstrate how cognitive load emanating 
from the allocation of employees to lateral coordination structures influences the types of signals to which 
the employee responds and, hence, the ways in which working time is distributed. Specifically, we show how 
individuals with higher cognitive load become less sensitive to signals of fairness in collaboration and value 
potentials, but rather begins navigating according to signals of complexity and risk in a risk-averse manner.    
Our findings have implications for the use of lateral mechanisms as a means of fostering increasing 
levels of integration and collaboration. Specifically, we provide further evidence that the realized 
information processing capacity of adopted mechanisms (e.g. cross-functional teams) is fundamentally 
contingent on individuals as the engines of information processing (cf. Turner and Makhija, 2012) and the 
ways in which individuals are made to perceive their environment (cf. Puranam et al., 2012). Secondly, our 
findings cast more light on the puzzling observation in recent studies (Hartig et al., 2015; Van den Berg et 
al., 2015) that individuals may respond in completely opposite ways to heterogeneous behavior amongst 
their peers; heterogeneity begets heterogeneity. By arguing that individual variation in cognitive load 
underlies the allocation of attention to particular signals and therefore entails different behaviors in situations 
with apparently identical stimuli, we sketch the contours of a mechanism that might help explain 
heterogeneous responses to homogenous situations.  
 
2.2 THEORETICAL FOUNDATION: AUTONOMY AND THE SUFFICIENCY PRINCIPLE 
ANTECEDENTS OF AUTONOMY IN EFFORT DISTRIBUTION 
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When interdependencies between differentiated tasks become more pronounced, the integration mechanisms 
and hierarchical forms best suited to manage the associated complexity and informational asymmetry vary 
accordingly (Allen and Gabarro, 1972; Foss and Weber, 2016). In an information processing framework, the 
aptness of any class of integration mechanism is determined by the level of requisite integration, i.e. the 
amount of disparate information that must be integrated, and the amount and complexity of information that 
the mechanism in question is assumed to be able to facilitate. Organizations are regularly able to standardize 
non-complex interactions through established rules and procedures (March and Simon, 1958; Pugh et al., 
1968). But this is only feasible to the extent that interaction is predictable and amenable to routinization 
(Galbraith, 1973). Given complexity, standardized tasks generate exceptions as employees encounter non-
routine challenges that are communicated to management under the assumption that “knowledge of the 
solutions to the most common and easiest problems is located at the production floor, whereas the 
knowledge about the more exceptional and harder problems is located at the higher layers of the hierarchy” 
(Garicano and Wu, 2012: 1387).  
As interdependencies become ever more complex and idiosyncratic, it is unlikely that standardization 
and hierarchy will suffice to ensure integration (Gattiker, 2007). Centralization of decision making (Child, 
1973) is bounded in its ability to facilitate integration by the cognitive capacity of the individual to whom 
decision rights are allocated (Mintzberg, 1979; Rivkin and Siggelkow, 2003; Simon, 1990). Indeed, 
individual processing capacity is limited by scarcity of attention (Ocasio, 1997; Shiffrin and Schneider, 
1977) and short-term working memory (Barrett, Tugade, and Engle, 2004; Colom et al., 2004; Evans, 2011). 
Centralization and dependence on hierarchical referral in the context of high uncertainty and interdependence 
is therefore likely to produce information overload on the part of managers and fall short of the intended 
integration (Gavetti et al., 2007; Mendelson, 2000). 
Given these information processing limits of vertical coordination mechanisms, scholars have instead 
emphasized the viability of lateral and more social mechanisms in dealing with increasing interdependence 
and complexity (Hoegl et al., 2003; Mullen and Copper, 1994; Van de Ven et al., 1976). These mechanisms 
span a wide range of structural and informal arrangements characterized by the delegation of autonomy and 
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decision making rights to the level at which the relevant information resides (Jensen and Meckling, 1992). 
Thus, lateral mechanisms avoid information overload in the hierarchy by instead relying on individual 
autonomy and interpersonal relations (McCann and Galbraith, 1981). Perhaps the least resource intensive of 
these personal mechanisms involves the spurring of informal relations through managerial rotation and 
engagement across multiple task environments and functions so as to reduce cross-functional equivocality 
and improve communication (Daft and Lengel, 1986; Pagell, 2004). For instance, when interdependencies 
exist between functions, hierarchical forms akin to a project matrix have been proposed to enjoy an 
integration advantage over unitary or multidivisional forms due to more frequent redeployment of employees 
(Foss and Weber, 2016; Hax and Majluf, 1981). Redeployment is expected to limit informational 
asymmetries relative to functional organizations, as employees are exposed to more diverse information and 
a greater range of interpretations (Dougherty, 1992; Hobday, 2000) and become skilled at negotiating 
common interpretations with their collaborators and predicting the behavior of others (Bunderson and 
Sutcliffe, 2002; Cronin and Weingart, 2007). 
With more frequent and permanent information processing needs, more enduring (and costly) lateral 
mechanisms may be instituted, such as the appointment of an individual to a liaison or integrator role 
(Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967; Galbraith, 1973). For instance, the notion of boundary spanners is well-
established (Marrone, 2010; Tushman and Katz, 1980). Relatedly, the notion of temporary task forces or 
dedicated cross-functional teams continues to enjoy prominence within OT and OM literatures as a means of 
mitigating silo-thinking and sub-optimization, as well as providing a platform for dynamic interaction and 
knowledge sharing across functional boundaries (Lovelace et al., 2001; McDonough, 2000; Wheelwright and 
Clark, 1992).  Establishing interdepartmental teams as a means of supporting information processing 
between differentiated units is premised on the assumption that teams afford a greater scope for individual 
agency and thereby facilitate cooperation through interpersonal relationships and individual autonomy 
(Hirunyawipada et al., 2010; Pagell, 2004). 
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THE SUFFICIENCY PRINCIPLE IN EFFORT DISTRIBUTION 
Optimal behavior in traditional information processing theory is when individuals dedicate the time and 
effort necessary to realize the information processing capacity of implemented mechanisms. But the 
information processing behavior of individuals is contingent on the perceived sufficiency of information 
(Chaiken and Trope, 1999). When available information and knowledge is deemed insufficient to the task at 
hand, individuals will display a higher level of epistemic motivation to engage in effortful and substantive 
information processing (Kruglanski and Webster, 1996). Conversely, when existing information or prior 
experience is seen as sufficient, epistemic motivation is reduced as individuals consider the relevant 
information requirements to be met and are able to rely more extensively on extant knowledge, expertise, 
and even heuristic reasoning (De Dreu, Nijstad, and van Knippenberg, 2008; Scholten et al., 2007). 
This sufficiency principle is consistent with dual process models of human cognition (Evans, 2008). 
When epistemic motivation is high, individuals will seek to engage in substantive information processing 
and allocate more time and effort to thorough elaboration of task-relevant information (Kahneman, 2003). At 
the group level, this involves “the exchange of information and perspectives, individual-level processing of 
the information and perspectives, the process of feeding back the results of this individual-level processing 
into the group, and discussion and integration of its implications” (Van Knippenberg, De Dreu, and Homan, 
2004: 1011).  
Substantive processing is often implicitly assumed when lateral integration structures are touted as 
superior mechanisms, since diverse information is expected to be effectively shared and processed among 
team members to foster more well-informed decisions (Hinsz et al., 1997; Jehn, Northcraft, and Neale, 
1999). Evidence would indicate, however, that this is not always the case (Kerr and Tindale, 2004; Lau and 
Murnighan, 2005). It is only individuals with high epistemic motivation who are expected to dedicate 
sufficient effort to afford this improved information processing capacity by fostering a joint skepticism of the 
adequacy of initially shared information and an openness to others’ unique information (Galinsky and Kray, 
2004; Scholten et al., 2007). Therefore, when organizations implement integration mechanisms that enable 
more personal and frequent interaction, high levels of epistemic motivation are expected to help realize the 
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benefits of diversity and pooled information processing by avoiding decisions made only on the basis of 
initially shared information and preferences while ignoring unshared information (Stasser and Titus, 1985). 
The withholding or redistribution of effort, on the other hand, implies the use of comparatively simple 
heuristic reasoning as a means of preserving cognitive resources for alternative or competing activities (e.g. 
Gavetti and Levinthal, 2000; Gigerenzer and Goldstein, 1996; Hogarth and Karelaia, 2005). With low levels 
of epistemic motivation, individuals may substitute the substantive sharing and processing of diverse 
information for more associative and intuitive information processing that exploits experience and 
environmental regularities (Kahneman and Klein, 2009). Heuristic reasoning relies on the use of adaptive 
strategies in uncertain situations with complex informational characteristics (Rusou, Zakay, and Usher, 2013) 
that systematically ignore available information (Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier, 2011) and reduce the tendency 
to exchange information (Kelly and Loving, 2004). As such, heuristic reasoning is linked to reduced time 
and cost of information processing and decision making. In groups, heuristic reasoning has also been shown 
to support coordination and knowledge sharing by reducing the complexity and therefore the absorptive 
capacity requirements of the information being communicated. Thus, heuristic strategies are described as 
“efficient cognitive processes that ignore information” (Gigerenzer and Brighton, 2009: 107) and have been 
identified as “potentially valuable firm resources” (Maitland and Sammartino, 2015: 1574). 
 
2.3 HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
COGNITIVE CONSTRAINTS ON THE SUFFICIENCY PRINCIPLE 
Whether individuals regard available information as sufficient depends on interactions between task 
characteristics and psychological traits (De Dreu et al., 2008; Nijstad and De Dreu, 2012). Individuals with 
more pronounced needs for cognitive closure (Webster and Kruglanski, 1994) tend to prefer rapid acquisition 
and processing of information to arrive at feasible decisions (Kruglanski and Webster, 1996), as compared to 
individuals disposed to avoid closure. Preference for closure means epistemic motivation is comparatively 
low and the sufficiency condition is satisfied with less effort. Heuristic reasoning is therefore more prevalent. 
In contrast, when individuals possess high needs for cognition and are more tolerant of ambiguity (Cacioppo 
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et al., 1996), with an overall openness to experience (Homan et al., 2008), higher epistemic motivation 
ensues. This leads individuals to engage in more substantive information processing and to be more 
cognizant of divergent input (Kearney et al., 2009).  
When tasks are beset by urgency and time pressure, the effect of need for cognitive closure on epistemic 
motivation is augmented so as to motivate more heuristic reasoning (De Dreu, 2003). Under similar 
conditions, the impact of a higher need for cognition and tolerance for ambiguity on epistemic motivation is 
mitigated, which restrains the push for more analytical reasoning (Verplanken, 1993). As detailed below, 
such findings on urgency and time pressure are symptomatic of a wider range of research into elements of 
organizational structure, job design, and task characteristics that dictate the level of cognitive load 
experienced by each employee and, hence, their preferred information processing strategy (Marois and 
Ivanoff, 2005; Ocasio, 1997; Shah and Oppenheimer, 2008). However, measures of time pressure, urgency, 
and general task complexity (Campbell, 1988; Hærem, Pentland, and Miller, 2015) are often wedded to the 
particular characteristics and conditions of the task at hand, which may be difficult for managers to anticipate 
and consistently account for. It is therefore relevant to consider the cognitive effects of more transparent and 
malleable elements of the organization design; in particular the allocation of employees and their attendant 
workload (see also Turner and Makhija, 2012). 
Individuals are boundedly rational with cognitive constraints (Simon, 1990). Their processing capacity is 
limited by finite cognitive resources (Marois and Ivanoff, 2005), scarcity of attention (Ocasio, 1997; Shiffrin 
and Schneider, 1977), and short-term working memory (Barrett, Tugade, and Engle, 2004). As cognitive and 
attentional resources are strained by work requirements, individuals compensate by satisficing in information 
acquisition and processing (Simon, 1955) through problemistic search and heuristic reasoning as a means of 
adapting to rationality constraints (Kahneman, 2003). Individual behavior is therefore sensitive to changes in 
task environments and working arrangements that increase cognitive load by diluting attention and 
introducing more extensive information processing requirements (Shah and Oppenheimer, 2008).  
Managerial decisions on the allocation of employees to tasks and domains within the firm, as well as the 
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reification of those decisions through organizational structure and working arrangements, determine the 
variation in task environments experienced by employees. This includes the variety of tasks to which each 
employee must pay attention and contribute (Harrison and Klein, 2007; Ocasio, 1997), as well as the number 
and types of interdependencies with other individuals and units (Puranam et al., 2012). When organizational 
tasks are associated with greater knowledge intensity and (causal) ambiguity, it is often necessary to bring a 
broader range of knowledge and skills to bear on each differentiated task (Tushman and Nadler, 1978). 
Collaboration between heterogeneous individuals within and across organizational units therefore becomes 
increasingly common (Mathieu et al., 2014), along with the need to mitigate the coordinative and 
collaborative difficulties that arise when individuals hold different perceptions and asymmetric knowledge 
(Dougherty, 1992; Kretschmer and Puranam, 2008). As such, recent research has emphasized multiple team 
memberships as an increasingly common characteristic of life in the firm (O’Leary et al., 2011); particularly 
among knowledge workers and in dynamic contexts (Cummings and Haas, 2012). 
 Organizational design choices to promote multiple memberships are justified by productivity concerns. 
Specifically, it enables an improved utilization of individual resources and time, since the distribution of 
individual workload tends to be uneven and, therefore, inefficient when confined to only one task or team 
(O’Leary et al., 2011: 466; Milgrom and Roberts, 1992: 409). Yet, these gains come at a cost. Scholars have 
proposed a curvilinear relationship between productivity gains and the number and variety of tasks or teams 
to which one is allocated (O’Leary et al., 2011). This expectation is based mainly on the observation that a 
higher level of utilization and an increasing number and variety of contexts to which the individual must 
respond will render individuals less flexible and, hence, more likely to have to coordinate asynchronously 
with team members, which increases processing time (Postrel, 2009). Furthermore, alternating between 
different task contexts engenders switching costs in the form of higher cognitive load and information 
processing time (LePine, Podsakoff, and LePine, 2005; Rubinstein, Meyer, and Evans, 2001) due to 
increases in perceived complexity (Meyer and Kieras, 1997: 10). Specifically, interpersonal complexity is 
expected to increase as multiple memberships create more interfaces between individuals with different 
knowledge, perceptions, prioritizations, and professional languages (De Vries, Walter, Van der Vegt, and 
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Essens, 2014; Dougherty, 1992). Similarly, architectural complexity is expected to increase as individuals 
are made to participate in more contexts, because they require greater architectural knowledge of “how the 
components of a system are related to each other” (Puranam et al., 2012: 420), yet face constraints to 
individual attention that restrict their ability to recognize, understand, and respond to a large number of 
interfaces (Ocasio, 1997; Park and Ungson, 2001). This is especially true as interdependencies change 
dynamically (Stan and Puranam, 2016). It follows that although analytical reasoning is well suited for more 
complex tasks, organizational design choices that increase utilization and perceived complexities push 
boundedly rational individuals towards heuristic reasoning as a means of managing and compensating for 
cognitive load (Gavetti, Levinthal, and Rivkin, 2005; Shiffrin and Schneider, 1977). Hence, we 
fundamentally expect cognitive load to be negatively associated with allocated effort. 
Hypothesis 1: When cognitive load increases, individuals will allocate less effort to a project. 
 
ALLOCATING ON THE BASIS OF VALUE SIGNALS 
There is mounting evidence that individuals condition their collaborative effort on signals from their peers 
(Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004; Fischbacher and Gächter, 2010). A large cadre of experimental studies in the 
economics and psychology literatures have explored how subjects factor in the expected or revealed 
contributions of others in their decisions on how much to contribute in collaboration (Brandts and Schram, 
2001; Frey and Meier, 2004). Explanations of this phenomenon have centered on issues of fairness and 
equitable distribution (Chaudhuri, 2011). Specifically, humans are inherently reciprocal creatures and often 
share an aversion towards perceived inequity either in gains or in effort (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Rabin, 
1993). Notably, this has been shown to hold both under conditions of advantageous and disadvantageous 
distributions, thus promoting discussion on inequity aversion as an integral part of utility (Binmore and 
Shaked, 2010; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000). 
Fundamentally, perceived fairness is expected to elicit reciprocal cooperation (Axelrod and 
Hamilton, 1981; Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003), while perceived unfairness engenders reciprocal defection 
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from collaboration (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004). Relatedly, evidence from recent experiments in the 
psychology literature provides another important link between cognitive load and conditional cooperation by 
demonstrating the existence of behavioral spillovers (e.g. Cason et al., 2012). In essence, behavioral 
spillover effects occur when individuals replicate strategies used in predictable settings into more complex 
and uncertain settings as a means of conserving cognitive resources. Using four different games, Bednar et 
al. (2012) explore behavioral spillover effects under cognitive load and find evidence that overloaded 
individuals are fundamentally impaired when it comes to efficiently selecting more valuable strategies 
separately for each task. Instead, they replicate strategies from low entropy settings into high entropy 
settings, indicating that the behavioral impact of cognitive load is pervasive and can lead individuals to 
maintain or adopt sub-optimal strategies.  
These findings are reinforced in a recent study by Duffy and Smith (2014), who manipulate 
cognitive load in a prisoner’s dilemma game with multiple players and conclude that low load subjects are 
better able to behave strategically. Specifically, low load subjects will strategically defect the game more 
readily as repeated games draw to a close, and are therefore more capable of conditioning their behavior on 
prior displays of collaboration from peers (see also Milinski and Wedekind, 1998). Similarly, Schulz et al. 
(2014) find that low load individuals are more likely to seek advantageously unfair outcomes and are more 
sensitive to perceived inequality, which adds to the fundamental insight that high cognitive load precludes 
strategic adaptation of behavior. This aligns with findings from research on the social heuristics hypothesis 
(Rand, 2016), which demonstrate that low load subjects engage in more selfish behaviors and are more likely 
to adapt their behavior to maximize personal pay-offs, as compared to high load subjects. In game theory 
terms, increasing cognitive load functions as a corner solution that locks subjects into stable and rather 
indiscriminate strategies without responding to indications of reciprocity or fairness. While this may promote 
cooperation and preclude opportunistic adaption, it may at the same time lead to the maintenance and 
augmentation of objectively inferior strategies (Cason et al., 2012; Van Huyck, Battalio, and Beil, 1991). 
The above findings lead us to predict individuals without high cognitive load to be better able to respond 
to signals of fairness as a means of improving equitable distribution of effort, and to be more responsive to 
value signals indicating strategic opportunities to redistribute (or reaffirm) effort to maximize perceived 
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value generated (Rand, 2016). On the contrary, individuals under high load will be comparatively insensitive 
to value signals, as they are less able to respond strategically and rather rely on more indiscriminate and 
replicating strategies (Duffy and Smith, 2014). Hence, we propose the following hypothesis set: 
Hypothesis 2a: In the absence of high cognitive load, individuals will allocate more effort to a project as 
value signals become stronger. 
Hypothesis 2b: When cognitive load is high, individuals will not change their effort allocation in 
response to value signals. 
 
ALLOCATING ON THE BASIS OF UNCERTAINTY SIGNALS 
The level of heterogeneity or noise in peer contributions has recently come under scrutiny (Hartig et 
al., 2015; Van den Berg et al., 2015) with the explicit expectation that individuals condition their own 
cooperation on this variation. In line with expectations, studies generally find that individuals contribute less 
and are less likely to reciprocate and cooperate in the face of greater heterogeneity in peer contributions (see 
also Cheung, 2014). A likely explanation for this is that heterogeneity decreases the perceived predictability 
of peers and, therefore, makes expectations regarding reciprocity and cooperative behavior less reliable 
(Wolf, Van Doorn and Weissing, 2011).  
When the collaborative environment is comparatively noisy with less reliable sociocognitive 
perceptions, adaptation is limited and individual information processing behavior becomes sticky (Rand, 
2016). Specifically, individuals with low cognitive load may choose to maintain their level of contribution in 
spite of initial violations of reciprocity. When information about peer behavior is uncertain and perceptions 
are less reliable, there is an incentive to avoid punishing one-time defectors that perhaps defect by accident 
or are justified in doing so for unobservable reasons, as these peers may again become cooperative (Van den 
Berg et al., 2015). This concern with avoiding the “continuing echo of a single error” under uncertainty (Wu 
and Axelrod, 1995: 188) is replicated by Fudenberg et al. (2012: 721) who find that “while there are 
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evolutionary arguments for cooperation in repeated games with perfectly observed actions, the evolutionary 
arguments for cooperative equilibria are even stronger with imperfect observations, as the possibility that 
punishment may be triggered by ‘mistake’ decreases the viability of unrelenting or grim strategies that 
respond to a single bad observation by never cooperating again”. Relating these findings more directly to 
the notion of variability and heterogeneity, McNamara et al. (2004: 745) argue that “if variability is 
maintained, and hence there is a chance that an opponent will cooperate, then there is the potential for a 
substantial gain, and it may be worth cooperating initially in the hope that the opponent is cooperative”.  
In a similar vein, low load individuals have been shown to respond more reasonable and patiently to 
more complex tasks and prospects, despite their intuitive aversion to higher processing demands and the 
inherent uncertainty (Shamosh and Gray, 2008). For instance, cognitive load manipulations have been found 
to increase impulsive behavior in high load subjects (Hinson, Jameson, and Whitney, 2003; Shiv and 
Fedorikhin, 1999) and, by the same token, lead to more risk-averse behavior (Benjamin et al., 2013; 
Whitney, Rinehart, and Hinson, 2008). In terms of the dual process theory with which we began this chapter, 
that is, the distinction between analytical and heuristic modes of thinking, low load subjects may simply be 
superior in activating analytical resources to avoid bias and curb risk-aversion for long enough to properly 
assess and distinguish between signals of complexity, which may indicate potentials for value-maximizing 
problem-solving (Loewenstein and O’Donoghue, 2005; Fudenberg and Levine, 2006), or more indeterminate 
risk. Building on these insights, we hypothesize that individuals without high load are better able to 
accommodate and distinguish between uncertainty signals and may therefore respond by allocating more 
time to complexity signals and remaining rather insensitive to risk. On the contrary, high load employees are 
expected to reduce effort in the presence of either form of uncertainty signal. 
Hypothesis 3a: In the absence of high cognitive load, individuals will maintain effort or allocate more 
effort to a project as uncertainty signals become stronger. 
Hypothesis 3b: When cognitive load is high, individuals will allocate less effort to a project as 
uncertainty signals become stronger. 
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On a final note, it may be worth considering the role of management teams in the ability of 
employees to respond to signals. Specifically, it is a well-established fact in management literature that the 
delegation of autonomy from management teams to project employees is directly contingent on managerial 
workload. Hence, Yukl argues that “decisions may be delegated because the manager responsible for them 
is overloaded and unable to give the decision adequate attention” (1981: 227). Similarly, Leana (1986) 
found support for the hypothesis that “subordinates whose supervisors are facing greater workloads will be 
delegated more authority”. Therefore, we hypothesize, quite simply, that increasing cognitive load of the 
management team may constitute a necessary condition for employees to act on risk-averse behavior.  
Hypothesis 4: As the cognitive load of the management team increases, employees will allocate less 
effort to a project as risk levels increase. 
 
2.4 DATA AND METHODS 
The empirical setting for this study is new product development (Adler, 1995). Specifically, we benefit from 
privileged access to comprehensive data relating to the full set of active NPD projects in a global hydraulic 
pump manufacturer over a two-year period. Our primary source of information for this study is the employee 
time registration system, which contains monthly data on the distribution of working hours among projects, 
tasks, and other activities for all employees below top management level. Employees are requested to log 
between 90-95% of their working time, including absence, illness, meetings, and other more fixed activities. 
Implicitly, employees have significant autonomy in the prioritization and allocation of significant parts of 
their time, due largely to the managerial expectation that employees need this level of freedom to effectively 
generate value for the company. 
To describe and control for contextual and individual factors that will likely influence the distribution 
choices of the individual employee, we consolidate data from 501 monthly reports from 34 unique NPD 
projects in the two-year period and obtain matching HR data for all individual employees in the project 
sample across all months. These human resource data include information on individual demographics, job 
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descriptions, physical location, and departmental affiliation, among other things, and allows us to track 
changes in these factors over time. Thus, by matching time registration data with demographic and work-
related information, we are able to longitudinally trace important variation in the performance of projects, the 
composition and effort of teams, and cognitive load differentials between team members, to better describe 
and control for the determinants of individual choices. 
The combination of three distinct data sources with separate contributors (project management teams, 
individual employees, and the HR department, respectively) helps mitigate concerns of common method bias 
(Podsakoff et al., 2003), which is a significant risk with this type of self-reported data that is prone to 
measurement error (Boyd, Dess, and Rasheed, 1993). Integrating these data sources, we end up with 5,102 
useable project-month-employee observations corresponding to 451 unique employees across 30 projects 
over 24 months. It is important to recognize that employees are effectively nested within projects. While our 
dependent variable matches this data structure by being unique to the employee on each project in a given 
month, we nevertheless exploit project-level independent and control variables. We are therefore faced with 
separate error terms at the individual and project levels. To account for this fact, we employ robust standard 
errors (adjusting for 1,195 clusters in the panel) to account for repeated observations at the project level. We 
also employ fixed effects estimation (on the basis of a Durbin-Wu-Hausman test) to limit between-unit 
variation and further mitigate residual non-random effects.  
 
Variable construction 
Dependent variable 
Individual effort allocation (̅ = 0.35; σ = 0.33) represents the distribution of employee working hours 
among the projects to which an employee contributes in a given month. The measure is constructed as a ratio 
of the number of working hours allocated by the employee to each project compared to the total number of 
working hours clocked by the employee. As this distribution changes between months and as a consequence 
of ongoing variation in the particular subset of projects to which the employee actively contributes, each 
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observational pair (project-month-employee) in the dataset represents a uniquely meaningful observation. 
The measure is adjusted to account for the fact that not all hours registered in a month are free to vary. We 
specifically exclude hours dedicated to absence (holiday and illness) and preplanned educational activities 
(formal education or seminars) to improve our approximation of the conditions underlying effort allocation 
decisions in the firm. 
 
Independent and moderating variables 
Value rank (̅ = 7.56; σ = 0.81) represents the performance ranking in a given month of all projects to 
which the employee contributes. The measure is constructed as a simple ranking with higher values 
signifying that the observed project is performing well relative to other projects of which the individual is 
part. The underlying performance metric used to construct the ranking is project timeliness, which is 
estimated using monthly project reports as the difference between the objective deadline, fixed by project 
management at the outset or midway point of the project, and currently expected completion date, which is 
updated continuously by project management if there is need to adjust expectations. Using this continuously 
adjusted measure effectively incorporates delays that have been anticipated by the management, but may not 
have had time to manifest.  
To account for differences in project size and their obvious impact on expected duration and magnitude 
of delays, we weigh the calculated difference by the planned project lifespan. The timeliness metric is further 
adjusted for delays incurred at the outset of the active phase in order to avoid inducing downwards bias in 
timeliness estimates. Given our access to the full ensemble of monthly reports, it is possible to estimate, at 
any given point in a project, the amount of additional delay that will be incurred beyond the current 
completion date estimate. This excess delay is most likely attributable to errors committed between phase 
inception and the point at which the delay is recognized and incorporated as an updated completion date. 
Hence, excess delay is allocated equally to each month in this period to control for hidden errors. These 
adjustments improve the statistical properties of our model, but all findings remain robust to their exclusion. 
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Fairness (̅ = 0.69; σ = 0.07) is measured as a Blau Index (Blau, 1977) of the amount of hours 
contributed by each group member to a given project in a given month.  To abide by the requirements of the 
Blau Index that the underlying distribution is organized categorically, the continuous measure of allocated 
hours was subdivided into six categories. The subdivision was determined on the basis of the nominal hours 
expected from employees, that is, a monthly average of 165 hours according to common Danish work time 
regulations. As employees are requested to register between 90-95 % of their work time in the work time 
registration system, we chose to center our subdivision equidistant between the full nominal hours and the 
90% cut-off point so as to avoid biasing our measure either way. Two additional cut-off points in either 
direction from this centre value, corresponding to 15 % intervals, were then used to generate six categories 
that each constitute between 11.8% and 24.5 % of the sample.  
Task complexity (̅ = 6.2; σ = 5) is defined and measured at the project level. Specifically, complexity is 
proxied by the number of identified and active problems currently undergoing analysis and problem solving. 
These numbers are updated monthly. As the number of identified problems increase, additional resources are 
dedicated to their resolution, including analysis, meetings, and finding relevant countermeasures. 
Requirements for analytical information processing are expected to increase accordingly. Project managers 
are limited to reporting a maximum of five active problems at any given time. However, they are required to 
describe the severity of each on a four-point scale spanning (1) problem identified; (2) owner/investigation; 
(3) containment in place; and (4) countermeasure confirmed. Our complexity measure is constructed by 
tallying the reversed values of the ratings of each active problem in order to assign more weight to 
unresolved problems. 
Risk level (̅ = 2.02; σ = 0.78) is reported monthly in the project manager report as a complement to the 
measure of number of active problems (complexity), mainly because the number of problems may signify 
either dire straits for the project or simply an astute and diligent management team. The risk level is 
measured as either (1) No risk, (2) Some items behind schedule but no risk to project, or (3) Genuine risk to 
project, and accounts for unobserved variation in the status of the project as a meaningfully distinct signal of 
uncertainty. 
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Cognitive load is measured in this paper as individual structural load (̅ = 3.6; σ = 2.7); a composite 
measure of the number of projects and other tasks to which the employee contributes (α = 0.75). Multiple 
projects and tasks engender switching costs and an increasing strain on cognitive capacity (LePine et al., 
2005; O’Leary et al., 2011). Relatedly, this involvement in multiple arenas may lead to social complexity, to 
the extent that the employee must engage with an increasing number of people with separate professions, 
perspectives, and languages (De Vries et al., 2014; Dougherty, 1992). Hence, we control for individual 
interpersonal load (̅ = 39.7; σ = 22.2), measured as the number of individuals that are interfaced with in a 
given month. This measure is used as a robustness check of cognitive load. 
To account for variation in the delegation of authority and frequency of direct involvement as alternative 
influences on information processing and performance (Leana, 1986), we control for the cognitive load of the 
management team (̅ = 9.3; σ = 2.3). As we lack time registration data for all managers (they are not subject 
to the same requirements as other employees), we rely instead on a composite average of the total number of 
management teams each manager actively participates in and the number of unique individuals that co-
participate in these teams in the same month (α = 0.7).  
Control variables 
As time registrations are structured with monthly intervals, month dummies are included to control for 
aggregate time-series trends. By the same token, phase dummies are added in light of the standardized stage-
gate structure of NPD projects to capture phase-specific effects, e.g. different mean levels of work intensity, 
uncertainty, or integration frequency. The inclusion of categorical variables to account for the fundamental 
structure of our data helps mitigate omitted variable bias. Their exclusion would risk spurious regression 
results (Malmendier and Nagel, 2011).  
We control for management team size (̅ = 9; σ = 1.2) to account for the well-known effects of group 
size on team functioning and the tendency to delegate (Hackman, 1983; Thomas and Fink, 1963). We 
measure employee managerial responsibilities using a dummy to capture unregistered workload. 
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Additionally, we control for individual temporal load (̅ = 139; σ = 52.7) as the number of hours registered, 
subtracting all hours registered as absence or illness. 
We control for project member seniority (̅ = 14.8; σ = 10.5) and age (̅ = 44.5; σ = 9.5) to account for 
the myriad effects related to both aging and experience. Building relevant expertise and accumulating 
domain-specific knowledge takes time and deliberate practice (Armstrong and Mahmud, 2008; Ericsson and 
Charness, 1994). Expertise and domain-specific knowledge correlate highly with problem solving efficiency 
(Gick, 1986; Larkin et al., 1980), improved decision making (Kahneman and Klein, 2009; Salas, Rosen, and 
Diaz Granados, 2010) and job performance (Dreyfus and Dreyfus, 2005; Ericsson and Lehmann, 1996; 
McCloy, Campbell, and Cudeck, 1994). But experience has a darker side as domain-entrenchment (see Dane, 
2010; Holyoak, 1991) may lead to loss of flexibility and adaptability in experienced individuals. This may 
directly influence collaborative abilities (Camerer, Loewenstein, and Weber, 1989). Moreover, it may leave 
the acquired competences vulnerable to change and diminish the ability of the individual to adapt and 
integrate (Cañas et al., 2003). Similarly, age is associated with multiple effects on ability and performance. 
Chiefly, aging is seen to directly impact cognitive capacity and decision making (Glisky, 2007; Mell et al., 
2009; Mutter, Strain, and Plumlee, 2007), but aging decision makers have demonstrated an ability to 
compensate to some degree by adapting their decision heuristics to environmental characteristics (Hertwig 
and Todd, 2003; Mata et al., 2012; Mata, von Helversen, and Rieskamp, 2010). Therefore, both variables are 
sources of important variation in decision-making and allocation of time. 
Correlation matrix and descriptive statistics (standard deviations and mean, minimum, and maximum 
values) are reported in Table 2.1. 
 
2.5 RESULTS 
The results from our hierarchical regression are presented in Table 2.2. All control variables and the four 
main independent regressors are included in Model 1. This constitutes our baseline model. The baseline is 
expanded in Model 2, as all four main independent regressors are interacted with our measure of cognitive 
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load to test the hypothesized moderating effects of cognitive load on the salience of each signal for effort 
distribution. Model 3 introduces an interaction between the cognitive load of the management team and the 
reported risk level to test the expected enabling effect of management cognitive load on risk-aversion in 
effort distribution. Models 4 and 5 include robustness checks. As all but the first model include two-way 
interactions, all non-binary regressors were mean centered. Independent and average variance inflation 
factors (VIF) did not indicate multicollinearity (1.01-1.78, x = 1.32). 
Consistent with our first hypothesis, our structural measure of cognitive load is negatively associated 
with the amount of hours allocated to the project (p<0.001) across all models. This aligns with our 
fundamental expectation that cognitive load induces compensatory behavior on the part of the individual, as 
well as the use of more heuristic reasoning to conserve cognitive resources. Interestingly, it can be observed 
from Model 1 how the four signals impact allocation in the main. In line with our theoretical argument, value 
signals (fairness and value rank) motivate the allocation of more hours to a project. Similarly, risk level is 
associated with lower allocation. However, and in line with Hypothesis 3a, task complexity is seen to 
motivate more effort. This may simply reflect the fact that in the absence of cognitive load, individuals are 
able to better  assess and act upon complexity as a potential for value-maximizing action ((Loewenstein and 
O’Donoghue, 2005; Fudenberg and Levine, 2006). 
Consistent with our second set of hypotheses, Hypothesis 2a and 2b, we find in Model 2 and 3 that 
individuals with low (mean) levels of cognitive load are comparatively more likely to allocate more of their 
available time to projects with clear value signals. Thus, we find highly significant interactions of structural 
load with both value rank (p<0.001) and fairness (p<0.001). To support these interpretations, we plot the 
effects of each interaction in Figures 2.1 and 2.2, respectively. Figure 2.1 shows the expected increase for 
mean load subjects, but a decline for high load subjects, as value generation prospects increase. Figure 2.2 
shows a similar increase for mean load subjects to teams with fair distributions of effort, and no identifiable 
change for high load subjects, which is in line with the hypothesized insensitivity.  
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Hypothesis 3a and 3b find partial support in our regression. The results demonstrate a significant 
interaction between structural load and task complexity (p<0.05), but no significant interaction with risk 
level. The significant interaction with task complexity is plotted in Figure 2.3 and indicates the expected 
decline in effort for high cognitive load individuals. Interestingly, we see an increase in effort from mean 
load subjects, which is in line with our hypothesis that in the absence of cognitive load, employees may be 
better able to accommodate complexity and distinguish it from more general signals of risk as a potential for 
value-adding behavior and problem-solving (Loewenstein and O’Donoghue, 2005; Fudenberg and Levine, 
2006).  
Finally, our fourth hypothesis on cognitive load of the management team as an enabling condition for 
risk-averse behavior is supported by the significant interaction term between risk level and cognitive load of 
management team in Model 3 (p<0.001). Graphing this interaction in Figure 2.4, we find that increasing load 
is correlated with a general decline in the amount of hours allocated to a project under risk, while we observe 
a minor increase with mean levels of cognitive load of the management. This minor increase is likely due to 
the fact that in the absence of high cognitive load, management will be both more inclined and better able to 
push for more involvement from employees to address risk. 
In sum, we confirm a substantial part of our hypotheses. We do not find direct support for Hypothesis 
3b, but we do find support for Hypothesis 4, which posits an alternative and more indirect relationship that 
may explain the insignificant findings on the relationship between risk level and structural load. 
We conduct two separate robustness checks. First, a major concern with our statistical specification is 
the simultaneity of our dependent variable on observed time distribution and our independent variables on 
cognitive load and the distinct signals. While the measures underlying these constructs are all reported in 
hindsight (managers assess the status of the project; employees register their working time), and therefore 
correspond in time, there is a plausible argument to be made that adjustments in time distribution patterns 
occur, at least partially, as a lagged phenomenon, as employees have to recognize, process, and consciously 
adapt to perceived signals, and to opt out of particular arrangements that may be sticky in terms of short term 
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participation. To check the robustness of our findings against these concerns, we lag our cognitive load 
measure by one month and re-run the regression. As seen in Model 4, all findings lend themselves to similar 
interpretation and do in fact improve both in terms of statistical significance and graphical features.  
Second, a valid concern arises from our inability to observe objective cognitive load, i.e. the neurological 
correlates of our variables of interest. While the accumulation of such data outside laboratory conditions 
would be highly expensive and limiting in terms of sample size and general feasibility, it is nevertheless 
potentially problematic to use the number of projects and tasks as a direct measure of cognitive load when 
the dependent variable of interest is time distribution. Hence, a competing interpretation of our findings 
could be that having more projects to attend to would limit the ability to distribute much time to either of 
them and therefore reduce the average time allocated to each project. There are, however, relevant arguments 
against such an interpretation. First, even if the competing interpretation were correct, this would only 
impact our observed main effect of structural load (Hypothesis 1), essentially as a spurious effect. However, 
there is no immediate reason to expect the observed pattern of associations between cognitive load and our 
four signal indicators, if increasing cognitive load were unequivocally tied to reductions in average time 
allocation. Second, employees generally do not allocate all of their time to projects and project-related tasks, 
but instead allocate parts of their time to meetings, helping behavior, department time and departmental 
activities, etc. It is plausible that time would be siphoned from these sources as readily, or perhaps more 
readily, than from competing projects, at least in the short term. Despite these arguments, we re-specify our 
model to use temporal load as a substitute for structural load. The measure is only weakly correlated with 
structural load (0.08), probably due to the significant variation in the proportion of working time dedicated to 
project work. As shown in Model 5, we partially confirm our findings. The interaction with risk level 
remains insignificant, similar to Model 3. In addition, the interaction term between temporal load and 
fairness becomes wholly insignificant, and the interaction with complexity, while significant, becomes 
harder to interpret meaningfully in terms of effect size and sign of effect. The contingent effects of value 
rank are confirmed. Such inconclusive and partially conflicting findings only emphasize the need for more 
fine-grained measures of cognitive load and related variables, as discussed further in the following section. 
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2.6 CONCLUDING DISCUSSION 
There is an assumption in the literature that delegation of decision authority to lower hierarchal levels is 
desirable both for upper and lower tiers of organizations. Delegation reduces the cognitive burden in the 
upper echelons (Harris and Raviv, 2002; Mintzberg, 1979), collocates decision authority with decision 
specific knowledge (Jensen and Meckling, 1992) and grants autonomy to front line employees, which in turn 
motivates them (Bénabou and Tirole, 2003) to exert greater effort and initiative in problem solving. At the 
same time, however, the existence of clear bounds on human cognition has been taken to imply a negative 
association between increasing workload and firm performance (e.g. LePine et al., 2005; O’Leary et al., 
2011; Rubinstein et al., 2001). If greater delegation through more lateral integration mechanisms induces 
cognitive load by increasing both the variety of tasks to which an employee must pay attention (Harrison and 
Klein, 2007; Ocasio, 1997), the number of interdependencies with other employees and tasks (Puranam et 
al., 2012), and the cognitive costs incurred by having to switch more frequently between different tasks 
(O’Leary et al., 2011; LePine et al., 2005), then it is relevant to explore the boundary conditions of more 
lateral mechanisms and delegation in terms of their ability to promote information processing and 
integration. 
In this paper, we explore and attempt to nuance this expectation that lateral mechanisms foster greater 
information processing capacity through more personal relationships and more individual autonomy by 
showing how cognitive load may interfere with the implicit assumption that individuals allocate sufficient 
time and effort to these mechanisms. We argue that the individual allocation of effort among competing tasks 
and projects depends fundamentally on the level of cognitive load, as differences in cognitive load will lead 
individuals to base their decisions and prioritizations on different signals. Specifically, we argue that 
individuals without high cognitive load will navigate mostly on value signals, which include differences in 
performance between projects and the fairness of contribution exhibited by team members. Conversely, we 
expect individuals with high cognitive load to become insensitive to value signals and to instead base their 
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behavior on uncertainty signals, which include task complexity and generalized risk, and to do so in a risk-
averse manner (Benjamin et al., 2013; Whitney et al., 2008).   
Drawing on extensive data from the time registration records of a global manufacturing firm, we find 
support for our general hypothesis that the realized information processing capacity of lateral mechanisms 
(i.e. the use of cross-functional teams and project organizing with autonomous behavior) is contingent on the 
cognitive load and allocative behavior of individuals. Specifically, we find that while individuals tend to 
generally reduce their commitment under cognitive load (Hypothesis 1), mean load subjects increase their 
commitment in order to reciprocate fairness within the team and to maximize value by contributing mostly to 
those projects that display best performance (Hypothesis 2a). High load subjects are insensitive to such value 
signals (Hypothesis 2b). Similarly, while mean load subjects tend to increase their commitment in response 
to complexity, largely, we theorize, due to their ability to construe complexity as an opportunity to generate 
valuable contributions, individuals with high cognitive load become risk-averse and reduce their effort in 
such settings (Hypothesis 3a). While we find no evidence of a direct effect of employee cognitive load in 
conjunction with risk (Hypothesis 3b), we do find that the cognitive load of the management functions as an 
enabling conditions for individuals to act on risk-aversion, due to the expected increase in delegation and 
autonomy (Hypothesis 4). 
Our findings tie together a conflux of theoretical perspectives and findings on both the use of lateral 
mechanisms and multiple team memberships to support integration (O’Leary et al., 2011; Van de Ven et al., 
1976), the effects of delegation on employee behavior (Aghion and Tirole, 1976; Bénabou and Tirole, 2003), 
the tendency for individuals to condition their behavior on signals from both their environment and their 
peers (Cason et al., 2012; Duffy and Smith, 2014; Rand, 2016), and the role of cognitive limitations and 
cognitive load in determining the allocation of effort (Hinson et al., 2003; Loewenstein and O’Donoghue, 
2005; Shiv and Fedorikhin, 1999). On the basis of these combinations, we are able to provide novel 
explanations of how and when the use of lateral mechanisms is an efficient means of fostering integration 
and aligning employee behavior with the interests of the organization. Specifically, we shed light on the 
question of when intended information processing capacity is in fact realized (Turner and Makhija, 2012) by 
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demonstrating the role of individual choice behavior under cognitive load. These findings have implications 
for the theoretical cohesiveness and practical applicability of organizational information processing theory 
(Tushman and Nadler, 1978) as a framework for the adoption of particular structures and organizational 
designs to support the integration of dispersed knowledge and human capital from separate parts of the 
organization. 
In general, the paper contributes to the emerging view that there is not necessarily a strict relationship 
between cognitive load, rationality constraints, and decreased information processing performance (e.g. Berg 
and Hoffrage, 2008). While we are not directly concerned with performance in this paper, our findings on the 
allocation of effort inform the distinction in much management theory between more heuristic and more 
analytical processes (Maitland and Sammartino, 2015; O’Leary et al., 2011; Vuori and Vuori, 2014). One of 
the key distinguishing features of these two classes of information processing strategies is their differences in 
effort and time requirement (Marois and Ivanoff, 2005; Ocasio, 1997; Shah and Oppenheimer, 2008). 
Whether alignment within a group of employees occurs around high or low effort, and around analytical 
or heuristic information processing strategies, the available evidence indicates self-reinforcing effects (Hartig 
et al., 2015; Van den Berg et al., 2015). Homogeneity begets homogeneity. As described, individuals 
condition their behavior on the contributions of their peers to mitigate perceived inequality (Fehr and 
Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000) or sustain a fair equilibrium level of contribution through 
reciprocal altruism or punishment (Axelrod and Hamilton, 1981; Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004b). With 
comparable levels of effort, group members will tend to prefer similar information processing strategies and, 
hence, exhibit similar contribution patterns within the group. Cheung (2014) corroborates this self-
reinforcement by demonstrating that individuals contribute the most when peers contribute equally, which 
confirms prior findings (Gunnthorsdottir et al., 2007). With equality of behavior and contribution, there is no 
apparent incentive to punish and no one is compelled to adapt their privately preferred strategy. Instead, 
homogeneity enables reliable predictions of peer behavior, which promotes conditional cooperation and 
mutual reinforcement of commonly preferred strategies (Van den Berg et al., 2015; Wolf et al., 2011). 
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Thus, whether an observed decrease in effort negatively impacts outcomes and performance is not a 
simple question. Rather, the efficacy of decreased effort and more heuristic information processing under 
cognitive load depends on the structure of the environment, and how well heuristics exploit regularities in an 
environment (a logic related to ecological rationality, see Gigerenzer and Brighton, 2009: 116). In this paper, 
we have demonstrated how structural choices condition the level of cognitive load, and how this in turn leads 
individuals to perceive respond to different signals with implications for behavior. However, whether the 
inclination of cognitively loaded individuals to reduce their effort levels in response to complexity and risk is 
in fact an instance of detrimental risk-aversion, or rather an adaptive choice to rely on heuristic reasoning to 
conserve resources for other tasks while arriving at similar or superior solutions, is contingent on the abilities 
of the individual and the characteristics of the task. Prahalad and Bettis (1986: 489) echo this as they argue 
that individual representations or schema “permit managers to categorize an event, assess its consequences, 
and consider appropriate actions (including doing nothing)”. However, they acknowledge also that such 
schema “are not infallible guides to the organization, [and that] in fact, some are relatively inaccurate 
representations of the world”. By emphasizing both the structural and sociocognitive antecedents of effort 
distribution and information processing behavior, this paper may help pinpoint the conditions under which 
heuristic reasoning or analytical processing emerge to be efficient by expanding the standard notion of 
ecological rationality to include considerations of cognitive load and environmental signals. 
In accordance with this, the paper contributes also to the view of strategy as diligence (Powell, 2017), 
and the notion of individual agency as the engine that determines information processing capacity (Puranam 
et al., 2012; Turner and Makhija, 2012). By affording attention to seemingly mundane elements of human 
capital allocation, and how these induce patterns of behavioral adaptation and deviation from expected 
behavior, it is possible to better identify and address the less grandiose challenges facing firms on a da-to-
day basis as a complement the more mainstream views of strategy as driven by competitive advantage. 
 
Limitations and future research 
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The study is limited by our inability to directly observe cognitive load. We proxy on the number of tasks 
and projects to which the employee contributes actively, and use more generalized time measurements as 
robustness, but we are nevertheless fundamentally barred from bridging the gap between inferred and 
perceived levels of cognitive load. As such, we cannot account for differences in the way individuals 
construe the same objective conditions. This concern mirrors the notion of individually perceived complexity 
(Davis, 1989; Igbaria, Parasuraman, and Baroudi, 1996), which holds, essentially, that individuals may 
experience different levels of complexity depending on their abilities and organizational context. Allowing 
for such perceptive differences implies that complexity and other constructs are not determined solely by 
structure or characteristics of the task, but depend also on perception and individual heterogeneity (e.g. De 
Vries et al., 2014; Hærem et al., 2015). Organizational design choices impact both structural and perceptive 
complexities and, therefore, have the effect of increasing individual variability. Future research would need 
to adopt complementary measures to address these concerns. One apparent method would be to survey 
perceived cognitive load, complexity, and uncertainty at the individual level to capture relevant variation in 
the way these perceptions both deviate from secondary proxies and moderate the relationship between 
integration effort and integration outcomes. 
Additionally, while single-firm sampling accounts for firm and industry effects and mitigates extraneous 
variation (Harrigan, 1983; Siggelkow, 2007), it simultanously exposes our conclusions to firm-specific 
effects. Relatedly, we are unable to properly mitigate survivor bias arising from the fact that we only observe 
active and completed projects. Future research would need to ensure that failures are not underweighted in 
the sample (Cooper and Kleinschmidt, 1990), as well as expand the sampling strategy to multiple firms to 
improve our confidence in the generalizability of the results. 
Our findings hint at an explanation for the puzzling observation in recent studies (Hartig et al., 2015; 
Van den Berg et al., 2015) that individuals respond heterogeneously to heterogeneous behavior amongst their 
peers; heterogeneity begets heterogeneity. For instance, Van den Berg et al. (2015) find that more 
heterogeneity in collaborative effort leads to “more variable (and more extreme) contributions in response”. 
Similarly, Hartig et al. (2015: 52) find a “strong and significant positive relationship between contribution 
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heterogeneity and variation in contribution responses [suggesting that] the more spread out others’ 
contribution behavior, the higher the variation in contribution responses”. Thus, the available evidence 
points to a variation breeds variation effect that is not readily explained by previous findings on conditional 
cooperation. Our findings would indicate that variation is explained through cognitive load, as differences in 
cognitive load leads individuals to observe, and therefore act on, different signals in objectively similar 
environments. While this provides a starting point for future research on this phenomenon, scholars may also 
want to consider previous findings on environmental noise. For individuals with more pronounced levels of 
cognitive load, the environment becomes noisier, which decreases the predictability of peer behavior and 
makes sociocognitive perceptions of reciprocity more uncertain (cf. Wolf et al., 2011). Building on the work 
of Axelrod on tournament games, Bendor, Kramer, and Stout (1991) find that collaboration is more robust in 
noisy environments, as generosity outperforms immediate reciprocation. The observation that behavioral 
variation and noise partially mitigates defection is robust in subsequent research using game theory 
(McNamara et al., 2004; Wu and Axelrod, 1995). 
Our arguments are premised on conditional cooperation between interdependent agents. A number of 
important extensions of our study relate to this theory in particular. If a relationship is due to end, for 
instance, the threat of punishment and promise of collaboration would not be expected to remain credible 
deterrents of non-cooperative behavior. Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) and Falk and Fischbacher 
(2006) test this expectation by extending their model to encompass repeated games and sequential 
reciprocity. As expected, there is evidence that cooperation tapers off as the end of the relationship 
approaches. As we do not observe collaboration directly, and since our sample is mostly consisting of active 
projects, we are not able to properly account for this effect. Future research would do well, therefore, to 
include measures of planned relationship duration.  
Along the same lines, some have proposed a need to distinguish situations where direct observation of 
the behavior of others is either possible or precluded. Specifically, they have raised concerns with the 
Fischbacher et al. (2001) study and other studies for their use of the “strategy method”, which has 
participants responding to a range of hypothetical contributions rather than the observed behavior of others. 
50 
 
The main concern is that the hypothetical nature of this method, along with one-shot games that do not allow 
subjects to in fact observe the behavior of others, will not elicit the same behavior as more realistic methods 
that allow for direct observation. While we have contributed to this by testing some of these findings in a 
real-world setting, more research is needed to establish confidence in the results and their applicability. 
Finally, our findings have practical implications. To the extent that managers determine the allocation 
and rate of utilization of their human resources, and impact this through organizational design decisions (De 
Vries et al., 2014; O’Leary et al., 2011), they are effectively also impacting on the cognitive load and, hence, 
the behavior of their subordinates. By adopting a more informed view of the behavioral implications of 
cognitive load, managers may be better able to predict and even control the outcomes of allocation decisions 
and the adoption of particular organizational design elements. This relates to the larger concern in the 
management literature with the discriminating effects of particular governance choices on behavior (Foss and 
Weber, 2016; Turner and Makhija, 2012; Weber and Mayer, 2014). 
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TABLE 2.1 – CORRELATION MATRIX, ALL VARIABLES
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TABLE 2.2 – REGRESSION MODELS  
 
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
                                                                                                     
DF                                                          1194             1194             1194   
R2                                                         0.202            0.229            0.232   
N                                                           5102             5102             5102   
                                                                                                     
                                                          (0.05)           (0.05)           (0.05)   
Intercept                                                  0.371***         0.374***         0.362***
                                                          (0.06)           (0.06)           (0.06)   
Phase 7                                                   -0.153*          -0.145*          -0.140*  
                                                          (0.07)           (0.07)           (0.07)   
Phase 6                                                   -0.134*          -0.169*          -0.137+  
                                                          (0.06)           (0.06)           (0.06)   
Phase 5                                                   -0.036           -0.038           -0.036   
                                                          (0.05)           (0.05)           (0.05)   
Phase 4                                                    0.003           -0.003            0.000   
                                                          (0.05)           (0.05)           (0.05)   
Phase 3                                                    0.042            0.039            0.043   
                                                             (.)              (.)              (.)   
Phase 2                                                    0.000            0.000            0.000   
                                                          (0.01)           (0.01)           (0.01)   
Management Team Size                                       0.002            0.011            0.010   
                                                          (0.00)           (0.00)           (0.00)   
Temporal Load                                              0.000            0.000            0.000   
                                                          (0.05)           (0.04)           (0.02)   
Managerial Responsibilities                               -0.224***        -0.164***        -0.171***
                                                          (0.01)           (0.01)           (0.01)   
Age                                                       -0.015           -0.013           -0.013   
                                                          (0.01)           (0.01)           (0.01)   
Seniority                                                  0.010            0.013            0.012   
                                                          (0.00)           (0.00)           (0.00)   
Interpersonal Load                                         0.001**          0.001**          0.001** 
                                                                                            (0.00)   
Risk Level # Cognitive Load of Management Team                                              -0.009***
                                                          (0.00)           (0.00)           (0.00)   
Cognitive Load of Management Team                         -0.005           -0.005           -0.002   
                                                                           (0.00)                    
Risk Level # Structural Load                                               -0.001                    
                                                                           (0.00)           (0.00)   
Task Complexity # Structural Load                                          -0.001*          -0.001*  
                                                                           (0.04)           (0.04)   
Fairness # Structural Load                                                 -0.206***        -0.205***
                                                                           (0.00)           (0.00)   
Value Rank # Structural Load                                               -0.021***        -0.021***
                                                          (0.01)           (0.01)           (0.01)   
Risk Level                                                -0.024**         -0.026**         -0.026** 
                                                          (0.00)           (0.00)           (0.00)   
Task Complexity                                            0.004**          0.004**          0.004** 
                                                          (0.06)           (0.06)           (0.06)   
Fairness                                                   0.117+           0.021           -0.006   
                                                          (0.01)           (0.01)           (0.01)   
Value Rank                                                 0.048***         0.055***         0.054***
                                                          (0.01)           (0.01)           (0.01)   
Structural Load                                           -0.063***        -0.061***        -0.061***
                                                                                                     
                                                            b/se             b/se             b/se   
                                                          Effort           Effort           Effort   
                                                             (1)              (2)              (3)   
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FIGURE 2.1 – VALUE RANK # STRUCTURAL LOAD 
 
 
FIGURE 2.2 – FAIRNESS # STRUCTURAL LOAD 
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FIGURE 2.3 – TASK_COMPLEXITY # STRUCTURAL LOAD 
 
 
FIGURE 2.4 – RISK_LEVEL # MANAGEMENT LOAD 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
CARRYING THE LOAD 
EFFECTS OF TEAM COGNITIVE LOAD ON GROUP PERFORMANCE 
 
Jesper Christensen1 
Torben Pedersen2 
 
ABSTRACT 
The human capacity for information processing is naturally limited. While research in 
economics, management, and psychology has repeatedly demonstrated the fundamental truth that 
individuals adapt their information processing behavior from analytical and elaborate processing to 
more heuristic reasoning as processing demands and cognitive load increase, comparatively little is 
known about how the information processing behavior of individuals combine under collaboration 
to influence the behavior and efficacy of the group in the aggregate. Even less is known about how 
individuals adapt or augment their behavior in response to different patterns of behavior among 
others in the group. Drawing on comprehensive data from a global manufacturing firm, we find that 
the association between cognitive load of team members and team performance approximates an 
inverted u-shaped relationship. While teams experience initial benefits from members with high 
cognitive load mainly through the tempering the tendency toward extensive analysis, an increasing 
proportion induces a decline in performance by impairing the collective sharing and processing of 
information in the team. We find evidence a several moderating effects on this negative association. 
Our findings contribute to our knowledge of how to effectively organize knowledge sharing and 
collaboration in organizations by demonstrating the interdependencies between the allocation of 
employees and information processing effectiveness.  
                                                          
1 Copenhagen Business School, Frederiksberg, Denmark. 
2 Bocconi, Milan, Italy. 
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3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Across disciplines, scientists are attempting to learn how human behavior is interdependent and 
contagious within and across social networks (Aral and Nicolaides, 2017; Aral and Walker, 2012; Burt, 
1987; Van den Bulte and Lilien, 2001). In management, scholars have long since recognized how strategy 
implementation and firm outcomes are rooted in myriads of decisions made collectively by interdependent 
employees throughout the organization. How separate strands of information held by individuals are pooled 
and processed to enable informed decisions is therefore an important issue (Collins and Smith, 2006). The 
common assumption is that unique information held by team members must be shared and discussed to 
ensure sufficient decision quality (Hinsz, Vollrath, and Tindale, 1997; Jehn et al., 1999). The associated costs 
and time are often seen as necessary and even profitable investments (Homan et al., 2007; Van Ginkel and 
Van Knippenberg, 2008). 
In truth, individuals often fall short of these requirements to extensively share and efficiently process 
information (Lau and Murnighan, 2005; Stasser, 1999; Wittenbaum and Stasser, 1996), as they are 
boundedly rational with limited processing capacity and finite attentional resources (Marois and Ivanoff, 
2005; Ocasio, 1997; Shiffrin and Schneider, 1977). When work requirements place a strain on cognitive 
capacity, individuals satisfice in information acquisition and processing (Simon, 1955) through heuristic 
reasoning to compensate for rationality constraints (Kahneman, 2003). Individual behavior is therefore 
sensitive to changes in task environments and working arrangements that increase cognitive load and dilute 
attention through more extensive information processing requirements (Shah and Oppenheimer, 2008). 
Numerous studies have explored the relative merits of more heuristic or more analytical modes of 
sharing and processing information (Ayal et al., 2015; De Dreu et al., 2008). Recent studies provide 
substantial evidence to indicate that reliance on fewer informational cues and more heuristic and experiential 
decision-making may, at times, outperform analytical strategies (Berg and Hoffrage, 2008; Marewski, 
Gaissmaier, and Gigerenzer, 2010; Rusou et al., 2013). Yet, despite our knowledge of their relative benefits, 
and of the conditions that determine whether individuals engage more heuristically or analytically with their 
work, our understanding of how the information processing behavior of individual employees interacts and is 
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aggregated within the team to impact collective outcomes is “in its infancy” (Mohammed and Schwall, 
2009: 302; Loock and Hinnen, 2015: 2033; Vuori and Vuori, 2014: 1691) with few exceptions (Fitzgerald et 
al., 2017; Maitland and Sammartino, 2015). 
While important advances have been made through simulation studies to better understand how team 
information processing depends on the behavior of individual members (e.g. Luan, Katsikopoulos, and 
Reimer, 2012; Reimer and Hoffrage, 2006; Reimer, Reimer, and Czienskowski, 2010), these tend to 
presuppose homogenous agents or unitary aggregation rules. Both of these conditions are often violated. 
When interdependent employees differ in terms of cognitive load, their information processing behavior is 
likely to differ accordingly so as to introduce behavioral heterogeneity in the team (O’Leary et al., 2011; 
Shah and Oppenheimer, 2008). Additionally, individuals condition their behavior on the behavior of others 
(Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004; Fischbacher and Gächter, 2010). It is therefore reasonable to expect potentially 
disruptive effects, as team members adapt their behavior and possibly reduce effort on the basis of the 
heterogeneous behavior of their peers (Fischbacher and Gächter, 2010; Fitzgerald et al., 2017).  Our purpose 
in this paper is to empirically explore how such heterogeneity in cognitive load and information processing 
behavior impacts the functioning of the team, and how mutual adaptation within the team influences this 
process. 
With comprehensive longitudinal data from a global manufacturing firm, we trace the working 
arrangements of 587 employees across 45 new product development projects over a two-year period to gauge 
variation in team cognitive load (TCO) over time3. Using this information, we find evidence of an inverted u-
shaped relationship between project performance and the team composition of TCO with initial positive 
returns to cognitive load and subsequent decline. We theorize that when a team possesses a low TCO ratio, it 
experiences beneficial effects as team members are dissuaded from extensive analysis, and the associated 
risk of informational overfitting (Gigerenzer, 2008), when less extensive processes are sufficient. In addition, 
the disruptive effects of misaligned information processing behavior are likely absorbed by the team at low 
                                                          
3 TCO is defined and operationalized as the ratio of team members with high cognitive load. 
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TCO ratios (Bendor et al., 1991; McNamara et al., 2004). As teams evolve towards a higher TCO ratio, 
disruptive performance effects manifest as team members reduce their effort out of necessity or in reciprocity 
to perceived reductions in peer effort, thereby constraining the information processing capacity of the team 
(Hartig et al., 2015; Van den Berg et al., 2015). We find that this decline in performance is particularly 
pronounced given increasing task complexity, but is mitigated to some extent as team members come to 
develop greater metaknowledge of each other. In addition, we find that even when teams are stable in TCO 
(i.e. absent changes in team composition or the average working conditions of team members), the mere 
passage of time induces cooperation decay in teams with moderate or high TCO ratios, as team members 
continuously re-adapt to the perceived decline in the contributions from their peers. 
This paper is an attempt to strengthen the psychological design of the firm and its constituent decision 
processes by coupling insights from psychology on individual behavior to higher-level organizational 
structures and outcomes (Kahneman and Klein, 2009; Milkman et al., 2009; Powell et al., 2011). By 
combining experimental evidence on conditional cooperation with a view of cognitive load as an antecedent 
of information processing behavior, we explore how individual information processing behavior combines to 
determine collective outcomes. An important implication is that managerial decisions on human capital 
allocation directly determine TCO and, therefore, influence the aggregation of individual behavior to 
collective outcomes in a predictable manner that is open to managerial control. Thus, the paper represents a 
response to calls for the extension of experimental findings on conditional cooperation from economics and 
psychology to questions of organizational design and the use of human capital (de Oliveira et al., 2015: 131; 
Hartig et al., 2015: 55). 
 
3.2 COGNITION, AGGREGATION, AND CONDITIONAL COOPERATION 
Cognitive load is defined as the strain imposed on individual attention and processing capacity by work 
related demands for more extensive or rapid information processing (Marois and Ivanoff, 2005; Ocasio, 
1997; Shah and Oppenheimer, 2008).  The strain on cognitive capacity increases, for instance, when 
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employees hold multiple project memberships and need to alternate between different tasks and projects, 
which engenders switching costs as the individual must continuously reorient attention (LePine et al., 2005; 
O’Leary et al., 2011). Similarly, multiple memberships are expected to increase social complexity by forcing 
the individual to interface with an increasing number of people with different specializations, perceptions, 
and professional languages (De Vries et al., 2014; Dougherty, 1992). High network centrality can produce 
similar effects (Brass et al., 2004; Labianca and Brass, 2006; Podolny and Baron, 1997). 
The prevailing finding in prior research is that increasing cognitive load will lead individuals to abandon 
more elaborate and analytical modes of thinking to search for heuristic means of accomplishing more in less 
time (O’Leary et al., 2011; Waller, Zellmer-Bruhn, and Giambatista, 2002). These studies have commonly 
explored the workings and effects of heuristic reasoning at the individual or organizational levels (e.g. 
Bingham and Eisenhardt, 2011; Scholten, Van Knippenberg, Nijstad, and De Dreu, 2007), leaving open the 
question of how individuals adapt their information processing behavior in teams (Fitzgerald et al., 2017), 
and how these adaptations may in turn impact the functioning of the team. Studies attempting to span the 
individual and collective levels remain a minority (e.g. Levinthal, 2011; Maitland and Sammartino, 2015). 
Part of the reason for this is the lack of consistent models for aggregating behavioral variation at the 
individual level to the team and organizational levels (cf. Kozlowski and Chao, 2012).  
Research has often employed a social combination approach (Hastie and Kameda, 2005; Reimer and 
Hoffrage, 2006) to attempt to explain how team members with different pre-formed opinions use various 
social combination rules as mechanisms for prioritizing and selecting among competing solutions to the issue 
at hand. Prominent combination rules include majority rule, voting, and averaging (Csaszar and Eggers, 
2013). While these and other decision rules are important for our understanding of team decision dynamics, 
their emphasis on team members’ preformed opinions has the unfortunate effect of pushing individual 
adaptation to the backseat and ignoring the potential changes in individual information processing that ensue 
from team member differences in cognitive load and processing behavior. Additionally, when team outcomes 
are determined by a tally or by fiat at the hands of a powerful individual or dominant coalition (Ten Velden, 
Beersma, and De Dreu, 2007), team efficacy becomes simply a matter of matching the preferences of the 
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dominant coalition with task requirements. Paying attention to the adaptive patterns that emerge when teams 
are composed of heterogeneous members promises a more nuanced view of decision making dynamics and 
collective implications. 
We propose conditional cooperation as a useful lens for understanding aggregation in teams. A 
significant number of experimental studies in psychology and economics have tested and confirmed the 
hypothesis that humans factor in the revealed or expected level of contribution of others when deciding how 
and how much to contribute to a common outcome (Brandts and Schram, 2001; Frey and Meier, 2004). In 
their seminal study, Fischbacher et al. (2001) test conditional cooperation, that is, the human inclination to 
contribute more to a common outcome when others are perceived to contribute more. They adapt the 
standard linear public goods game by having participants decide how much of a fixed endowment to 
contribute at various average levels of contribution from other team members. Although the marginal pay-off 
of a contribution is negative in the experiment, only around 30 percent of subjects behave in accordance with 
the standard assumption of free-riding, whereas more than half of subjects display conditionally cooperative 
behavior, as is repeatedly confirmed in subsequent studies (Chaudhuri, 2011). 
Numerous explanations have been offered for this behavioral phenomenon. Following Chaudhuri (2011), 
these fall in two main categories concerned either with issues of equitable distribution or with participants’ 
sociocognitive perceptions and beliefs about the actions of others. Fehr and Schmidt (1999) propose inequity 
aversion as a reason for the observed conditionality, assuming that people inherently dislike unequal 
distributions, regardless of whether distributions are advantageous or disadvantageous for the individual 
(Binmore and Shaked, 2010; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000). Studies in the second category build on Rabin’s 
(1993) original notion of fairness equilibria in coordination, where subjects exhibit reciprocal behavior to 
maintain coordinative equilibria perceived to be fair. Fairness is judged on the basis of subjects’ perceptions 
and beliefs about the contributions of others. Perceived fairness elicits reciprocal altruism and cooperation 
(Axelrod and Hamilton, 1981; Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003), whereas perceived unfairness motivates 
reciprocal punishment and defection from collaboration (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004). In the following, we 
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expand upon this notion of conditional cooperation as driven fundamentally by perceptions of fairness to 
understand the mechanism linking individual cognitive load with collective information processing.  
 
3.3 HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
We derive a set of hypotheses associating TCO with project performance. These hypotheses rest on the 
premise that team members under cognitive load will tend to reduce their collaborative effort to conserve 
time and resources (Kahneman, 2003; Shah and Oppenheimer, 2008). 
 
TCO and performance 
Much research holds that analytical processing is generally superior to less elaborate and more heuristic 
decision modes, due to the greater emphasis on detail and thorough processing of informational cues 
(Kahneman and Frederick, 2002). When team members are aligned around low or moderate levels of 
cognitive load, analytical information processing is possible with few constraints on the retrieval and use of 
salient information cues (De Dreu, 2003; Shah and Oppenheimer, 2008). This is expected to enable 
potentially high-quality team decisions as individuals display higher commitment (Tsui, Egan, and O’Reilly, 
1992); as task representations become better aligned as shared cognition (Cronin and Weingart, 2007; 
Healey, Vuori, and Hodgkinson, 2015); and as the diversity of information and perspectives held by 
members are discussed and integrated in a more cohesive and less conflict-prone manner (Homan et al., 
2007; Jehn et al., 1999; Van Ginkel and Van Knippenberg, 2008; Van Knippenberg et al., 2004).  
In this view, the failure of more heuristic thinking modes to incorporate information and understand the 
idiosyncrasies of the task is correlated with greater susceptibility to bias and inefficient use of available 
information (Banks and Oldfield, 2007; MacGregor and Armstrong, 1994; Stanovich and West, 2008). This 
is supported by studies demonstrating comparatively higher accuracy and consistency of analytical 
deliberation on numerical tasks (Beilock and DeCaro, 2007; McMackin and Slovic, 2000), and by evidence 
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demonstrating high correlations between analytical thinking modes and the Adult Decision Making 
Competence scale, a widely-used and robust measure of decision making quality (Bavol’ár and Orosová, 
2015; Bruine de Bruin et al., 2007, 2012).  
Increases in individual cognitive load stimulate a preference for - and eventually necessitate - more 
heuristic and less time-consuming information processing (De Dreu, 2003; Hoffmann, Helversen, and 
Rieskamp, 2013) as a means of conserving time and cognitive resources. In these conditions, employees rely 
on experiential judgment and intuition, and engage less in analytical processes and knowledge sharing within 
the team (Epstein, 1994; Kahneman, 2003). And while the fact that individuals engage in both analytical and 
heuristic modes is well-established (Evans, 2008), there is increasing disagreement on their relative utility 
and the conditions under which either mode is advantageous (Rusou et al., 2013). 
To understand how team performance is contingent on TCO, it is important to recognize that conditional 
cooperation is fundamentally fragile (Van den Berg et al., 2015; de Oliveira et al., 2015). Specifically, the 
maintenance of cooperation within the team depends on perceived reciprocity, but individuals cannot be 
expected to weigh signals of cooperative behavior in equal measure to signs of defection and failures to 
reciprocate (see De Dreu et al., 2008: 42 for a similar logic). Unfair or unequal contributions from peers 
crowd out positive cooperative behavior (cf. Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) and lead the contributing 
individual to either reciprocally defect to lower levels of contribution or engage in other forms of punishment 
(cf. Gächter, Renner, and Sefton, 2008). Simply put, sociocognitive perceptions of behavior do not weigh 
positive and negative signals equally. This implies that when perceived effort is unbalanced, which becomes 
increasingly likely with increasing TCO ratios, it may only require a handful of instances where cooperation 
is not reciprocated to outweigh the effects of multiple cooperating peers. When negative signals outweigh the 
stabilizing effects of multiple conditional cooperators, the perceived defection of a few team members will 
spur further defection and induce a shift in the team equilibrium toward a less analytical information 
processing strategy. Recent experimental evidence lends support to this proposition. For example, Hartig et 
al. (2015: 53) find that “conditional cooperators are more inclined to follow the bad example of a low 
contributor rather than the good example of a high contributor”. Similarly, de Oliveira et al. (2015), 
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Gunnthorsdottir et al. (2007), and Fehr and Fischbacher (2003:785) demonstrate that a relatively small 
number of selfish individuals can “induce a large number of altruists to defect”. We therefore expect a 
negative impact on team information processing capacity and team performance as TCO ratios increase. 
However, limited differences in the level of cognitive load among team members need not result in 
deteriorating team functioning. In favour of this, research has documented how teams engage in ad-hoc 
sharing of workload, and how collaboration tends to remain robust in noisy environments in the short run, 
when the motives of others are difficult to ascertain and leniency and helping behavior therefore trump 
immediate reciprocation (Bendor et al., 1991; McNamara et al., 2004; Wu and Axelrod, 1995). In fact, there 
is reason to expect beneficial effects when a minority of team members experience high cognitive load, as 
this would serve to counteract the documented tendency to carry on analyses for as long as time is available, 
even beyond what is necessary to reach well-informed conclusions (e.g. Gutierrez and Kouvelis, 1991; 
Latham and Locke, 1975). Specifically, when a team minority does not reciprocate the analytical behavior of 
the majority, team members are likely to respond by limiting the extensiveness and depth of analysis 
(Gunnthorsdottir et al. 2007; Hartig et al., 2015). While this does not amount to a significant decline in the 
information processing activity of the team, it is expected to help limit exposure to problems of overfitting 
(Gigerenzer, 2008). Overfitting describes the phenomenon where the use of more information biases non-
routine decisions, as the uncertainty of non-routine decisions makes it difficult to assess the applicability of 
information from similar decisions in the past. Past information may contain ample amounts of irrelevant 
information that does not apply but is not filtered out or ignored (Hertwig and Todd, 2003).  
In sum, while we predict an overall negative association between project performance and increases in 
TCO ratios, we predict beneficial effects on team functioning as long as this ratio remains a minority.  
Hypothesis 1: There is an inverted u-shaped relationship between TCO and project performance.  
The moderating effect of task complexity 
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Contrary to this common understanding of information sharing and analytical processing as generally 
superior (e.g. Dawes, Faust, and Meehl, 1989), an increasing number of studies challenge the proposed 
association between intuitive thinking modes and biased decision making (Ayal, Hochman, and Zakay, 2011; 
Ayal, Zakay, and Hochman, 2012). In fact, there is accumulating evidence of specific instances of more 
heuristic thinking modes leading to more accurate decision making (Acker, 2008; Glöckner and Herbold, 
2011; Usher et al., 2011), and analytical thinking modes producing significantly biased decision behavior 
(Ayal and Hochman, 2009; Dijksterhuis and Nordgren, 2006; Nieuwenstein et al., 2015).  
As proposed by Ayal et al. (2015), these contradictory findings are plausibly explained by the common 
methodological disposition in prior research toward experimental studies that isolate decision processes from 
contextual factors. Indeed, earlier contributions to decision research demonstrate how “decision-making … is 
highly contingent on the demands of the task” (Payne, 1982:382). In favor of this, Hammond et al. (1987) 
manipulate participant thinking modes by changing the format of the provided information and demonstrate 
synergies between task characteristics and thinking modes. Similar contingencies between the nature of the 
task and individual cognition have been repeatedly demonstrated (Ayal et al., 2015; Shanteau, 1992; Thomas 
and Millar, 2011). In general, complex tasks are more compatible with more elaborate and analytical 
processing of information (Homan et al., 2007; Jehn et al., 1999; Usher et al., 2011). The same goes for more 
intellective tasks with “definitive objective criterion of success” (Laughlin, 1980: 128; Dane and Pratt, 2007), 
predictable or known associations between actions and outcomes (Hammond et al., 1987), and logical sub-
tasks that enable task decomposition (Dane, Rockmann, and Pratt, 2012; MacGregor, Lichtenstein, and 
Slovic, 1988). Conversely, for more judgmental tasks with “no objective criterion or demonstrable solution” 
(Laughlin, 1980: 128) and a more uncertain organizing principle between actions and outcomes (Epstein, 
1994), more experiential and heuristic information processing is found to be the more compatible strategy 
(Ayal et al., 2015; Rusou et al., 2013). 
In accordance with these findings from decision research, we propose that the negative performance 
effects of increasing TCO are contingent on task complexity. When task characteristics are difficult to assess 
and decompose, and when the relevance of existing information is fundamentally uncertain, information 
66 
 
processing in the team is less likely to benefit from extensive information sharing and collective discussion 
(Gigerenzer, 2008; Hertwig and Todd, 2003). Additionally, a reliance on more heuristic and experiential 
approaches will entail the commitment of fewer resources to problem solving and may therefore be better 
able to accommodate operational constraints. 
Hypothesis 2: The negative effect of TCO on project performance is moderated by task complexity. In the 
presence of task complexity, team performance is more susceptible to increases in TCO. 
 
The moderating effect of stability 
Conditional cooperation implicitly assumes that team members are able to observe the behavior of others 
and respond directly. We cannot ignore, however, that the process of adapting to others is an inherently 
temporal thing in the sense that perceptions and reactions occur sequentially (cf. Ancona et al., 2001; 
Mitchell and James, 2001). When time is considered, adaptation within the team becomes an evolutionary 
effect, in the sense that team members continually adjust to incremental changes in the behavior of their 
peers. Even with moderate levels of TCO, and even in the absence of exogenous changes in team 
composition, we expect a process of mutual adaptation and consecutive shifts toward lower aggregate effort, 
as team members continuously adjust their behavior to reciprocate the observed adaptation by their peers. As 
this decay progresses, heuristic reasoning and lower average levels of effort emerge as the equilibrium 
strategy to which the team will eventually conform. 
This chain of adaptation resonates with studies in the economics and psychology literatures that observe 
cooperation decay in repeated games (de Oliveira et al., 2015; Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003; Fischbacher and 
Gächter, 2010). This phenomenon is partly explained by conditional cooperators becoming discouraged by 
perceived selfishness and lower contribution among peers (Gunnthorsdottir et al., 2007). A complementary 
explanation is that individuals become increasingly strategic toward the end of relationship, when the costs 
to defection decrease (Duffy and Smith, 2014; Keser and Van Winden, 2000). Moreover, cooperation decay 
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over time is observed even in relatively homogenous teams (de Oliveira et al., 2015), which demonstrates 
how conditional cooperation is not inherently stable even in homogenous teams due to our inability to 
accurately perceive and assess peer behavior (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Fischbacher and Gächter, 2010).  
To the extent that stable patterns of TCO initiate processes of mutual adjustment and cooperation decay, 
teams are expected to gravitate towards lower levels of information processing effort, thereby decreasing 
team performance as stability persists for consecutive periods.  
Hypothesis 3: The negative effect of TCO on performance is moderated by team stability. The negative 
effect of TCO on performance increases, as teams remain stable around a particular level of TCO for 
consecutive time periods. 
 
The moderating effect of meta-knowledge  
Work on transactive memory systems (Brandon and Hollingshead, 2004), shared cognition (Healey et 
al., 2015), and collective interpretation (Gavetti and Warglien, 2015) have offered explanations of how teams 
and networks of interdependent individuals may over time come to develop and exploit shared 
representations of where and through which interfaces relevant information resides. These lines of research 
complement the fundamental insights from media richness (Daft and Lengel, 1986) and channel expansion 
theory (Carlson and Zmud, 1999) that the information processing capacity of organizational mechanisms and 
structures (e.g. teams) is not predetermined, but is rather expanded (or diminished) over time as individuals 
become familiar with both the structure of the teams and the behavior of interdependent others (Fraidin, 
2004).  
As team members become familiar with the abilities, work constraints, and behavioral patterns of their 
peers, a cognitive division of labour may arise so as to improve team functioning and streamline the 
identification, retrieval, and application of available knowledge (Hollingshead, 2001).Team members are 
said to develop meta-knowledge (i.e. knowing who knows what). An immediate implication of this is a 
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reduction in the social and structural complexity perceived by team members, as the effort associated with 
locating and communicating with others that hold specialized stocks of relevant knowledge is decreased. 
Similarly, the development of mutual knowledge is expected to improve the ability of team members to 
perceive and understand the causes of heterogeneity in peer contributions (e.g. other commitments), which 
would in turn mitigate the tendency to reciprocate by reducing effort (Hartig et al., 2015; Van den Berg et al., 
2015). 
Hypothesis 4: The negative effect of TCO on project performance is moderated by team member meta-
knowledge. As team members build more extensive metaknowledge, the negative association between TCO 
and project performance is reduced.  
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3.4 DATA AND METHODS 
Common to our hypotheses is the assumption that changes in TCO impact project outcomes by causing 
adaptation in psychosocial aspects of collaboration; specifically by impacting individual information-
processing behavior and adaptation within the team. Our research design should therefore plausibly 
disentangle the hypothesized relationships from aggregate trends and other spurious effects of cognitive load. 
This would be difficult to accomplish with cross-sectional measures, as the effects of compositional changes 
in project teams manifest primarily over time and in environments with repeated observations. Absent useful 
instruments, hypothesis testing in our study must rely on longitudinal data with repeated within-unit 
observations to identify relevant patterns and interactions with stable sample characteristics. 
To this end, we trace the new product development (NPD) efforts of a world-leading manufacturing firm 
over a two-year period. NPD projects are dedicated to the development and maturation of product concepts 
and process technologies (Adler, 1995). Projects span from initial design decisions over the development, 
validation, and approval of concepts to the optimization of final manufacturing. These sequential and 
interdependent activities account for the majority of development and project organizing within the firm. 
These projects represent immense resource investments and strategically important undertakings for the 
firm and are therefore subject to considerable documentation requirements and ongoing assessments of 
performance. Given their standardized structure, projects move through predefined stage gates with common 
criteria for progression that form the basis for monthly reports on key operational indicators delivered by the 
project management team. Main indicators include salary and development costs, project activities, staffing, 
timeliness and delays, product quality, and manufacturing efficiency. Moreover, managers are expected to 
enumerate and describe ongoing concerns and specific problems currently being addressed and analyzed by 
team members, and to provide generalized risk assessments in relation to project objectives and deadlines. 
Aside from providing current estimates on all operational indicators, project managers are also requested 
every month to provide adjusted estimates of expected future performance on most operational indicators for 
the remaining phases. Additionally, project management is expected at the inception and midway point of a 
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project to provide best estimates on central operational metrics for the remainder of the project. The main 
emphasis here is on establishing deadlines for all remaining stage gates and realistic targets for the quality 
and cost of product development. These fixed estimates are logged in all monthly reports to serve as 
unbiased anchors against which ongoing performance is assessed. The continuously updated estimates are 
logged as well so as to make visible the number and magnitude of prior changes in expected project duration 
and performance as a way of motivating deadline adherence and debiasing future estimates. The combination 
of fixed estimates of expected performance and continuously updated measures and re-estimations enables us 
to meticulously trace and pinpoint developments in performance and deviations from both original 
expectations and recent best estimates.  
We consolidate data from 501 monthly reports from 34 unique projects in the two-year period from 
January, 2015 to December, 2016. We were unable to obtain monthly reports for every project in every 
month, as some projects are initiated (11) or completed (4) within this period, meaning the panel is naturally 
unbalanced.. We obtain comprehensive data from the company work time registration system on the 
distribution of working hours for project employees and managers. Specifically, the system registers all tasks 
and projects to which an employee has contributed in the specific month, including the amount of hours 
allocated to each. We obtain matching employee data from the company HR database on individual 
demographics, departmental affiliations, job descriptions, managerial responsibilities, and physical location 
in terms of country, city, building, and floor of main work station. Our combination of these distinct data 
repositories enables the construction of longitudinal measures of individual cognitive load and TCO, and 
allows us to trace changes in team composition and other important secondary variables. Additionally, it 
helps mitigate concerns of common method variance (Podsakoff et al., 2003), which is a significant risk with 
management reports and similar self-reported data that is prone to measurement error when illusory 
correlations and implicit theories inform subjective estimates (Boyd, Dess, and Rasheed, 1993). 
The combination of individual and project data provides 7,429 useful project-month-employee 
observations corresponding to 486 unique individuals allocated across 34 projects over 24 months. Due to 
the nature of our inquiry and the structure of our data, individuals are effectively nested within projects. 
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While important independent regressors are measured at the individual level, the dependent variable resides 
at the project level, and we therefore have to contend with separate error terms at the individual and project 
levels. To this end, we employ robust standard errors (adjusting standard errors for 1,635 clusters in the 
panel) to control for repeated observations at the project level and account for the dual error terms. 
Additionally, the Durbin-Wu-Hausman specification test indicates that the regressors in our model are 
correlated with unique errors, so we employ fixed effects estimation to further limit between-unit variation 
and alleviate residual non-random effects in the sample. We also conduct bootstrap reestimations as a means 
of resampling with replacement from our sample to alleviate concerns that the obtained standard deviations 
are unduly biased on account of our data structure. Bootstrapping with varying sample sizes, even well 
below the number of clusters in the full model (N = 200), confirms our findings.   
  
Variable construction 
Dependent variable 
Project performance is multidimensional with an emphasis on accelerating time to market without 
compromising product quality or development cost (Ragatz, Handfield, and Scannell, 1997). Temporal 
metrics are generally more sensitive to deviations in performance as compared to assessments of costs and 
quality, due to the relative ease of discovered and quantifying delays against preset deadlines. We therefore 
operationalize performance as project timeliness (̅ = -0.3; σ = 0.31), captured as differences between the 
latest estimated completion date of the current phase and the associated objective deadline (fixed by 
management at project inception and updated at the midway point). 
By using the difference between objective deadline and expected completion date as our performance 
metric, rather than the more intuitive difference between objective deadline and current month, we take 
advantage of the fact that the latest estimated completion time incorporates errors and delays that have 
already been committed and recognized by the management team. To account for the obvious impact of 
72 
 
differences in project size and expected duration at project outset on the magnitude of delays, we weigh the 
estimated difference by the planned lifespan of the project. 
We further improve our timeliness metric by adjusting for delays that were already incurred at the 
inception of the present phase, so as to not bias timeliness downwards. Moreover, we are in a position to use 
future monthly reports to estimate, at any given point in a project, how much additional delay is going to be 
incurred in excess of the currently estimated completion date. It is likely that this excess delay is attributable 
to errors committed between the start of the phase and the time at which the excess delay is incorporated into 
the estimated completion date. We therefore allocate excess delay equally to all months in this period as a 
means of accounting for hidden errors. Notably, while the described adjustments improve the statistical 
properties of our regression, our results and conclusions are robust to their exclusion. 
Independent and moderating variables 
TCO (̅ = 0.28; σ = 0.12) is defined as the ratio of team members clocking more than their nominal 
hours. Nominal hours is defined according to common Danish work time regulations as a monthly average of 
165 hours. By virtue of the comprehensive records on work time distributions in the firm, we are able to 
adjust our measure to account for absence due to illness or holiday. Additionally, in view of the fact that 
employees may grow accustomed to slight variation in actual working time across months, we intentionally 
reduce the sensitivity of our measure by  defining the cut-off point for individual cognitive overload to be a 
half working week (18.75 hours) above nominal hours. While this slightly improves the statistical properties 
of our model, all findings are robust to the use of unadjusted nominal hours. To enable more specific tests of 
moderating effects on the negative effect of TCO, we compute the inflection point of the variable in the 
regression model. We find that negative performance effects set in at TCO ratios above 30 % and construct a 
dummy variable to reflect when TCO is above this inflection point. 
This measure is based on the level of cognitive load of each individual team member and provides us 
with the ability to track longitudinal changes in the composition of the team without relying on averaging, 
which would reduce the sensitivity of the measure. By virtue of our access to data on how the number and 
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distribution of hours continuously changes for each employee, the overload ratio enables us to capture team-
level effects of cognitive load on collaboration. Team overload ratio takes on values between 0 and 1, with 0 
representing teams with no members experiencing significant cognitive load, and 1 signifying the obverse 
scenario in which all members are overloaded. 
Task complexity (̅ = 6.2; σ = 5) is measured at the project level. While no direct measures of complexity 
are available, the number of identified and unresolved concerns in need of analysis and problem solving are 
reported on a monthly basis. When the number of concerns increases, additional resources and manpower are 
dedicated to analysis, meetings, and the development of relevant countermeasures. We therefore regard the 
number of active concerns to be an appropriate proxy for task complexity and the associated requirements 
for analytical information processing and knowledge sharing. Project managers may report a maximum of 
five concerns in any given month, and are expected to report the severity of each on a four-point scale 
covering (1) problem identified; (2) owner/investigation; (3) containment in place; and (4) countermeasure 
confirmed. We construct a measure of analytical requirements by totaling the reversed values of each active 
problem (so as to assign greater value to unresolved challenges). 
Stability (̅ = 0.5; σ = 0.85) is simply a count of the number of consecutive months in which the TCO 
composition remains stable. Stability is defined with a percentage bound of change to allow for the fact that 
teams are able to absorb (or, indeed, fail to recognize) minor variations in TCO over time (Bendor et al., 
1991; McNamara et al., 2004; Wu and Axelrod, 1995). Specifically, teams are considered stable to the extent 
that monthly changes in TCO do not deviate more than 5% from the prior month. The use of percentage 
bounds of change is superior to the use of simple TCO intervals, as intervals may positively bias stability 
estimates (when TCO is equidistant from cut-off points and hence can change significantly without 
compromising stability) or negatively bias estimates (when TCO coincides with a particular cut-off value 
and minor changes therefore register as instability).  
Metaknowledge (̅ = 0.34; σ = 0.4) is measured for each individual employee, and may differ across all 
projects to which this individual contributes. Specifically, metaknowledge is expressed as the ratio of 
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familiar team members to team size, where familiarity is captured by counting the number of team members 
on the focal project which the individual is simultanously collaborating with on other tasks or projects. 
Hence, the measure intentionally ignores prior collaborations on the grounds that working conditions and 
associated behaviors of employees may change rather rapidly. An extended measure accounting for prior 
collaborations is included later as a robustness check. 
Control variables  
As observations in our data set are structured with monthly intervals, we include month dummies to 
account for aggregate time-series trends. In similar fashion, we add project phase dummies to capture phase-
specific effects in the standardized NPD design, as for instance different mean levels of technical uncertainty 
or cross-functional integration. Failure to do so amounts to potential omitted variable bias and risks 
producing spurious regression results (Malmendier and Nagel, 2011). 
Our measure of task complexity cannot be expected to comprehensively depict the state of the project. 
While more concerns are likely to be associated with more information processing, an increase in the number 
of reported concerns might signify either extensive problems or simply an astute management team. In order 
to adequately account for unobserved variation in project health, we control for the level of project risk (̅ = 
2; σ = 0.78), assessed monthly by project management as either (1) No risk, (2) Some items behind schedule 
but no risk to project, or (3) Genuine risk to project.  
We measure team size (̅ = 38; σ = 20) and management team size (̅ = 9; σ = 1.2) to address the diverse 
effects of size on team processes, collaboration quality, and communication efficiency established in the 
literature (Hackman, 1983; Thomas and Fink, 1963). Additionally, team size has been shown to directly 
influence the magnitude of variation (Ancona and Caldwell, 1992).  
To account for variation in the delegation of authority and frequency of direct involvement as alternative 
influences on information processing and performance (Leana, 1986), we control for the cognitive load of the 
management team (̅ = 9.3; σ = 2.3). As we do not have access to time registration data for all managers, we 
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instead rely on a composite average of the total number of management teams each manager contributes to 
and the number of unique individuals with which the manager collaborates (α = 0.7).  
In the interest of controlling for alternative sources of cognitive load for individual employees, we 
include a measure of individual structural load (̅ = 3.6; σ = 2.7); a composite average of the number of 
projects and other tasks to which the employee contributes in the given month (α = 0.75). Alternating 
between multiple tasks and projects generates switching costs and an exponential strain on cognitive capacity 
(LePine et al., 2005; O’Leary et al., 2011). Multiple memberships also amplify social complexity, when 
individuals need to engage with an increasing number of people with different specializations, perspectives, 
and professional languages (De Vries et al., 2014; Dougherty, 1992). We therefore control for individual 
interpersonal load (̅ = 39.7; σ = 22.2), measured as the number of other employees with which the 
individual interfaces in a given month. Additionally, we add a dummy control for employee managerial 
responsibilities to capture unregistered workload and interactions. Finally, we control for individual 
temporal load (̅ = 139; σ = 52.7) by a simple measure of the number of hours clocked by the employee, 
which corresponds closely to the measure of cognitive load used to compute TCO. It is included to help 
control for possible multilevel issues. 
We control for project member seniority (̅ = 14.8; σ = 10.5). Acquiring relevant expertise and domain-
specific knowledge has been consistently demonstrated to require time and deliberate practice (Armstrong 
and Mahmud, 2008; Ericsson and Charness, 1994). In turn, expertise and domain-specific knowledge have 
been demonstrated to correlate highly with more efficient problem solving (Gick, 1986; Larkin et al., 1980), 
improved decision making (Kahneman and Klein, 2009; Salas et al., 2010) and similar benefits so as to 
bolster overall job performance (Dreyfus and Dreyfus, 2005; Ericsson and Lehmann, 1996; McCloy, 
Campbell, and Cudeck, 1994). Conversely, however, experience has been associated with a number of 
limitations related to domain-entrenchment (see Dane, 2010; Holyoak, 1991). Entrenchment involves a loss 
of flexibility and adaptability in experienced individuals, such that the ability to assume the perspectives of 
others and appreciate contrary thoughtworlds is constrained (Camerer, Loewenstein, and Weber, 1989). 
Moreover, the individual tends to become more vulnerable to changes in extant routines and less able to 
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integrate new conditions into their mode of operating (Cañas et al., 2003). Thus, while the performance 
implications of project member seniority are uncertain, it is an important source of performance variation. 
We also control for project member age (̅ = 44.5; σ = 9.5), which has a similar dual role with regard to 
project outcomes. Consider, for instance, the deteriorative impact of aging on cognitive capacity and decision 
making (Glisky, 2007; Mell et al., 2009; Mutter et al., 2007). Yet, despite progressive deficiencies in 
learning, contingency judgment, and memory, aging decision makers have been observed to compensate for 
superior cognitive capacity by adapting their selection strategies and decision heuristics to environmental 
characteristics (Hertwig and Todd, 2003; Mata et al., 2012; Mata, von Helversen, and Rieskamp, 2010). 
Hence, the aging decision maker is able to disregard available information to reduce processing load without 
significant losses in decision quality (Mata and Nunes, 2010); a phenomenon that is also observed among 
experts (Garcia-Retamero and Dhami, 2009) and ascribed to the level of experience with a particular 
decision type or context (Merritt, Karlsson, and Cokely, 2010). Specifically, we control for non-linear effects 
of age, as the impact of cognitive decline is expected to eventually supplant the efficiency of compensatory 
strategies and experience (Mata et al., 2012). 
Correlation matrix and descriptive statistics (standard deviations and mean, minimum, and maximum 
values) are reported in Table 3.1. 
 
3.5 RESULTS 
Our results from the hierarchical regression are presented in Table 3.2. Model 1 consists of all controls 
and the four main independent regressors. This baseline model is expanded with a quadratic term of TCO in 
Model 2 to test the hypothesized inverted u-shaped association between TCO and project performance. 
Model 3 relies on the computed TCO dummy to test the hypothesized moderating effect of task complexity, 
stability, and metaknowledge on the negative association between TCO and project performance. The 
dummy is defined as 1 for all observations with TCO values above the calculated inflection point for the 
inverted u-shaped relationship (calculated at 0.3). Due to the inclusion of two-way interaction terms, all non-
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binary regressors were centered on their respective means. Except for obvious correlations between age and 
the corresponding squared term, neither independent nor average variance inflation factor scores indicate 
multicollinearity (1.04-2.89, ̅ = 1.6). 
Consistent with our first hypothesis, the regression results in Model 1 and 2 demonstrate a statistically 
significant inverted u-shaped relationship between TCO and project performance (p < 0.001). When team 
members are homogenous around low levels of cognitive load or experience only moderate levels of 
cognitive overload within the team, individuals will reciprocate by maintaining collaboration and their extant 
levels of contribution. As the degree of cognitive overload within the team increases towards higher TCO 
ratios, there emerge more apparent incentives to defect from collaboration and reciprocate by adjusting 
contributions to the perceived effort of others (de Oliveira et al., 2015; Van den Berg et al., 2015). This 
hypothesized adjustment toward lower levels of information sharing and analytical information processing 
detrimentally impacts performance. 
Substituting our dependent variable for the computed TCO dummy in Model 3, we find support for our 
second hypothesis that task complexity moderates the negative effects of TCO on project performance 
(p<0.01). When task complexity increases in the form of more pressing needs for analysis and problem 
solving behavior, the disruptive performance effects of increasing TCO ratios and subsequently decreasing 
effort and analytical behavior become salient in the team. Conversely, and in accordance with theoretical 
predictions, these disruptive effects are less salient in teams facing fewer acute problems and more options to 
rely on experiential and heuristic reasoning. 
Consistent with our third hypothesis, being stable around TCO ratios greater than 30% is seen in Model 
3 to negatively moderate the association between TCO and project performance (p < 0.001). These results 
confirm our expectation that while a stable distribution of cognitive load might have positive implications in 
terms of team members becoming familiar with and better able to compensate for this inequality (main 
effects of stability are consistently significant and positive in all models, p<0.001), there is nevertheless 
significant risk of cooperation decay as time progresses, even in the absence of exogenous changes in team 
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composition of TCO (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003; Fischbacher and Gächter, 2010; Gunnthorsdottir et al., 
2007). Cooperation decay implies an aggregate shift in team behavior toward less elaborate and more 
heuristic information processing with generally detrimental consequences for project performance. 
Finally, our fourth hypothesis is rejected in Model 3, as we see a statistically significant and negative 
moderation effect of metaknowledge on the association between TCO and project performance (p<0.001). 
This runs contrary to our expectation that more extensive familiarity with team members provides 
opportunities to improve information search within the team, thus reducing the reliance on effortful 
information acquisition (Brandon and Hollingshead, 2004; Healey et al., 2015; Hollingshead, 2001). Rather, 
an interpretation of this may be that more frequent interactions in different settings may in fact have 
detrimental consequences, if one observes behavior that motivates reciprocity (e.g. non-cooperation or 
reduced effort). These reciprocity effects would explain our findings, as the behavioral spillover effect 
(Bednar et al., 2012; Cason et al., 2012) would induce team members to be more sensitive to perceived 
reductions in effort or, alternatively, to simply reciprocate prematurely on account of behavior observed 
outside the team. 
We observe several significant controls. Particularly interesting is the consistently significant quadratic 
effect of age on project performance (p<0.05). In accordance with theoretical predictions, we observe 
decreasingly positive returns to age, which provides support for the bounded ability of aging team members 
to compensate for cognitive decline (Mata et al., 2012). The consistently insignificant effects of all three 
cognitive load parameters at the individual level lend credence to our expectation that the primary 
performance effects of cognitive load manifest as a collective phenomenon. Indeed, we find that both team 
size and management team size strongly predict negative performance (p<0.001), which could also be taken 
as an indication that mutual adaptation and overall team effects of cognitive load manifest more clearly in 
teams above a certain threshold minimum size. The notion of cognitive load as a collective phenomenon is 
supported as well by the consistently significant and positive effect of management team cognitive load 
(p<0.001). As management face more numerous and varied tasks, they are likely to substitute detrimental 
micromanagement for greater delegation of real authority (Leana, 1986; see also Aghion and Tirole, 1997).  
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Robustness analyses 
To assess the robustness of our independent variables, we undertake meaningful adjustments of their 
operationalization as a way of ensuring that the observed results are not an artefact of our variable 
construction. In the regression models, TCO was based on measures of individual cognitive load, measured 
as the number of hours put in by the individual (adjusted for absence). Specifically, individuals were defined 
to be cognitively overloaded when their working hours exceeded nominal hours by more than half a working 
week (18.75 hours). As a robustness check, we recalculate TCO using less sensitive cut-off values of 
individual cognitive load amounting to an entire working week in excess of nominal hours (37.5 hours). 
Though significance levels are reduced slightly, the interpretation of our findings remains similar. 
All moderating variables are adjusted in similar fashion. Thus, our task complexity measure is adjusted 
to only include concerns that have not yet been rated as 4) countermeasure confirmed, as these problems are 
less likely to require significant analytical activity. We adjust the percentage bound of change underlying our 
stability measure from 5% to 10% to test if the time-dependent adaptive processes within the team are 
maintained in the presence of more variation in TCO ratios over time. Neither adjustment produces 
meaningful changes in our main regression results. 
Finally, with regard to meta-knowledge, there is an implicit assumption in research on familiarity and 
collective systems of knowledge that all team members develop the same level of meta-knowledge. Recent 
research has challenged this assumption and proposed that meta-knowledge may instead be concentrated 
with one member (Mell et al., 2014). In teams with concentrated meta-knowledge, the central member is 
proposed to act as a catalyst for the identification and integration of distributed knowledge. The individual 
effectively adopts a brokering role to mitigate unnecessary cognitive effort and search costs on the part of 
each other member. With extensive knowledge of each team member, the central individual may broker 
relevant meetings between team members to share and process complementary information without them 
having to engage needlessly with others. Thus, while decentralized meta-knowledge has an advantageous 
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effect on the cognitive load of team members, centralized meta-knowledge may be sufficient to reduce peer 
sensitivity to differences in contributions among members, as relevant interactions are ensured. As members 
are less motivated to react to perceived differences in contributions, the negative implications of TCO are 
mitigated. However, operationalizing centralized meta-knowledge as the highest level of individual meta-
knowledge in the team, we find similar results compared to decentralized meta-knowledge. 
 
3.6 CONCLUDING DISCUSSION 
This article contributes to our knowledge of collective information processing behavior in organizations. 
Organizations routinely seek to integrate dispersed and specialized human capital from across the firm to 
improve decision-making and problem solving, but these efforts fall short when individuals fail to share and 
process available information (Lau and Murnighan, 2005; Stasser, 1999; Wittenbaum and Stasser, 1996). 
While information processing behavior has been studied extensively in psychology and management (Ayal et 
al., 2015; Gavetti and Levinthal, 2000; Hogarth and Karelaia, 2005), our understanding of how variation in 
the information processing behavior of team members impacts collective outcomes is “in its infancy” 
(Mohammed and Schwall, 2009: 302; Loock and Hinnen, 2015: 2033; Vuori and Vuori, 2014: 1691), despite 
the prevalent use of team structures to facilitate coordination (Mathieu et al., 2014). Considering information 
processing behavior across different levels implies a departure from extant research, which has routinely 
emphasized individual-level strategies with an impact on individual decision making (Hogarth and Karelaia, 
2007; Vuori and Vuori, 2014), or organizational-level strategies with an impact primarily on unit or 
organizational outcomes (Bingham, Eisenhardt, and Furr, 2007). 
We explore cognitive load as an antecedent of individual information processing behavior (Shah and 
Oppenheimer, 2008) and, in turn, as an antecedent of collective performance. Specifically, we argue that 
conditional cooperation functions as the primary mechanism underlying both the adaptation of individual 
information processing within the team, and the aggregation of individual behavior to collective outcomes.  
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Drawing on comprehensive NPD data from a global manufacturing firm, we find evidence of an inverted 
u-shaped association between TCO, i.e. the ratio of team members with high cognitive load, and project 
performance (Hypothesis 1). We argue that low levels of TCO have beneficial implications for team 
information processing and performance, mainly because teams are less likely to engage in extensive 
analyses that are prone to overfitting through the inclusion of irrelevant information (Gigerenzer, 2008; 
Gutierrez and Kouvelis, 1991; Hertwig and Todd, 2003). While disruptive performance effects do manifest 
as TCO ratios increase further, we find that this decline in performance is moderated by three distinct factors. 
First, teams become more susceptible to the disruptive effects as task complexity increases (Hypothesis 2), 
due to their impaired ability to adequately address complex problems through the sharing and collective 
processing of available information. Second, when teams remain stable around moderate or high TCO ratios, 
performance continues to decline with consecutive periods of stability (Hypothesis 3). We attribute this to 
cooperation decay within the team, as team members keep re-adjusting their effort to the perceived effort of 
others, thereby inducing consecutive downward shifts in aggregate effort. Third, we find that as teams 
develop more extensive metaknowledge, the negative effects of misaligned behavior at higher TCO ratios is 
potentially amplified, contrary to our prediction (Hypothesis 4). Greater metaknowledge, it seems, enables 
bad behavior to influence multiple team contexts through behavioral spillover effects (Bednar et al., 2012; 
Canon et al., 2012). 
The proposed relationships between cognitive load, collective behavior, and project performance are 
heavily premised on research into conditional cooperation (e.g. de Oliveira et al., 2015; Fischbacher and 
Gächter, 2010) and the effect of cognitive load on cooperative behavior (Duffy and Smith, 2014; Schulz et 
al., 2014). The majority of research in these areas employs game theoretical research designs to study the 
cooperative behavior of subjects under diverse conditions with the most prominent research design being 
public good games (Van den Berg et al., 2015; Fischbacher et al., 2001) and variations on the standard 
prisoners dilemma (McNamara et al., 2004). While game theoretical research has enabled significant 
advances in our understanding of human cooperation, they also suffer from particular limitations going 
forward. Nijstad and De Dreu (2012: 19) note that the empirical foundations often derive “from tightly 
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controlled laboratory experiments with ad hoc groups of students performing relatively short-lived tasks with 
hypothetical rather than real consequences to the individuals and their groups (or the wider organization)”. 
While there are numerous efforts to actively address these concerns in repeated games, it is important to test 
derived hypotheses in the field where “the cooperative and competitive motives could be induced by features 
of the relevant context” to substantiate the inferences drawn from the lab (Toma and Butera, 2015: 464). As 
such, a key contribution of this paper is to adapt findings from the lab and test their validity in real-world 
settings. Additionally, there is significant room for qualitative studies to explore how separate information 
processing behaviors compete or complement each other in specific contexts (e.g. Maitland and Sammartino, 
2015), and for studies in general to consider the “full ensemble of games than an individual faces” to 
account for behavioral spillover effects (Bednar et al., 2012: 13), possibly by use of proxies such as cognitive 
load.  
More generally, the paper seeks to strengthen the psychological design of the firm and its constituent 
decision processes by coupling insights from psychology to higher-level organizational structures and 
outcomes (Kahneman and Klein, 2009; Powell et al., 2011). Specifically, we have identified the adaptive 
implications and performance correlates of different team compositions, which enables us to make novel 
predictions on the management and allocation of employees with different levels of cognitive load, and to 
better ensure the integration of human capital despite differences in workload. This insight that employee 
behavior is interdependent and contingent on the sociocognitive composition of the team “will enable us to 
transition from independent intervention strategies to more effective interdependent interventions that 
incorporate individuals’ social contexts into their treatments” (Aral and Nicolaides, 2017: 2). Additionally, 
by tying individual cognition and behavior directly to elements of organizational design that are amenable to 
managerial control, the propositions provide avenues for the profitable execution of strategy (Powell et al., 
2011). Here, firm performance arises not only from the novelty or inimitable advantages of firm strategies, 
but rather from the application of insights from behavioral research to identify and address systematic errors 
in decision-making, invisible patterns of behavioral adaptation, and general deviations from predicted 
rationality in more mundane and fundamental activities. 
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The proposed theory has important practical implications. As managers decide on the task allocation and 
rate of utilization of their employees, and often reify those decisions through organizational design (De Vries 
et al., 2014; O’Leary et al., 2011), they simultaneously govern employees’ cognitive load, which in turn 
impacts their proclivity for either heuristic reasoning or more analytical information processing (Homan et 
al., 2007). By linking analytical and heuristic reasoning with managerial choices vis-à-vis the task allocation 
and utilization of employees, the paper proposes a relationship between human capital, organizational 
design, and performance that is malleable and amenable to managerial control. In this sense, the paper can be 
said to address the issue of how and when our insights on individual behavior and cognition, as derived from 
studies of isolated individuals under the auspices of psychology, become valid and valuable in turbulent, 
temporal, and multi-agent organizations (see Bingham and Eisenhardt, 2011; Vuori and Vuori, 2014). Thus, 
the paper aligns with recent microfoundations literature, which calls for exploration of the processes through 
which characteristics of heterogeneous individuals interact and are aggregated within and across 
organizational structures (Felin et al., 2012; Gavetti et al., 2007).  
In doing so, the paper contributes also to an emerging line of research on the discriminating effects of 
structural arrangements and governance choices on cognition and behavior (Foss and Weber, 2016; Turner 
and Makhija, 2012; Weber and Mayer, 2014). Becoming aware of the impact of different organizational 
design choices on the exacerbation or mitigation of interpretative conflict, cognitive adaptation, and similar 
issues promises new avenues for management to improve the functioning and predictability of their 
organization. 
 
Limitations and future research 
While our single company sample improves our ability to control for extraneous variation at the level of 
the firm and the industry (see Siggelkow, 2007), and simultanously reduces the likelihood of spurious 
influences on the hypothesized mechanisms and relationships (Harrigan, 1983), we cannot exclude the 
existence of firm-specific effects. Future research would need to confirm and build on our findings using 
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data from multiple firms to improve generalizability (Hambrick, 1981). To this end, it is advisable to balance 
fine-grained research strategies, such as ours, with more accessible cross-sectional samples to approach a 
“medium-grained methodology wherein the generalizability of cross-grained methodologies is combined 
with the detail of fine-grained methodologies in large sample studies” (Harrigan, 1983: 399). 
The study is limited by our inability to directly observe collaboration. We infer collaboration from the 
co-allocation of individuals in the same period, but this need not be true. Future studies need to devise ways 
to better discriminate collaboration and co-allocation. By the same token, we do not observe technical 
contingencies (e.g. breakdowns) or resource constraints (e.g. delayed equipment delivery or staffing 
limitations) that may significantly impact performance but do not pertain to team dynamics. Moreover, we 
are faced with potential survivor bias, as our sample consists only of active and completed projects. While 
the firm screens project proposals extensively to minimize the risk of project termination, we cannot exclude 
the potential bias of failures being underweighted in the sample (Cooper and Kleinschmidt, 1990). 
Another potential limitation of the theory is the intentionally broad conceptualization of heuristic 
reasoning as a reduction in the amount and depth of salient information considered (Shah and Oppenheimer, 
2008), despite the vast literature on different forms of heuristics that reduce information according to various 
rules with different implications for information processing (e.g. Gigerenzer and Goldstein, 1996). As 
demonstrated by Maitland and Sammartino (2015), different individuals in a decision-making team will draw 
on different heuristics to search for, discover, and analyze information. As such, convergence on heuristic 
reasoning does not equal convergence in terms of the particular heuristic rules followed by individual agents. 
However, to the extent that such heuristics have similar implications in terms of reducing salient information 
and relying on fewer informational cues (Gigerenzer and Brighton, 2009), the expectation that information 
elaboration processes will be constrained in such contexts should remain valid. Nevertheless, while this 
approach aligns with calls to “push past just generating heuristic lists” to look for general truths about 
heuristic reasoning (Maitland and Sammartino, 2015: 1556), it does constitute a conscious limitation and 
potential blind spot in the argument. Future research would need to test whether interactions between 
cognitive load and team performance are impacted by the particular heuristic rules used by collaborating 
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individuals. Additionally, future research should consider substitutability or complementarity of team 
members in terms of their applied strategies and knowledge (e.g. Camerer and Fehr, 2006; Nijstad and De 
Dreu, 2012; Postrel, 2002). When certain members are indispensable to team outcomes, their behavioral 
preferences are likely to impact the team equilibrium more than dispensable members, who are more easily 
ejected or denied influence. This relates more broadly to the argument that more powerful members are able 
to sway the team to their preference (Ten Velden et al., 2007; 2010). 
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TABLE 3.1 – CORRELATION MATRIX, ALL VARIABLES 
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TABLE 3.2 – REGRESSION MODELS 
 
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
                                                                                                     
DF                                                          1559             1559             1559   
R2                                                         0.559            0.565            0.568   
N                                                           7342             7342             7342   
                                                                                                     
                                                          (0.61)           (0.60)           (0.61)   
Intercept                                                 -1.120+          -1.047+          -1.083+  
                                                          (0.02)           (0.02)           (0.02)   
Phase 7                                                    0.198***         0.204***         0.219***
                                                          (0.02)           (0.02)           (0.02)   
Phase 6                                                    0.081***         0.093***         0.094***
                                                          (0.03)           (0.03)           (0.03)   
Phase 5                                                    0.233***         0.250***         0.248***
                                                          (0.02)           (0.02)           (0.02)   
Phase 4                                                    0.245***         0.264***         0.254***
                                                          (0.02)           (0.02)           (0.02)   
Phase 3                                                    0.051**          0.070***         0.064***
                                                             (.)              (.)              (.)   
Phase 2                                                    0.000            0.000            0.000   
                                                          (0.00)           (0.00)           (0.00)   
Age, Squared                                              -0.001+          -0.000           -0.000+  
                                                          (0.03)           (0.03)           (0.03)   
Age                                                        0.050+           0.044+           0.048+  
                                                          (0.01)           (0.01)           (0.00)   
Seniority                                                 -0.008           -0.008           -0.007   
                                                          (0.00)           (0.00)           (0.00)   
Temporal Load                                              0.000            0.000            0.000   
                                                          (0.00)           (0.00)           (0.00)   
Interpersonal Load                                         0.000           -0.000            0.000   
                                                          (0.00)           (0.00)           (0.00)   
Structural Load                                            0.000            0.001           -0.000   
                                                          (0.00)           (0.00)           (0.00)   
Team Size                                                 -0.002*          -0.002**         -0.002*  
                                                                                            (0.01)   
TCO_Dummy # Metaknowledge                                                                   -0.103***
                                                                                            (0.00)   
TCO_Dummy # Stability                                                                       -0.021***
                                                                                            (0.00)   
TCO_Dummy # Task Complexity                                                                 -0.003** 
                                                          (0.02)           (0.02)           (0.02)   
Metaknowledge                                              0.040*           0.037*           0.078***
                                                          (0.00)           (0.00)           (0.00)   
Stability                                                  0.013***         0.012***         0.019***
                                                          (0.00)           (0.00)           (0.00)   
Task Complexity                                           -0.006***        -0.007***        -0.006***
                                                                                            (0.00)   
TCO_Dummy                                                                                   -0.014***
                                                                           (0.07)                    
OLOL                                                                       -0.375***                 
                                                          (0.02)           (0.05)                    
OverLoadRatio_weighted                                    -0.053*           0.238***                 
                                                                                                     
                                                            b/se             b/se             b/se   
                                                      Timeliness       Timeliness       Timeliness   
                                                             (1)              (2)              (3)   
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FIGURE 3.1 – TCO # TCO 
 
 
FIGURE 3.2 –TCO_DUMMY # TASK COMPLEXITY 
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FIGURE 3.3 – TCO_DUMMY # STABILITY 
 
 
FIGURE 3.4 – TCO_DUMMY # METAKNOWLEDGE 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
SO CLOSE, YET SO FAR 
THE INTERDEPENDENCE OF GEOGRAPHICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL DISTANCE IN COLLABORATION 
 
Jesper Christensen1 
Marcus M. Larsen2 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
When companies engage in non-routine work, the ability to combine human capital from across the 
organization to mitigate complexity and enable novel solutions is highly valuable. Conversely, the physical 
separation of functions and units is often beneficial when complexity is less pronounced and independent 
units are allowed to hone their specializations and reduce unwarranted coordination costs. However, firms 
often struggle to strike an appropriate balance between integration and separation and make timely decisions 
on the allocation of employees. In this paper, we propose that the quality of collaboration and the ability of 
employees to contribute to project performance cannot be managed on the basis of geographical distance 
alone, but rather depends on the interaction of multiple dimensions of distance. We hypothesize and find 
support for the argument that collaboration quality and subsequent performance hinges strongly on the 
degree of psychological distance perceived by each employee. We show how performance varies with the 
degree of psychological distance from the task at hand, and how this association is moderated by the level of 
geographical dispersion of employees. Thus, the paper proposes contingent interaction effects between 
multiple dimensions of distance that better predict collaboration quality and improves the basis for strategic 
decision making on organizational design, location choice, and the allocation of human capital within the 
firm. 
 
 
 
                                                          
1 Copenhagen Business School, Frederiksberg, Denmark. 
2 Copenhagen Business School, Frederiksberg, Denmark. 
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4.1 INTRODUCTION 
When companies undertake non-routine projects, there is often a need for employees from across the 
organization to collaborate (Adler, 1995; Brown and Eisenhardt, 1995; Majchrzak, More, and Faraj, 2012). 
Yet, existing evidence indicates that efforts to integrate specialized and diverse human capital across 
functional and departmental boundaries produce mixed results, often at disproportionate costs (Lovelace et 
al., 2001; Sivasubramaniam, Liebowitz, and Lackman, 2012). 
The inconsistent outcomes of integration efforts are often attributed to challenges of coordination 
(Kretschmer and Puranam, 2008). Coordination problems arise due to the lack of shared and accurate 
knowledge about how and when one is interdependent with others and about the decision rules that others are 
likely to use (De Vries et al., 2014). Specifically, coordination is impeded when individuals employ different 
cognitive frames (Dougherty, 1992; Weber and Mayer, 2014), hold inconsistent representations of tasks and 
the organization (Cronin and Weingart, 2007; Cronin, Weingart, and Todorova, 2011), or are misaligned 
with regard to project scope, technical ambitions, and expectations regarding the capabilities and limitations 
of others (Gulati et al., 2005). A common source of such misalignment is distance; when employees are 
separated, common ground and mutual understanding becomes more difficult to develop and maintain 
(Allen, 1977; Hinds and Bailey, 2003). 
In this article, we explore how two distinct dimensions of distance between interdependent employees 
influence collaborative behavior and project performance. Distance is commonly understood and construed 
as the geographical distance between employees (e.g. Storper and Venables, 2004; Gray et al., 2015). Seeing 
organizations as “interrelated behaviors of people who are performing a task that has been differentiated 
into several distinct subsystems, each subsystem performing a portion of the task” (Lawrence and Lorsch, 
1967: 3), research has demonstrated how physical co-location of employees and organizational units, with 
face-to-face interaction in particular (Allen, 1977; Storper and Venables, 2004), enables more frequent 
interactions and knowledge flows compared to geographical dispersion. But while geographical proximity 
has long been lauded as a particularly effective mechanism to foster coordination and collaboration (Daft and 
Lengel, 1986), studies have found inconsistent evidence for this expectation (Cha et al., 2014; Wilson et al., 
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2013), which has been ascribed in part to the failure of prior studies to account for variation in psychological 
distance (Chong et al., 2012; Wilson et al., 2008). Specifically, our perception of objects (e.g. tasks, teams, 
or colleagues) depends on their distance from us either in time, in terms of social or professional differences, 
or in their relevance to our immediate context (Trope and Liberman, 2003; Pronin, Olivola, and Kennedy, 
2008), which impacts information processing, decision-making, and collaboration. Psychologically distant 
objects become less salient and are construed in more abstract terms, causing individuals to deemphasize 
relevant details and idiosyncrasies in favour of more creative cognition (Förster et al., 2004; Liberman et al., 
2007). 
Consolidating comprehensive longitudinal data from a world-leading hydraulics manufacturer, we 
explore the contingencies between geographical and psychological distances among interdependent 
employees. We confirm a negative effect of geographical dispersion on team performance. Similarly, we 
observe negative effects of psychological distance when collaborating employees are psychologically distant 
with reduced attention to detail and analytical thinking in favour of more creative and potentially disruptive 
cognition. However, when exploring the interaction between these dimensions, we find that geographical 
dispersion positively moderates the effects of psychological distance. To explain this, we argue that while 
teams do benefit from geographical proximity, this holds true only when team members are psychologically 
close to the tasks at hand. When this condition is violated, e.g. when teams engage with outside professionals 
in search of knowledge or attempt to anticipate conflict by involving employees and departments that will 
assume responsibility for the project in the future, the disruptive cognition and reduced analytical effort 
associated with psychological distance is magnified in local teams that lack appropriate mechanisms to limit 
or guide this behavior, thereby undermining the collaborative benefits of proximity. Conversely, we find that 
the negative effects of psychological distance are mitigated as teams become more dispersed. We theorize 
that geographical dispersion imposes restrictions on the behavior of team members so as to encourage more 
selective contributions and interventions in team decision processes. This curbs the potentially disruptive 
effects of psychological distance and helps channel the potential benefits of creative cognition. 
The study responds to calls for an improved understanding of the contingencies between distance 
dimensions in organizational work (e.g. Trope and Liberman, 2010; Wilson et al., 2013). Our findings lend 
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credence to the claim that the effects of different distance dimensions cannot be adequately assessed in 
isolation (Boschma, 2005; Wilson et al., 2013). Moreover, our findings contribute to the expanding research 
stream on the relevance of behavioral insights for organizational design and the allocation of human capital 
(e.g. de Vries et al., 2014; Foss and Weber, 2016). By bringing insights from CLT on the antecedents of 
collaborative behavior to bear on operational challenges to do with the allocation and integration of 
employees, our study helps clarify the conditions under which the advantages of close collaboration manifest 
and are likely to outweigh other strategic options (e.g. outsourcing and geographical dispersion of 
organizational units). Thus, the study carries implications for strategic decision making and the 
organizational design of collaboration and knowledge sharing (Higgins, 1996; Rietzschel et al., 2007). 
 
4.2 THEORETICAL FOUNDATION: CONSTRUAL LEVEL THEORY 
Psychological distance resonates with research into Construal Level Theory (CLT) that shows how 
individuals construe and evaluate information about tasks and individuals differently depending on their 
social, temporal, or hypothetical distance from them, which prompts individuals to adapt their information-
processing and decision-making behavior accordingly (Liberman and Trope, 1998; Trope and Liberman, 
2003; Pronin et al., 2008). Greater psychological distance has been linked to more abstract and creative 
cognition (Förster et al., 2004), and to more global cognition that emphasizes potentials and common ground 
over problems and dissimilarities (Förster, 2009; Giacomantonio, De Dreu, and Mannetti, 2010). A reverse 
pattern has been observed for psychologically proximate individuals, who emphasize detail, identify 
immediate challenges and dissimilarities, and engage in more constrictive and analytical thinking (Eyal et al., 
2004).  
In prior studies, psychological distance is determined by variations in temporal and spatial distance (e.g. 
working with immediate or distant deadlines), social distance (e.g. social projections and ingroup/outgroup 
membership, see Clement and Krueger, 2002), and the extent to which tasks and decisions are hypothetical 
or have tangible implications (Fujita et al., 2006; Liberman, Sagristano, and Trope, 2002; Smith and Trope, 
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2006). In theory, psychological distance is rooted in the interaction of these dimensions (Giacomantonio et 
al., 2010). 
When an individual perceives a task or other individuals to be distant along one or more of these 
dimensions (e.g. when tasks are due in the immediate or the more distant future, or when collaboration 
involves colleagues from different departments or hierarchical strata), detailed and pertinent information 
about the idiosyncrasies of the work or the activities and intentions of colleagues become more difficult to 
access and experience. Psychological distance therefore induces individuals to employ more general schema 
and representations to categorize and understand tasks and other people (Trope and Liberman, 2010); a 
phenomenon known as high-level construal. These mental representations are more abstract and 
decontextualized, as they organize available knowledge around few general elements; “one focuses on the 
forest rather than on the trees” (Giacomantonio et al., 2010: 762; Smith and Trope, 2006). 
When tasks or colleagues are perceived to be psychologically close, specific and discrete information is 
more readily available, which enables low-level construal with more detailed, contextualized, and nuanced 
representations (Förster et al., 2004; Liberman et al., 2007). This implies less schematic perceptions that 
accommodate contextual specificity and associate available knowledge with a larger set of distinct categories 
and elements (Förster et al., 2004); “one focuses on the trees rather than on the forest” (Giacomantonio et 
al., 2010: 762). 
 
4.3 HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
We develop a set of hypotheses associating project performance with the geographical dispersion of the 
project team and the psychological distance between employees and tasks. While each distance dimension is 
expected to exert a negative effect on performance, we posit that geographical dispersion moderates the 
effects of psychological distance on collaborative behavior and project performance. 
 
Geographical distance 
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Geographical proximity and distance are important organizational design parameters (Kraut et al., 2002; 
Monge et al., 1985). Specifically, the distance between organizational members has been suggested to impact 
the quality of interpersonal collaboration and the pursuit of joint behavior across units, partly because “where 
activities take place partly determines what actors can do, what they know, and what they can learn” (Tyre 
and Von Hippel, 1997: 3).  
Prior studies indicate that collaboration and knowledge sharing decrease when individuals and units are 
physically dispersed (Allen, 1977; Hansen and Løvås, 2004; Staats, 2012; Van den Bulte and Moenaert, 
1998). Studies have also associated distance with moral hazard and coordination problems, especially when 
collaboration builds on tacit knowledge (Storper and Venables, 2004; Sonn and Storper, 2008). As 
organizational members cannot easily build interpersonal relationships and trust and are prevented from 
direct observations of each other (Zaheer and Venkataraman, 1995; Zollo, Reuer, and Singh, 2002), distance 
has often been associated with consequences such as inertia, organizational complexity, and coordination 
costs (Cummings and Kiesler, 2007; Larsen, Manning and Pedersen, 2013; Rawley, 2010). 
Given the challenges emanating from distance, spatial proximity has often been lauded as a particularly 
beneficial mechanism to foster improved integration and collaboration (Faraj and Xiao, 2006; Gray et al., 
2015; Kahn and McDonough, 1997). When activities are interdependent and must be “integrated to achieve 
effective performance of the system [and] unity of effort among the various subsystems” (Lawrence and 
Lorsch, 1967: 3-4), proximity allows organizational members to build collegial social environments and 
common ground (Clark and Brennan 1991, Kraut et al. 1990), especially through more frequent face-to-face 
interaction (Storper and Venables, 2004)  Accordingly, much research has linked proximity with a vast array 
of performance benefits, such as improved cross-functional collaboration and coordination (Jassawalla and 
Sashittal, 1999; Song et al., 1997), innovation performance (Hoegl and Proserpio, 2004), and knowledge 
sharing (Frank, Ribeiro, and Echeveste, 2015; Staats, 2012). Based on these considerations, we expect a 
negative association between the geographical distance between project team members and the performance 
of the project. 
Hypothesis 1: Geographical distance between project members negatively impacts project performance. 
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Psychological distance and formal responsibility 
Changes in psychological distance and mental construal have important and rather immediate cognitive 
and behavioral implications (Braga, Ferreira, and Sherman, 2015; Liberman et al., 2002; Wilson et al., 2013). 
Studies have established an association between psychological distance and more creative and expansive 
cognition that implies a greater tolerance for variation. Being psychologically distant promotes an abstract 
and more holistic approach to collaboration with an emphasis on identifying areas of agreement and 
entertaining novel perspectives (e.g. Giacomantonio et al., 2010; Henderson, Trope, and Carnevale, 2006). 
Conversely, psychologically close activities are approached through more detail-oriented and constrictive 
frames that emphasize the identification and resolution of immediate concerns (Förster et al., 2004). In 
support of this, Förster (2009) demonstrates how people engaging in high-level construal tend to emphasize 
similarities and possibilities over dissimilarities and potential problems, whereas individuals with low-level 
construal tend toward the reverse. Similarly, psychological distance has been shown to impact negotiation 
tactics so as to optimize mutual gain and perceived fairness, as opposed to maximizing individual outcomes 
(Henderson et al., 2006; Henderson and Trope, 2009). 
The mechanism underlying psychological distance and the attendant changes in mental construal and 
behavior is one of cognitive salience (Braga et al., 2015; Wilson et al., 2013). When psychological distance 
is assessed in terms of the social relationship between individuals or the temporal separation of individuals 
and tasks, it is to capture the “subjective experience that something is close or far away from the self, here, 
and now”(Trope and Liberman, 2010: 440). When individuals perceive tasks or colleagues as being distant, 
it is beneficial to preserve and emphasize only the essential and stable properties of the thing, whereas when 
objects are perceived as more proximate, it is useful to identify the minute details to enable action and 
decision-making. The mechanism therefore aligns cognitive functions with perceived requirements to help 
process objects effectively. 
Research into the behavioral effects of accountability mirrors this mechanism by showing how formal 
accountability stimulates greater subjective salience of tasks and information (Lerner and Tetlock, 1999). 
Accountable individuals are subject to outside assessment of their work and will likely have to justify 
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decisions (Frink and Klimoski, 1998; Weigold and Schlenker, 1991). This reduces psychological distance to 
the task and encourages preemptive self-criticism (Tetlock, 1983; Tetlock, Skitka, and Boettger, 1989) – that 
is, individuals engage in more thorough and complex thinking as they attempt to challenge and re-think their 
conclusions and anticipate possible objections. Thus, when individuals are formally accountable for the 
outcomes of group processes or specific tasks, the perceived level of responsibility induces greater cognitive 
effort and more extensive information processing of pertinent details and potential impediments to task 
completion (Blaskovich, 2008; Karau and Williams, 1993). Similarly, felt responsibility leads employees to 
avoid and more likely punish cognitive and social loafing within the group (Weldon and Gargano, 1988).  
In sum, individuals with low perceived accountability (e.g. when presently responsible or expected to 
assume formal responsibility in the near future) will experience low levels of psychological distance and 
therefore engage with greater attention to detail, more extensive cognitive effort, and a more pronounced 
emphasis on potential impediments to progress. Conversely, contributing individuals with more distant 
prospects of formal accountability are expected to engage with more holistic perceptions, an emphasis on 
novel perspectives over more immediate details and concerns, and less cognitive engagement with pressing 
analytical requirements (Liberman et al., 2002). As a rule, the downsides of reduced analytical effort and 
attention to detail are expected to impede project performance. 
Hypothesis 2: Psychological distance between project members negatively impacts project performance. 
 
Bounded interventions 
While we have posited main effects of geographical and psychological distance, it is important to 
recognize that employees are always situated both geographically and psychologically in relation to their 
work. It is reasonable to expect potential contingencies between these dimensions of distance, as the 
relevance of proximity tends to vary with context and task (March and Simon, 1958; Thompson, 1967). For 
instance, research points to performance and innovation benefits accruing from access to diverse knowledge 
and comparative advantages in distant locations (Dunning, 1993; Lewin and Peeters, 2006). In addition, 
when activities require different methods and knowledge, their separation enables organizations to 
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economize on bounded rationality and benefit from specialization (Connor and Prahalad, 1996). 
Consequently, the organizational design necessary to manage particular interdependencies may vary 
considerably (Foss and Weber, 2016; Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967; Van de Ven et al.,, 1976), with more 
integrated and proximate arrangements often reserved for complex tasks with more extensive analytical 
requirements (Cuijpers et al., 2011; Mishra and Shah, 2009). When work requires less explicit elaboration 
and processing of pertinent information, the benefits accruing from geographical proximity are expected to 
be less pronounced (Braga et al., 2015; Wilson et al., 2013). 
Similarly, the negative effects of psychological distance are expected to depend on the degree of 
geographical dispersion. As dispersion increases, the frequency of interaction decreases and teams become 
less able to maintain extensive mutual knowledge (Hoegl and Proserpio, 2004). Contextual information 
about the local conditions and constraints of individual members is not communicated effectively, as 
dispersed members become increasingly selective in their contributions and in their ability to recognize the 
information that would impact collaboration (Cramton, 2001; Hinds and Bailey, 2003). However, when 
distant team members are forced to be more selective in their interventions and communication to the group, 
this could help curb and filter the potentially detrimental emphasis on creativity and novel perspectives 
associated with psychological distance and high-level construal. As the required effort to communicate and 
understand the specificities of the team and the task increases with distance, individuals are incentivized to 
interact less frequently with the team and become more cognizant of the quality and relevance of their 
suggestions (Carlile, 2004; Zaccaro and Lowe, 1988). As such, distant team members have been observed to 
be less able to initiate the restructuring of work processes or objectives within the team without local support 
(Hoegl and Proserpio, 2004). 
In sum, when combining the effects of geographical dispersion with its expected ability to constrain the 
disruptiveness of creative cognition from psychologically distant members, we hypothesize a positive 
moderation effect of geographical distance on psychological distance and, hence, on project performance. 
Hypothesis 3: Geographical distance positively moderates the negative association between 
psychological distance and project performance. 
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4.4 DATA AND METHODS  
To examine the effects of psychological distance and geographical distance on project performance, we 
exploit an opportunity to trace the new product development (NPD) efforts of a world-leading hydraulics 
pump manufacturer over a two-year period. Drawing on both internal and external sources of new 
knowledge and innovation, NPD projects emerge from initial technology trials within the firm and are tasked 
with developing and maturing new product concepts and process technologies (Adler, 1995). Their lifecycle 
spans from preliminary design decisions and strategic prioritizations over concept development, validation, 
and approval to ramp-up and optimization of final manufacturing. Collectively, these activities account for 
the bulk of resources invested in development activities and project organizing within the firm. 
Given their strategic importance and significant resource commitments, NPD projects are subject to 
extensive standardization, rigorous documentation requirements, and continuous assessments of both current 
and prospective performance. All projects are comprised of seven distinct phases and follow a standardized 
stage gate model with predefined tasks and responsibilities in each phase and preset criteria for progression 
from one phase to the next. Within this structure, each project management team is tasked with delivering 
monthly reports that detail project performance on key operational indicators and potential deviations. Main 
operational indicators include project timeliness and delays, salary expenses, expected unit production costs, 
direct development costs from materials and project activities (e.g. workshops, meetings, and travel), and 
investment costs accruing from new equipment acquisitions and internal costs of factory time. The 
management team is also expected to account for and describe all problems currently being analyzed and 
resolved by the project team, and to provide an overall assessment of the current level of risk to the 
objectives of the project. Additionally, as projects mature, the management team is expected to provide 
quarterly estimates on product quality, warranty rates, sales volume, and turnover. 
Every monthly report provides updated estimates on all operational indicators. This includes estimates 
pertaining to the current phase, e.g. expected date when the stage gate will be passed, expected total costs at 
phase completion, and current risk level and number of active problems. However, reports also include 
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updated estimates for all future project phases, as it is often necessary to adjust future deadlines and 
operational expectations in accordance with present delays and overruns. As each project proceeds to pass 
successive stage gates, the realized completion date and operational metrics for each completed phase is 
logged in the monthly reports to serve as fixed points against which prior estimates and re-estimates for that 
particular phase, as well as estimates for future phases, can be measured to determine the patterns and 
variations in estimation error and performance over time. 
Naturally, performance is also assessed against pre-set criteria and objectives. Project management is 
requested at the outset of the project and at the midway point to establish fixed objectives for each remaining 
phase in terms of time and operational metrics. These reflect reasonable expectations based on project 
characteristics and available information to enable ongoing measurements of how much the project deviates 
from original intentions and the business case. These remain fixed and visible in all future monthly reports to 
serve as a means of debiasing ongoing estimates as well as to motivate deadline adherence. Assessing project 
performance against these fixed metrics provides a measure of performance that enables cross-project 
comparisons (e.g. for resource allocation purposes), whereas assessments based on the continuously updated 
estimates allows for the pinpointing of when delays and overruns occur and, therefore, better enables fair 
estimates of current monthly performance. 
We consolidate data from 501 monthly reports from 45 unique projects in the two-year period from 
January, 2015 to December, 2016. As our primary independent variables on distance are defined at the 
individual level, we couple the panel data set with matched data from two other repositories within the firm. 
From the company HR records, we obtain data on individual demographics (e.g. age, seniority, and gender), 
department, job position and description, managerial responsibilities, and geographical location in terms of 
city, building, and floor of main work station. From the company work time registry, we obtain detailed 
records for each employee concerning all tasks and projects to which the individual has contributed in a 
given month, as well as the number of hours allocated to each of these tasks. Combining these repositories 
allows us to construct longitudinal measures of geographical distance and psychological distance at the 
employee level, while tracing changes in important secondary variables, including individual work load in 
terms of hours and number of projects, as well as changes in team compositions and distance dimensions.  
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Combining these sources of employee data with project data, we obtain 7,536 useable project-month-
employee observations corresponding to 583 unique individuals appearing with varying frequency in the 45 
projects over 24 months. Given the continuous distribution of the dependent variable and the hypothesized 
linear relationships, we conduct a hierarchical regression analysis with Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
estimation. The hierarchical structure of the model is appropriate for illustrating and sequentially testing the 
hypotheses with the proposed interaction between psychological distance and geographical distance.  
While our main independent regressors are measured at the individual level, outcomes are measured at 
the project level. Individuals are nested within projects, and we therefore have separate error terms at the 
individual and project levels. We employ robust standard errors (adjusting for 1,635 clusters in the panel) to 
control for repeated project-level observations and account for the dual error terms. Additionally, we use 
fixed effects estimation to limit between-unit variation in the sample3 and mitigate remaining non-random 
effects at the project level.  
Our use of different sources of data on project performance, team compositions, individual distances, 
and other variables helps mitigate potential common method variance from illusory correlations and implicit 
theories within the reporting management teams (Podsakoff et al., 2003), which is expected to be prevalent 
in contexts such as ours given the presence of measurement error and subjective estimates (Boyd et al., 
1993). 
 
Variable construction 
Project performance (̅=-0.3; σ=0.32)  is commonly considered multidimensional with an emphasis on 
accelerating time to market without compromising product quality or development cost (Ragatz et al., 1997). 
Compared to assessments of costs and quality, temporal metrics are highly sensitive to changes in project 
performance given the relative ease with which delays may be discovered and quantified against preset 
deadlines. Thus, our key dependent variable exclusively captures time performance, calculated as the 
difference between the most recently estimated completion date and the preset deadline for the active phase 
                                                          
3 A Durbin-Wu-Hausman specification test rejects the null hypothesis that unique errors are uncorrelated with the 
regressors in our model. 
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(established by project management at the inception of the project and updated only at the midway point). 
The difference is weighted by the planned lifespan of the project to account for the effects of duration on the 
magnitude of delays. 
We further improve our time performance metric by adjusting for the amount of delay already incurred 
at the inception of the current phase, so as to not bias phase performance downwards. Additionally, we 
exploit the fact that for most observed months, we know from subsequent reports when the current phase was 
in fact completed and, hence,  how much delay will be incurred in excess of the currently estimated 
completion date. As this excess delay is attributable to errors committed at some time between phase 
inception and the time at which the excess delay is incorporated into the estimated completion date, we 
allocate excess delay equally between all months in this period.  
Psychological distance (̅=1.04; σ=1.3) is defined for each employee as the number of stage gates 
between the current phase to which the employee contributes and the nearest phase for which the employee 
holds formal responsibility. The individual degree of formal responsibility for each phase is derived from the 
relationship between the activities and requirements associated with each project phase and the departmental 
affiliation and job description of each employee as reported in the company HR database. 
In early project phases, the new technology or product concept is often fluid and loosely defined. 
Employees experiment with the physical and technological limits of the concept, as well as its possible 
applications and value creation potential. Activities revolve around R&D with expansive experimentation, 
technological design, and explorative testing. In later phases, the concept matures and is increasingly adapted 
for production and specific applications. Employees seek to reduce variability and to define in detail the 
characteristics and specifications of the product or technology in an effort to align with the capacity and 
capabilities of the manufacturing system in preparation of ramp-up and initial production. 
This gradual progression from explorative R&D to full-scale manufacturing and sales release enables the 
mapping of the individual degree of formal responsibility at any given stage of a project. As a baseline, all 
departments in the firm are classified as belonging to either R&D, which holds formal responsibility up to 
and including the third phase, or Operations, which assumes responsibility from the fourth phase onwards. 
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With this, the departmental affiliation of each employee is sufficient to establish which phases the individual 
is formally associated with.  
A valid concern with this approach would be that employees within departments vary significantly with 
regard to their specific job function and project roles. To remedy this, we use records of job positions and job 
descriptions from the company HR directory to further specify the particular phases that each employee is 
primarily responsible for. Different job roles hold formal responsibility for distinct subsets of project phases, 
and may therefore span across R&D and Operations or be nested entirely within one of them. To illustrate, 
quality engineers, machine operators, and technical marketing personnel become formally responsible in the 
sixth and seventh phases, whereas design engineers and mechanical engineers are primarily responsible in 
the second and third phases. If a design engineer were to become involved in the fifth phase of a project, 
perhaps to ascertain previously agreed specifications or engage in technical adjustments or rework, the 
engineer would be two stage gates removed from formal responsibility and thus experience moderate levels 
of psychological distance. Notably, certain job roles (e.g. managers and lead analysts) tend to have wider 
scopes of responsibility that span most if not all project phases. 
Geographical distance (̅=0.41; σ=0.5) is defined for each individual project member as the average 
distance in meters to all other project members in a given month. Physical distance is measured as the 
shortest walking distance for all project members in close vicinity (i.e. same city), and as the shortest 
travelling distance (by car or by plane) for project members in different cities within Denmark. For project 
members outside Denmark, physical distance is simply the beeline Euclidian distance between them. This 
measurement differentiation is used to best approximate the experienced physical distance between 
individuals. Combining these measures, individual physical distance is calculated as the Euclidian distance 
from the focal individual to all other team members (O’Reilly, Caldwell, and Barnett, 1989; Wagner, Pfeffer, 
and O’Reilly, 1984).  
To account for the disproportionate difference in distance between co-located team members and team 
members in different countries, we calculate the square root of the mean squared distance between team 
members. Given the wide dispersion of project members across Europe, China, India, and the US, we 
logarithmically transform our individual distance measures to further reduce the skew introduced by project 
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members situated in China, India and the US in particular. Additionally, we weigh our distance measures by 
the hours contributed by each employee to avoid distorting the average dispersion measure for local project 
teams on account of a few hours clocked by a foreign employee4. This weighting simultaneously addresses 
the plausible endogeneity issue that individuals are positioned according to their predicted work patterns 
with co-located individuals expected to collaborate more extensively on overlapping tasks and projects. 
We include a number of control variables at the individual and project levels. To capture unobserved 
effects of distance we include Global Breadth (̅=2.27; σ=1.28) as a measure of the number of foreign 
production sites that are actively part of the project. The measure varies from 0 for local projects to 5 for highly 
internationalized projects. 
At the project level, it is important to recognize that observations in our data set are structured with 
monthly intervals due to the reporting practices of the firm. We therefore include month dummies in our 
regression to capture the impact of aggregate time-series trends in the two-year period. Failure to control for 
such aggregate trends amounts to omitted variable bias and risks producing spurious regression results 
(Malmendier and Nagel, 2011). Similarly, we account for the effects of the standardized NPD project 
structure by adding dummies for each project phase. This helps control for the performance variation that 
occurs due to phase-specific characteristics, e.g. different mean levels of cross-functional collaboration or 
technical uncertainty. 
We include measures of team size (̅ = 38; σ = 20) and management team size (̅ = 9; σ = 1.2) to control 
for the plethora of established effects of size on group process, collaboration efficiency, and communication 
quality (Hackman, 1983; Thomas and Fink, 1963). Additionally, group size may directly influence the 
magnitude of the coefficient of variation (Ancona and Caldwell, 1992).  
At the level of the individual employee, we control for cognitive load as an alternative source of 
variation in individual information processing behavior and decision making. Cognitive load is defined as the 
strain imposed on individual attention and processing capacity by work-related demands for greater 
collaboration and more extensive or rapid information processing (Marois and Ivanoff, 2005; Ocasio, 1997; 
                                                          
4 Measurements were obtained using Google Maps. 
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Shah and Oppenheimer, 2008). When employees hold multiple project memberships, the need to alternate 
between tasks and projects engenders switching costs and an exponentially increasing strain on cognitive 
capacity (LePine et al., 2005; O’Leary et al., 2011). We therefore control for individual structural load 
(̅=3.59; σ=2.69); a composite measure of the number of projects and the number of other tasks to which the 
individual employee contributes in the focal month (α = 0.75). Moreover, multiple memberships are 
expected to increase social complexity by forcing individuals to interface with an increasing number of 
people with different specializations, perceptions, and professional languages (De Vries et al., 2014; 
Dougherty, 1992). We therefore control for individual interpersonal load (̅=39.7; σ=22.2), measured as the 
number of other employees with which the individual interfaces in a given month. Additionally, we add a 
dummy control of whether employees have managerial responsibilities (̅=0.038; σ=0.19) to capture 
unregistered workload and interactions, and we control for individual temporal load (̅=139; σ=52.7) by a 
simple measure of the number of hours clocked by the employee. Lastly, we control for the cognitive load of 
the management team (̅=9.3; σ=2.3) by a composite average of the number of management teams each 
manager is allocated to and the number of other individuals with which the manager collaborates (α = 0.7). 
Our development of the psychological distance construct relies on an important premise. We propose 
accountability as an independent dimension of psychological distance that is not adequately captured by 
extant measures of temporal, social, and hypothetical distance (Liberman et al., 2002; Pronin et al., 2008), 
meaning our construct ought to be robust to the inclusion of other measures of psychological distance. To 
this end, we control for deadline proximity (̅=133.2; σ=120.9), the number of days until the next deadline 
on the focal project, and project priority (̅=2.27; σ=1.28), the number of other deadlines on other projects to 
which the individual contributes that are temporally closer, so as to capture different aspects of temporal and 
hypothetical distance in the work situation of the employee (Trope and Liberman, 2010). 
We control for project member age (̅=44.5; σ=9.5) and seniority (̅=14.8; σ=10.5) with the firm, 
measured as years of employment, to account for beneficial effects of domain-specific knowledge and 
expertise (Armstrong and Mahmud, 2008; Ericsson and Charness, 1994) and the associated improvements in 
problem solving and decision-making quality (Dreyfus and Dreyfus, 2005; Kahneman and Klein, 2009; Salas 
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et al., 2010). By the same token, we account for negative effects of domain-entrenchment (Camerer, 
Loewenstein, and Weber, 1989; Dane, 2010) and the deteriorative impact of aging on cognition and decision 
making (Glisky, 2007; Mell et al., 2009; Mutter et al., 2007). 
Correlation matrix and descriptive statistics (standard deviations and mean, minimum, and maximum 
values) are reported in Table 4.1. 
 
4.5 RESULTS 
The hierarchical regression results are presented in Table 4.2. Model 1 is comprised of all control 
variables and the main independent variables representing geographical distance and psychological distance. 
This baseline model is expanded in Model 2, which adds the interaction of geographical distance and 
psychological distance to explore the hypothesized moderating relationship. Model 3 includes quadratic 
terms of geographical and psychological distance as a robustness check on model specification. As the 
second and third models include two-way interactions, non-binary regressors were mean centered. 
Independent and average variance inflation factors (VIF) did not indicate multicollinearity (1.01-2.61, ̅ = 
1.55)5. 
Consistent with our first and second hypotheses, the main effects of psychological distance and 
geographical distance on project timeliness are statistically significant and negative across all models (p < 
0.05)6. Consistent with our third hypothesis, Model 2 demonstrates a statistically significant and positive 
interaction between geographical distance and psychological distance (p < 0.001), while the main effects 
remain significantly negative (p < 0.05). This provides initial support for our expectation that geographical 
distance positively moderates the association between psychological distance and project performance.  
However, to comprehensively understand the hypothesized effects, we plot the two-way interaction in 
Figure 4.1 to interpret the individual configurations graphically (Aiken, West, and Reno, 1991; Jaccard and 
Turrisi, 2003). The illustration supports the statistical interpretation that performance declines with 
                                                          
5 VIF exceeds 2 for Group Size and Global Breadth. Our findings are robust to their exclusion. 
6 As expected and explained in the following section, psychological distance is significant and positive in Model 3. 
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psychological distance when geographical dispersion is low. This aligns with our prediction that 
performance benefits the most when individuals are proximate and responsible for the tasks at hand, and that 
the abstract cognition and emphasis on novel perspectives associated with increasing psychological distance 
may eventually become disruptive when frequent collaboration is unconstrained. Moreover, these negative 
effects of psychological distance are mitigated when geographical dispersion is high, which corresponds to 
our hypothesis that dispersion constrains the frequency of collaboration and encourages more selective 
contributions on the part of distant team members.  
While these results lend further credence to the existence of a moderating relationship between physical 
and psychological distance in organizational work, it is notable that the presence of psychologically distant 
team members appears to cultivate an advantage in dispersed teams. This hints at a more nuanced role for 
psychological distance in explaining project performance that needs to be explored to improve confidence in 
our findings. 
We observe a number of significant controls. It is particularly interesting that one of the alternative 
measures of psychological distance, deadline proximity, is highly significant across all specifications (p < 
0.001), indicating that we have successfully accounted for alternative sources of psychological distance. 
Additionally, Global Breadth is consistently significant and positive (p<0.001). One interpretation of this 
effect is that projects with more global involvement and more production sites involved across the globe will 
likely be more high profile within the firm and, as a consequence, have access to the necessary resources and 
quality of manpower. Lastly, the size of the project team exerts consistently negative effects on project 
timeliness. While this likely reflects the expected increase in group heterogeneity with regard to 
specializations, perceptions, and professional languages (De Vries et al., 2014; Dougherty, 1992), it is also 
the case that larger groups will experience greater geographical dispersion and, hence, more difficult 
working conditions. 
 
Robustness and alternative specifications  
Project performance is multidimensional and often encompasses aspects of time, cost, and quality 
(Ragatz et al., 1997). While cost measures inherently co-vary with temporal measures, and hence would not 
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alleviate simultaneity or omitted variable bias, project quality is impacted by a wider range of factors and 
does not vary predictably with time or cost (i.e. timely projects may signify greater underlying quality, or, 
alternatively, more time spent could produce improved quality). To ascertain the robustness of our results 
against this observation, we construct an alternative dependent variable composed of a set of project quality 
metrics on warranty rates, turnover, and sales volume. We calculate each as a ratio of the achieved level of 
quality to the preset target so as to account for their naturally different measurement scales. The composite 
dependent variable is calculated as an average of the three continuous metrics.  
As shown in Model 3, our findings are robust to the alternative dependent variable, though the statistical 
properties and interpretations of this model are comparatively weaker due to the considerable drop in 
observations and, therefore, reduced levels of statistical power (see Aiken and West, 1991; Dawson and 
Richter, 2006; Cohen et al., 2013). We rerun the regression with a dummy-based composite measure (with a 
value of 1 indicating stable or increasing performance compared to the month prior) to account for 
unwarranted skew between the continuous metrics, and find similar results.  
By their nature, monthly reports are reflective of past events. Thus, a valid objection to our regression 
specification is the simultaneity of our dependent variable and certain independent regressors. Specifically, 
the data obtained from the company work time registry and HR records are potentially misaligned with the 
monthly reports by one month, due to the lagged nature of the reports and management perception. To 
account for this, we lag the variables derived from the work time registry and HR records by one month and 
rerun the regression, obtaining qualitatively similar and statistically robust results with a significantly 
reduced sample size (N = 3,947 ; observations are dropped in case of gaps in the panel and from the last 
observed month in each project). 
An issue remains with our conceptualization of psychological distance using formal job roles, since 
formal roles may be expanded or adjusted informally over time through the adoption of new work 
arrangements and through informal knowledge seeking and networks (Gulati and Puranam, 2009). By 
contrast, our previous conceptualizations are based solely on formal elements that may not sufficiently 
capture variation at the individual level over time. To address this, we combine our formal measures of 
responsibility with time registration data to discern patterns of how individuals have actually contributed to 
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particular phases in the two-year period. We reduce psychological distance accordingly for phases that an 
individual has been working consistently and extensively on for the majority of the period. While this risks 
biasing our psychological distance measure toward zero and reducing its sensitivity, our findings remain 
unchanged with and without this adjustment. 
To ensure the robustness of our measure of geographical distance, we computed travel times between all 
project member locations using the same measurement differentiation as with geographical distance. Travel 
times between countries were computed using the shortest travel time by plane and the shortest travel times 
by car or public transportation to and from the airport. The analysis yields qualitatively similar results when 
travel times are substituted for geographical distance. In the same vein, we eliminated project members from 
China, India, and the US to minimize the impact of geographical outliers, but the results remained robust. 
An important alternative specification of our study is found in the construal level literature. Trope and 
Liberman (2010) propose that psychological distance behaves as a concave, logarithmic function in 
accordance with the Weber-Fechner law, as opposed to a simple linear function. In other words, the impact 
of psychological distance on construal and cognition may be non-linear and exponentially decreasing with 
greater social, temporal, or spatial distances. Other studies have provided evidence that both temporal and 
spatial distances display this pattern (Holyoak and Mah, 1982; Zauberman et al., 2009), prompting Trope and 
Liberman (2010: 444) to call for investigations of the functions that relate different measures of distance to 
psychological distance as an important addition to extant research. Accordingly, we specify an expanded 
regression model (Model 4) with quadratic terms for geographical distance and psychological distance to 
account for potential non-linear effects of distance. While the quadratic effects are significant (p < 0.001) 
and indicate, as expected, decreasingly negative effects as distance increases, neither graphical interpretation 
nor average marginal effects reveal any meaningful deviations from a simple linear relationship. 
 
4.6 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
Our study is motivated by the familiar story that as projects and other non-routine work progresses, 
formally defined teams and responsible individuals often come to realize that much relevant knowledge and 
110 
 
skill resides outside both the team and the department (Allen, James, and Gamlen, 2007). When knowledge 
holders from different functions within the organization become involved, and are brought together in close 
quarters to improve communication, knowledge sharing, and frame alignment (Allen, 1977; Daft and Lengel, 
1986), the degree of knowledge activation varies significantly, meaning that the expected collaborative 
advantages sometimes fail to manifest (e.g. Jehn and Mannix, 2001; Jehn et al., 1999; Lakemond and 
Berggren, 2006). 
 Accordingly, while the potential upsides to geographical proximity with regard to coordination and 
collaboration are widely acknowledged in the literature, we argue and empirically demonstrate that the 
observed inconsistencies are, at least in part, explained by interactions with psychological distance (see also 
Chong et al., 2012; Wilson et al., 2008). Drawing on prior research that demonstrates cognitive and 
behavioral implications of psychological distance (e.g. Giacomantonio et al., 2010; Sagristano et al., 2002), 
along with findings from research into individual accountability that demonstrate a positive correlation with 
cognitive effort and negative correlations with cognitive and social loafing (Blaskovich, 2008; Karau and 
Williams, 1993; Weldon and Gargano, 1988), we argue that psychological distance in collaboration is a 
particularly important and dynamic source of psychological distance. 
The paper empirically explores the interactions between psychological distance and geographical 
distance, along with their combined and contingent effects on project performance. Our findings demonstrate 
the expected negative main effects of psychological distance and geographical distance on project 
performance, but also provide support for the existence of a positive moderation effect of geographical 
distance on the negative association between psychological distance and performance. Specifically, while 
increasing psychological distance among team members implies declining performance when team members 
are highly proximate, the reverse is true in geographically dispersed teams.  
Accordingly, the paper proposes two main contributions. First, we employ extensive longitudinal 
microdata to approximate causal explanations of the contingencies among distance dimensions in their 
impact on collaboration and, therefore, on performance across different task environments. Second, we 
develop and test an accountability-based proxy for psychological distance. In this sense, accountability 
functions as an important consideration in organizational design and work design that may considerably 
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shape the expected effects of geographical proximity and, hence, provide a more nuanced premise for 
strategic management decision to engage in co-location, re-shoring, and similar organizational design 
considerations. Additionally, accountability is arguably more amenable to managerial action and more 
malleable in the short term than other dimensions of psychological distance, e.g. social or temporal distance, 
and therefore more resource efficient with regard to organizational change. 
Our findings have implications for established knowledge regarding co-location and the organizational 
allocation of human capital in general (Agrawal, Kapur, and McHale, 2008; Boschma, 2005; Ganesan, 
Malter, and Rindfleisch, 2005; Kiesler and Cummings, 2002). Specifically, geographical proximity is often 
implicitly assumed to mitigate or completely remove the effects of other dimensions of distance among 
employees, e.g. temporal and social distance. Rather, we propose psychological distance as a central 
lynchpin between geographical distance and the quality and performance implications of team decision 
making. In doing so, the paper aligns with other remarks that “the effectiveness of structural changes such as 
team arrangements and collocation depends more on the behavioral aspects of how they are employed 
rather than the extent to which they are employed” (Swink, Talluri, and Pandejpong, 2006: 557). Thus, the 
paper provides an alternative and managerially actionable explanation for the absent or contingent effects of 
proximity found in other studies (Carmel, 1999; Cha et al., 2014). 
A tangential discussion has to do with the benefits of knowledge diversity. Spatial proximity and cross-
functional integration are regarded as means to bring diverse knowledge and human capital to bear on 
complex or non-routine tasks (Van Knippenberg, De Dreu, and Homan, 2004). However, while some studies 
find that knowledge diversity positively predicts performance and the quality of decision making (Dahlin, 
Weingart, and Hinds, 2005; Van der Vegt et al., 2005), others report negative relationships (Jehn and 
Mannix, 2001; Jehn et al., 1999) or an absence of evidence for significant direct effects (Kochan et al., 2003; 
Pelled, Eisenhardt, and Xin, 1999). This lack of a clear consensus regarding the performance effects of 
investments in diversity and cross-functional collaboration further motivates our study as an examination of 
the antecedents of successful integration of human capital (Joshi and Roh, 2009; Mohammed and Nadkarni, 
2011). 
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As for strategic management and decision making, the study holds certain implications concerning the 
decision about where to locate more or less interdependent firm activities, as physical separation or 
proximity might not be the sole determinant of collaboration quality in a multinational setting. Indeed, as 
firms become more knowledge-intensive, the need for integration is expected to increase between functions 
that were previously separable, because interfunctional interdependencies and the requisite interaction 
frequency increase to accommodate more complex knowledge and more extensive information processing 
(Galbraith, 1973; Ketokivi and Ali-Yrkkö, 2009).  
Accordingly, the traditional assumption that R&D and manufacturing are distinct units with different 
operational logics that require separation or even offshoring (Jansen et al., 2009; Pisano and Shih, 2009) is 
nuanced by the recognition of knowledge interdependencies among R&D and manufacturing in knowledge-
intensive firms (Gray et al., 2015; Fuchs and Kirchain, 2010). This is particularly true with regard to new 
product development processes (Adler, 1995; Nihtilä, 1999; Olson et al., 2001). In other words, because 
manufacturing and R&D are increasingly reciprocally interdependent, the complexity and coordination costs 
that would result from offshoring with ICT as the primary coordination mechanism might become untenably 
high. As requisite integration grows, other forms of organizing with other coordination mechanisms, e.g. co-
location, are adopted to better suit the information processing needs of the firm.  
While our findings enable more appropriate organizational design of co-located and integrated 
production through an understanding of the contingent effects of work requirements and psychological 
distance, it is important to note how our results also point to hidden costs of co-location and integration that 
mirror studies on the hidden costs of offshoring (Larsen et al., 2013). Specifically, our analysis demonstrates 
how geographical proximity might constrain and limit the effects of psychological distance to engage in 
expansive and innovative cognition in situation with low task complexity. To the extent that spatial 
proximity promotes attention to detail and more constrictive cognition, parts of the firm value chain could in 
fact benefit from increased geographical distance to bolster the positive effects of psychological distance on 
creative cognition and greater tolerances for variety. 
 
Limitations and future research 
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Our research design allows us to trace the longitudinal effects of psychological and geographical 
distance on project performance, but we are hesitant to claim causality due to certain limitations. 
An important limitation of our study is single company sampling. While this improves our ability to 
implicitly control for extraneous variation at the firm and industry levels (see Siggelkow, 2007), and reduces 
the likelihood of capturing external contingencies that may spuriously influence the hypothesized 
mechanisms and relationships (Harrigan, 1983), we are fundamentally barred from excluding the possibility 
of firm-specific effects. This provides an obvious opportunity for future research to confirm and improve 
upon our findings by adopting a research design with multiple firms to improve generalizability (Hambrick, 
1981). However, purely cross-sectional research designs would potentially be unable to account for the 
mechanisms proposed in this paper. Therefore, future studies should consider balancing out fine-grained 
research strategies, such as ours, with the commonly encountered and empirically more accessible cross-
sectional designs to approach a “medium-grained methodology wherein the generalizability of cross-grained 
methodologies is combined with the detail of fine-grained methodologies in large sample studies” (Harrigan, 
1983: 399). 
Another limitation of our research design is our inability to observe collaboration directly. In effect, we 
infer collaborative activity from the fact that individuals are allocated to the same team within the same 
period, while this need not be true. Being able to discriminate better between individuals that do in fact 
collaborate and individuals that are merely co-allocated would bolster confidence in our findings. By the 
same token, we cannot sufficiently adjust variation in project performance for technical contingencies (e.g. 
breakdowns) or resource constraints (delays in equipment delivery or bottlenecks in factory time) that 
negatively influence performance but do not pertain to collaboration or other issues arising from distance.  
We were also unable to satisfactorily control for the managerial experience of employees and managers, 
despite the likely correlation with seniority. With experience, project managers and management teams are 
expected to be better able to anticipate and incorporate slack in both the preset objectives and ongoing 
estimates to improve (perceived) adherence (Huckman, Staats, and Upton, 2009: 95). Moreover, our dataset 
consists solely of active and completed projects, meaning survivor bias is a concern in our sample. While the 
firm employs extensive screening measures to ensure only viable projects enter the NPD process, we cannot 
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fully mitigate the potential positive bias that arises when failures are underweighted in the sample (Cooper 
and Kleinschmidt, 1990). 
These shortcomings provide straightforward avenues for future research to explore. Additionally, to the 
extent that these shortcomings - and the adoption of hybrid strategies in general - prove difficult to 
circumvent due to empirical constraints, scholars are encouraged to employ the logic of interdependent 
distance dimensions to other levels of analysis where data may be more readily available. For instance, 
research on the organizational design of global value chains and strategic decision making vis-à-vis location 
choice and cross-country collaboration between independent units might benefit from conceptualizing 
responsibility and psychological distance at the company unit or subsidiary level. To the extent that the 
aggregate behavior of employees in a business unit or subsidiary are influenced by the absence of formal unit 
responsibility or the prospect of the unit becoming responsible in the short run, it is plausible to expect 
psychological distance to complement the usual geographical considerations in determining the conditions 
under which offshoring, outsourcing, or co-location may be beneficial or riddled with hidden costs. 
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TABLE 4.1 – CORRELATION MATRIX, ALL VARIABLES 
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TABLE 4.2 – REGRESSION MODELS 
 
 
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
                                                                                                                      
DF                                                          1552             1552              558             1552   
R2                                                         0.631            0.633            0.660            0.635   
N                                                           7325             7325             2379             7325   
                                                                                                                      
                                                          (0.25)           (0.25)           (1.55)           (0.25)   
Intercept                                                 -0.925***        -0.932***        -1.617           -0.958***
                                                          (0.03)           (0.03)                            (0.03)   
Phase 7                                                    0.605***         0.604***                          0.590***
                                                          (0.03)           (0.03)              (.)           (0.03)   
Phase 6                                                    0.403***         0.405***         0.000            0.413***
                                                          (0.03)           (0.03)           (0.10)           (0.03)   
Phase 5                                                    0.399***         0.399***        -0.184+           0.396***
                                                          (0.02)           (0.02)              (.)           (0.02)   
Phase 4                                                    0.374***         0.375***         0.000            0.381***
                                                          (0.01)           (0.01)                            (0.01)   
Phase 3                                                    0.119***         0.119***                          0.117***
                                                             (.)              (.)                               (.)   
Phase 2                                                    0.000            0.000                             0.000   
                                                          (0.01)           (0.01)           (0.04)           (0.01)   
Global Breadth                                             0.137***         0.137***         0.639***         0.137***
                                                          (0.01)           (0.01)           (0.03)           (0.01)   
Risk Level                                                -0.008           -0.009           -0.159***        -0.009   
                                                          (0.00)           (0.00)           (0.00)           (0.00)   
Team Size                                                 -0.003***        -0.003***        -0.002           -0.003***
                                                          (0.03)           (0.03)              (.)           (0.03)   
Managerial Responsibilities                               -0.023           -0.096***         0.000           -0.083** 
                                                          (0.00)           (0.00)           (0.03)           (0.00)   
Seniority                                                 -0.004           -0.004           -0.028           -0.004   
                                                          (0.01)           (0.01)           (0.03)           (0.01)   
Age                                                        0.008            0.008            0.027            0.009+  
                                                          (0.00)           (0.00)           (0.00)           (0.00)   
Temporal Load                                              0.000            0.000            0.000            0.000   
                                                          (0.00)           (0.00)           (0.01)           (0.00)   
Structural Load                                           -0.000            0.000           -0.003            0.000   
                                                          (0.00)           (0.00)           (0.00)           (0.00)   
Interpersonal Load                                         0.000            0.000            0.002***         0.000   
                                                          (0.00)           (0.00)           (0.00)           (0.00)   
Deadline Proximity                                        -0.001***        -0.001***        -0.000           -0.001***
                                                          (0.00)           (0.00)           (0.01)           (0.00)   
Project Priority                                          -0.001           -0.001           -0.046***        -0.001   
                                                                                                                      
Deadline Proximity                                                                                                    
                                                                                                             (0.00)   
Geographical Distance, Squared                                                                                0.002** 
                                                                                                             (0.00)   
Psychological Distance, Squared                                                                               0.007** 
                                                                           (0.00)           (0.05)           (0.00)   
Psychological Distance # Geographical Distance                              0.011***         0.152**          0.009** 
                                                          (0.00)           (0.01)           (0.08)           (0.01)   
Geographical Distance                                     -0.015**         -0.012*          -0.158+          -0.030***
                                                          (0.00)           (0.00)           (0.02)           (0.00)   
Psychological Distance                                    -0.007*          -0.007*          -0.034           -0.013** 
                                                                                                                      
                                                            b/se             b/se             b/se             b/se   
                                                      Timeliness       Timeliness          Quality       Timeliness   
                                                             (1)              (2)              (3)              (4)   
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FIGURE 4.1 – PSYCHOLOGICAL DISTANCE # GEOGRAPHICAL DISTANCE 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
CONCLUSION 
With the aim of improving our understanding of the behavioral underpinnings of human capital integration, 
the thesis investigates the interdependent roles of cognitive load and organizational design in determining 
information processing and performance in organizations. The thesis proposes and demonstrates the 
importance of accounting for cognitive load in decisions on employee allocation, and argues for the need to 
apply these insights to the selection and implementation of integration mechanisms intended to support 
collaboration and integration. Failure to do so might induce unexpected deviations in employee behavior and 
collaboration that erode performance and impair the ability of the firm to capitalize on knowledge resources. 
The thesis consists of three research papers that rely on comprehensive longitudinal data from a global 
manufacturing firm to explore related aspects of human capital integration. The first paper (Chapter 2) 
studies how individuals decide on the distribution of available working hours among competing projects and 
requirements. The paper hypothesizes and finds evidence that employees navigate on the basis of particular 
organizational signals when allocating their time and attention. In the absence of cognitive load, employees 
are able to navigate on value signals to reciprocate the collaborative efforts of others and allocate effort to 
those endeavors promising greater contributions to performance, both in terms of engaging with complexity 
and contributing more to well-functioning projects. In the presence of cognitive loads, employees lose their 
sensitivity to value signals and instead begin distributing their time on the basis of uncertainty signals so as 
to avoid complexity and display risk-averse behavior. The cognitive load of the management team is shown 
to enable risk-averse behavior, arguably because more autonomy is delegated. 
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The second paper (Chapter 3) builds on the findings of the first paper by studying how individuals adapt 
their information processing behavior in teams in response to cognitive load and the observed behavior of 
other team members. The paper proposes conditional cooperation as a sociocognitive mechanism governing 
both the mutual adaptation between team members and the process through which differences in cognitive 
load and information processing behavior are aggregated to impact team performance. The paper finds 
evidence of an inverted u-shaped relationship between the ratio of team members with high cognitive load 
and team performance. When team compositions exceed a particular threshold, estimated at around 30 %, 
performance decreases as the ability of teams to effectively share and process requisite information begins to 
decline. We demonstrate how this negative association is exacerbated by task complexity and over time, but 
is mitigated by the development of metaknowledge among team members. 
The third paper (Chapter 4) argues that geographical and psychological distance between interdependent 
employees represents an important set of organizational design parameters that exert isolated as well as joint 
effects on collective information processing. While the physical separation of interdependent employees has 
detrimental performance effects due to declining coordination frequency and impaired mutual understanding, 
the negative effects of psychological separation, e.g. through differences in the degree of accountability, are 
rooted in the tendency for psychologically distant employees to engage in more abstract or creative cognition 
to the detriment of thorough information processing and problem identification. Outside of these negative 
effects, we find evidence that the effects of psychological distance are mitigated by geographical distance, 
which indicates a phenomenon where spatial separation induces psychologically distant employees to more 
selectively assess their creative or divergent contributions so as to not disrupt information processing, but 
rather improve performance through more timely suggestions. 
Collectively, the three papers regard human capital integration as neither fundamentally structural nor 
wholly behavioral. Important contingencies emerge when aspects of organizational design and employee 
allocation impact cognitive load and induce behavioral adaptation at the individual (Chapter 2) and team 
levels (Chapter 3) in such a way as to determine the realized information processing capacity of implemented 
structures. Moreover, organizational design choices that do not directly impact cognitive load may influence 
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information processing behavior in related ways (Chapter 4), thus producing team heterogeneity and the 
foundation for further adaptation within the group. The primary finding of the thesis, therefore, is the 
dynamic relationship between organizational design choices, cognitive responses, and behavioral adaptation 
at individual and group levels that fundamentally determine information processing capacity. With these 
interactions in mind, it is possible to provide more detailed or even novel answers on well-known operational 
questions concerning, for instance, the low rate of knowledge sharing in teams despite being co-located. 
 
THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
The findings of this dissertation have important theoretical implications and provide a number of relevant 
avenues for future research. These fall into three related categories. First, the thesis provides an expansion of 
traditional information processing theory to better account for behavioral elements and their interaction with 
common integration mechanisms and key organizational design choices. Second, the thesis provides insights 
and recommendations to better align decisions on organizational design, employee allocation, and the 
location of firm activities with the common objectives of improving information processing capacity and the 
integration of human capital. Third, the thesis highlights and explores relevant overlaps between the field of 
management, economics, and psychology to both pose new questions and provide new answers. 
First, the thesis addresses the sufficiency of the decisional logic underlying traditional information 
processing theory in terms of the choice of appropriate integration mechanisms (Tushman and Nadler, 1978; 
Van de Ven et al., 1976). This logic differentiates mechanisms on their expected information processing 
capacity and assumes this capacity to increase with the level of human agency embedded in the structure. 
The fundamental argument of the thesis is that while this logic serves as an excellent foundation, it is 
susceptible to behavioral variation at the individual and team levels as employees adapt to the structural 
conditions and the cognitive strain imposed by them. This perspective is not outlandish (Puranam et al., 
2012; Radner 1993, 2000; Turner and Makhija, 2012) and indeed several scholars have called for the 
exploration of more micro-level data on integration (Griffin and Hauser, 1996; Malhotra and Sharma, 2002; 
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Oliva and Watson, 2011) in order to elucidate and better understand the microfoundational and behavioral 
elements that influence the realized information processing capacity of implemented mechanisms (Turner 
and Makhija, 2012) and, hence, the practical applicability of the theory (Van de Ven et al., 2013).  
The dominant explanation for the limited success in prior studies to validate the traditional information 
processing perspective is the difficulty of capturing intervening variables that govern the relationship 
between structural choices and outcomes (Abell et al., 2008; Puranam et al., 2015; Siggelkow and Rivkin, 
2009). This thesis contributes specifically to this point by defining and measuring several intervening 
elements that constitute first steps towards a better understanding of how information processing capacity is 
both bounded and enabled along behavioral dimensions. In particular, the thesis defines and measures the 
role of cognitive load (Shah and Oppenheimer, 2008) as an intervening variable in two respects. First, 
cognitive load functions as the key individual condition that is impacted by organizational design choices so 
as to determine how the individual perceives various environmental signals and, hence, how the individual 
chooses to allocate effort between competing activities. Second, cognitive load is proposed and tested as a 
fundamental source of team heterogeneity that influences processes of within-team adaptation and, in turn, 
indirectly influences how individual variation is aggregated to impact the efficacy of the team as a whole.  
Moreover, aside from merely identifying and investigating cognitive load as an individual-level 
determinant of behavior, the thesis moves on to define two separate phenomena that either amplify or 
mitigate the effect of individual differences on information processing effectiveness and collective outcomes. 
First, the thesis explores conditional cooperation as the central mechanism underlying the aggregation of 
individual variation to team and firm levels. Second, the role of psychological distance is explored as an 
alternative mechanism, rooted in organizational design, which may filter or exacerbate the individual 
tendency to either reduce effort and rely on abstract and heuristic cognition or maintain effort and engage 
more fully in elaborate, analytical processes.  
Taken together, the thesis identifies two intervening variables and two complementary mechanisms that 
interact to explain the relationship between higher-order structural choices and observed outcomes at the 
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individual and team levels (Siggelkow and Rivkin, 2009). In doing so, the paper adds to a growing line of 
research on the discriminating effects of organizational design choices and hierarchical forms on cognition 
and behavior (Foss and Weber, 2016; Turner and Makhija, 2012; Weber and Mayer, 2014). Highlighting the 
potential for different organizational design choices to both exacerbate and mitigate interpretative conflict, 
cognitive adaptation, and similar issues promises new avenues for management to improve the functioning 
and predictability of their organization. Future research would need to further explore the interaction 
between the identified variables and mechanisms in other contexts, as well as to define and explore new 
intervening elements that help nuance the impact and efficacy of organizational design. 
As a second main contribution, the thesis has sought to strengthen the psychological design of the firm 
and its embedded decision processes by demonstrating how the identified relationships between individual 
cognitive load, information processing behavior, and collective outcomes are clearly amenable to managerial 
influence and intervention. Specifically, the key variables on cognitive load and psychological distance lend 
themselves to longitudinal measurement within a firm by the use of often pre-existing data on the allocation 
of individuals between tasks, projects, and locations. By tying individual behavior and cognition to elements 
of organizational design that are amenable to managerial control, the thesis and the findings of the individual 
chapters provide distinct avenues for the profitable execution of strategy (Powell et al., 2011). Profitability 
here, arises not from the definition of new and superior strategic endeavors, so much as it stems from the 
application of simple insights on how individuals are likely to respond to seemingly mundane changes in 
task composition, workload, allocation and separation, and how these reactions may be mapped in terms of 
their probable influence on decision quality, knowledge sharing, and information processing. By becoming 
better able to identify systematic errors in decision-making, hidden patterns of behavioral adaptation, and 
repeated deviations from predicted rationality, it may be possible for managers to generate more value from 
extant initiatives and structures without change and, hence, provide a better foundation for learning 
economics within existing structures. In general, this ambition to identify predictable relationships between 
human capital, organizational design, and performance is reflective of the larger objective to learn how and 
when our insights on individual behavior from psychology and related disciplines in fact become valid and 
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valuable in turbulent, time-dependent, and multi-agent organizations (see Bingham and Eisenhardt, 2011; 
Vuori and Vuori, 2014). In attempting to do so, the thesis aligns with recent calls in the microfoundations 
literature for studies into the processes through which characteristics of heterogeneous employees interact 
and are aggregated within and across firm structures (Felin et al., 2012; Gavetti et al., 2007). 
Third, the thesis demonstrates the substantial benefits that accrue from pursuing multidisciplinary 
research (Agarwal and Hoetker, 2007). By drawing specifically on research into conditional cooperation (de 
Oliveira et al., 2015; Van den Berg et al., 2015; Hartig et al., 2015), cognitive load (Cason et al., 2012; 
Schulz et al., 2014; Rand, 2016), and psychological distance (Giacomantonio et al., 2010; Sagristano et al., 
2002) from the economics and psychology literatures, we are able to adopt novel perspectives on relevant 
constructs (e.g. cognitive load and psychological distance) and explanatory mechanisms (e.g. conditional 
cooperation) that help us pose new questions and interpret our findings from a more varied range of 
perspectives (Barney and Zajac, 1994; Mahoney, 2005). Others have contributed immensely to our 
understanding of management in this manner, e.g. Simon (1955), Cyert and March (1963), or even 
Kahneman and Tversky (Tversky and Kahneman, 1986), which corresponds to the claim by Simon (1997: 
70) that “the most important data that could lead us to an understanding of economic processes and to 
empirically sound theories of them resides inside human minds…[so] we must seek to discover what went on 
in the heads of those who made the relevant decisions”. In a limited way, this thesis contributes to this 
tradition specifically by tying together research on conditional cooperation, cognitive load, and 
organizational design to demonstrate key linkages that help explain important organizational phenomena, 
e.g. why some firms excel at sharing knowledge and extracting value from human capital, while others 
struggle to do so in spite of excellent employees and resources. Additionally, however, we consider it a 
contribution that this form of multidisciplinary research acts as a proving ground for mono-disciplinary 
theories to establish, for instance, whether observations on human behavior are consistent and reliable 
outside laboratory settings, or in situations with actual stakes as opposed to hypothetical scenarios (Cheung, 
2014; Fischbacher et al., 2001). In this sense, multidisciplinary research provides its own rationale above and 
beyond the integration of pre-existing insights.  In posing this argument, we concur with Weber and Mayer 
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(2014: 361) that “multidisciplinary research allows different questions to be explored than those typically 
examined within one of the base disciplines alone” (see also Agarwal and Hoetker, 2007).  
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Powell (2017) speaks of a Chess syndrome in our application, as scholars and practitioners, of organizational 
theories and strategy. He emphasizes the ubiquitous dangers of assuming that planned implementations of 
structure and strategy necessarily realize their intended impact. In this thesis, we have drawn on a 
multidisciplinary set of theories to inform and expand traditional information processing theory in a bid to 
strengthen the psychological design of our organizations and their ability to generate value from their human 
capital. By delving into the black box of individual cognition and adaptation within integration research, we 
demonstrate how the information processing implications of different integration mechanisms and attendant 
management practices (e.g. the allocation of employees) are fundamentally determined along certain 
behavioral dimensions. By shedding light on some of these, we hope to temper the view that integration is 
necessarily beneficial, as well as to provide a better foundation for managers to both assess the potential 
value of integration and specifically intervene to increase this value potential. As such, we claim to have laid 
the groundwork for a model of integration that incorporates a cognitive perspective and sketches the contours 
of a behavioral theory of integration (Gavetti and Warglien, 2015; Kretschmer and Puranam, 2008; Postrel, 
2002; Turkulainen and Ketokivi, 2013). 
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